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Chapter 1
FAMINE AND ITS CAUSES
INTRODUCTION
Famines are one of the great scourges of mankind. They kill 
large numbers of people, especially women and children; impoverish 
whole populations; encourage the spread of disease and 
malnutrition, dislocate families, villages, and even entire 
societies, and create or spread political instability. Famines and 
the conflicts that often create and spread^ them leave wounds in a 
society that may take generations to heal.
There are two types of famines: those that are a result of a 
lack of food and those that are a result of a lack of purchasing 
power among the poor.1 Of the two, the latter is the most 
prevalent.
To combat famines, there are two general approaches: provision 
of food and provision of economic support. The relative 
effectiveness of each is determined by when the assistance is 
applied. In most cases, food relief alone has only a limited 
impact and is often counterproductive.
From the general approaches, two broad strategies to fight 
famine have developed. The first, which revolves around food aid, 
can be called "conventional relief." The second, which focuses on 
addressing the root causes of famine and which is designed to 
prevent, contain, and control famines with a range of economic and 
market interventions, many be called "counter-famine" assistance. 
If counter-famine measures are taken early, many famines can be 
prevented or quickly controlled.
DEFINING FAMINE
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Famine may be defined as a set of conditions that occur when 
large numbers of people in a region can't obtain sufficient food to 
eat, and widespread, acute malnutrition results. (Acute 
malnutrition occurs when a person eats so little food that his or 
her body's store of nutrients is depleted.) If the condition 
continues, the person could die.
The primary consequence of famine is a significant increase in 
the number of deaths (mortality) associated with inadequate food 
consumption. Note that consumption levels, not food availability, 
define a state of famine. Other consequences are a significant rise 
in rates of disease (morbidity) and massive dislocation of 
populations.
Famine is an area-wide phenomenon characterized by the 
inability of local markets to supply food at costs that a 
substantial number of the population can afford. Most people —  
including some who work in famine relief —  believe famines occur 
when there isn't enough food in an area to feed people. That is 
rarely true, even in conflict zones. Instead, famines occur when 
the poor don't have enough money to buy food when it's scarce and 
prices rise. Some amounts of food can usually be found even in 
countries that are in the midst of civil wars and those that have 
perpetual food deficits. In those countries, for example, people 
who live in urban areas can usually afford to buy higher-priced, 
imported foods. There are only a few societies that cannot 
redistribute available food stocks to meet temporary needs —  if 
they want to. That means that famines are an economic and political 
problem more than a commodity deficit. The best historical example 
of this is the Irish Potato Famine of 1851: at the height of the 
famine when poor Irishmen were starving, Ireland was exporting 
wheat and other grains to England at above-normal levels.
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN FAMINE AND CHRONIC NUTRITIONAL DEFICIENCIES
Many countries experience perpetual food shortages and 
distribution problems. These result in chronic and often 
widespread hunger among significant numbers of the population. 
There is a difference between famine and chronic malnutrition. 
Chronic hunger occurs when a large percentage of the populace 
routinely lack the financial resources to acquire sufficient food 
from available stocks or the types of food they can obtain is 
nutritionally deficient, i.e., they have a poor diet. Chronic 
hunger can be found in rich countries like the U.S. as well as fefae 
poor nations such as India. Individually, chronic hunger leads to 
stunted growth and physical deficiencies; collectively it leads to 
higher infant and child mortality but at rates far less than in 
famines.
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While chronic hunger is a major concern, the approaches used 
to eradicate it are different than those used to fight famine. 
They require long-term institutional and developmental approaches.
CONTEMPORARY FAMINES
As recent as the 1970s, most famines were a result of a 
combination of economic and environmental factors. However, after 
the great Sahelian (Africa), Ethiopian and Bangladesh famines of 
that decade, the international community initiated a number of 
measures that were designed to increase food security at the 
international level; in other words to make it easier to send food 
from the more productive counties to the Third World and to 
increase food supplies in the most famine-prone countries. 
Significant strides were also made in developing systems to help 
warn of impending food shortages: satellites were able to detect 
drought conditions and economic indicators were identified that 
gave reasonably accurate signals that food shortages were becoming 
critical.
As a result of these advances, famines should not be a 
significant threat; yet they are. The reason: war and civil 
conflict. In every famine that has occurred in the 1980s and 90s, 
the country was at war, either with itself or with its neighbors. 
The Ethiopian famine of 1984-86 started in the war-torn provinces 
of Eritrea and Tigray; the Sudanese famine of the same period 
occurred as the civil war in the south assumed tragic proportions, 
and the Somali famine of 1992 was due almost entirely to factional 
fighting that disrupted the flow of food to the people in all parts 
of the country.
A look at any famine today will find a country in conflict. 
In most cases the famine will be in or adjacent to the war zone but 
famine conditions may also develop in areas far from the actual 
fighting. In 1990, severe food shortages developed in western 
Sudan largely because the government was spending all its efforts 
on fighting the war in the south and was diverting food and 
transport to that area. When a drought occurred in the west, there 
was insufficient food to reallocate to the region and the cost of 
hiring trucks to move what little was taken in made the market 
price prohibitive for the poor. Furthermore, the government was 
unwilling to admit that there was a problem; they feared that in an 
unstable political environment admitting that food problems existed 
would be seen as a failure of their administration or might further 
erode popular support for the war in the South.
Without conflict, there would be few famines today. Since war 
is the major cause of famines, it might seem that there is little 
reason to study their origins and roots. However, it is not that 
simple as famines often spread from conflict zones to other areas. 
And as in the example of Sudan cited above, food crises can break
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out spontaneously in areas quite far from the fighting. In those 
areas other factors may cause the famine to develop and behave in 
a manner similar to classic, non-conflict induced famines. For 
that reason, it is important to develop an understanding of the 
classic famine —  its characteristics, how it develops and spreads 
and, most important, how it can be fought. When that has been 
mastered, famines in conflict, which are infinitely more complex 
and difficult to fight, can be tackled.
CAUSES OF FAMINE
Famines are the result of an unusual event or set of events 
striking a community in which large numbers of people are already 
undernourished. They include:
War, civil conflict, or social upheaval.
The failure of a harvest due to climatical or other 
environmental conditions such as drought, flood, wind, or 
insect infestation.
The disruption or collapse of the food distribution network 
and/or the marketing system affecting a significant percentage 
of the population. Political, environmental, or economic 
crises could cause these events.
Lack or disruption of an emergency food support system that 
ensures that the rural poor have access to food during food 
shortages. This could include food banks, price supports, and 
transportation subsidies.
Famines may be triggered, or their onset accelerated, by 
natural phenomena such as drought, floods, or insect infestations 
(usually locusts), or by war or civil conflict. The two most 
common triggers are conflict and drought.
War and Civil Conflict
Wars triggered most of the great famines of the late Twentieth 
Century. Recent examples include the Nigerian civil war 
(1968-1970), the Bangladesh civil war (1971); the armed 
insurrection in the northern Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea and 
Tigray (1984-1985), and widespread civil war in many parts of 
Mozambique after 1984. War not only contributes to the creation of 
famine, but it also disrupts famine relief operations.
Conflict can trigger famine in a number of ways. It can:
Disrupt the agricultural cycle.
Drive farmers from the land.
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Disrupt marketing processes.
Destroy stores of harvested foods.
Create food shortages that drive the prices above levels 
that low-income families can pay.
Not every war creates famine conditions. There are many cases 
where both government and rebel forces have ensured that food 
supplies were available throughout a conflict. Throughout the long 
troubles in Lebanon, for example, no major food shortage has 
occurred. In El Salvador, and during the Nicaraguan civil war in 
the late 1970s, insurgent forces took steps to ensure that food was 
provided to people in the rebel-held areas. As a general rule, 
however, the chances of the rebel forces being able to create an 
alternative distribution sources for the population under their 
control decreases as the area of conflict gets larger and the 
potential supply line gets longer.
Throughout history famine has been used as an instrument of 
war. In recent years there have been disturbing instances where 
governments have tried to use the denial of food as a deliberate 
weapon to try to control populations in rebel areas. However, a 
famine created or prolonged for military purposes is an ultimately 
ineffective weapon. That is because it is indiscriminate and only 
attacks the people who are least likely to be combatants —  
children, pregnant and nursing women, and the elderly. They are the 
ones who die first and in the largest numbers.
The proponents of total war argue that famines undermine the 
morale of the fighters, increasing desertion and weakening their 
will to struggle. There is no evidence to support this contention. 
In fact, waging war against civil populations usually solidifies 
support for the resident combatants. The Nigerians used starvation 
as a weapon against Biafra but the country held out despite almost 
a million and a half deaths —  mainly to women and children. The 
rebel army never ran out of food and resisted until the last small 
enclave in the country was defeated.2 The point is this: 
combatants are always given priority for food. Those with guns 
never starve.
Drought
A drought is any unusual, prolonged dry period. While droughts 
are usually associated with semi-arid or desert climates, they can 
occur in areas that usually have adequate rainfall. Technically, a 
drought is a condition of climatic dryness that is severe enough to
2 Mayer, Jean. Preface to Famine: Its Effects and Management. 
John R.K. Robson, Editor. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 
N.Y. 1981.
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reduce the soil moisture content and water supplies below the 
minimums necessary for sustaining plant, animal, and human life. 
They are usually accompanied by dry, hot winds, and may be 
terminated by violent storms.
The effects of drought can be divided according to the 
primary, or immediate, effects and the secondary, or resulting, 
effects.
Lack of water produces the primary effects of a drought. As a 
dry period progresses, existing water supplies are overtaxed and 
eventually dry up. Crops, livestock, and other animals are lost. 
Finally, there is no water for washing, bathing, or drinking.
The secondary effects of drought follow. As water supplies 
dwindle and crops and fodder are depleted, families leave their 
homes to look for better grazing lands for their herds. Some of the 
families may migrate to the cities, seeking jobs or alternative 
sources of income. If dwindling food supplies are not replaced, 
famine can occur, accelerating migration. The migration may 
contribute to the spread of the disaster, especially if grazing 
animals are moved with the people.
If the drought is long term, it may result in permanent 
changes in settlement patterns and in social and living patterns. 
For example, before the 1968 drought in Mauritania, 65 percent of 
the people were nomads. By 1976, that figure had dropped to 3 6 
percent. The town of Nouakchott grew from 12,3 00 in 1964 to 
approximately 135,000 ten years later.
Complex Famines
Complex famines are those triggered by multiple factors —  
usually war and drought. Such situations complicate relief 
operations. Complex famines usually occur only in Africa. Recent 
examples include Northern Ethiopia (1977-1978) and (1984-1985), 
Mozambique (1984-1988), and Somalia (1991-92).
FAMINE VULNERABILITY
Societies that are vulnerable to famine have several 
characteristics: the people are usually subsistence farmers or
pastoralists (dependent on livestock), they are poor and 
underemployed, the number of landless people is high, and the debt 
(of both individuals and the country as a whole) is great.
Figure 1-1 (Map of drought prone areas)
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Famine usually occurs in rural areas and only rarely spreads 
into urban zones. This means that the people who produce food are 
the ones most likely to starve. Why are poor farmers and herdsmen 
so vulnerable? Farmers face continual risks from the time they 
plant their seeds until they harvest their crops and sell them. 
Figure 1-2 shows those factors. If any of problems occur, the 
harvest could be marginal or even a total failure.
Subsistence agriculture has the following characteristics:
1. Farmers' plots are small and often fragmented.
2. Tools and implements are primitive.
3. Production is geared to feeding families, not to selling 
crops.
4. Few alternative or seasonal employment opportunities exist.
5. The people have little surplus grain or cash reserves.
Subsistence farmers rarely grow only one crop —  even though 
the land might produce more that way. Instead, each family attempts 
to grow almost all it needs for the entire year. Often they fail 
to achieve their objective, their produce lasting them for only six 
to nine months. For the vast majority of the peasants, output is 
so low that the possibility of establishing grain reserves is 
simply out of the question. At the village and regional level too, 
subsistence farming communities rarely have reserves of food 
available. Whole regions are perpetually vulnerable to famine if 
there is no means for releasing food into those areas when famine 
conditions begin to occur.
Figure 1-2
Subsistence agriculture often produces the kind of food that 
makes it difficult for the human body to survive famines. Many 
food-scarce societies depend on manioc, maize, and other 
carbohydrate-rich, protein-poor foods. These foods provide 
necessary calories, but they inhibit the body's ability to draw 
proteins from other parts of the body that the brain needs to 
perform adequately and for the body to survive. In other words, 
societies that depend on those foods are nutritionally vulnerable 
from the outset.
Subsistence farmers normally have two ways of ensuring that 
they will have enough food (i.e., food security) —  growing grain
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and growing livestock. When a harvest fails., they .start trading 
their livestock fgx grain. Normally one sheep or goat can be sold 
for the money to buy two sacks of grain. y?hen grain prices 
increase, mpre /animals have to be sold to obtain the same amount of 
grain; As more and more animals are sold4, the market -becomes 
saturated and the value of livestock declines. When the number of 
animals per sack doubles, it usually triggers "panic sales’ of 
livestock, decreasing the price of livestock even more.
When people can no longer afford a whole sack of grain, they 
buy in smaller guantities. To sustain their income on the lower 
volume of sales, merchants increase prices.
Eventually, the livestock market may collapse and grain prices 
throughout the affected region may increase so that the ratio of 
■small animals to one sack of grain may be 10-1. When that happens, 
the purchasing power of subsistence farmers is ravaged since few 
are likely to have had more than a couple dozen goats or sheep to 
begin with (some of those may have been lost to drought or 
conflict).
Pastoralists are also vulnerable to famine. Few nomads for 
example, raise animals to eat —  they are a trading commodity and 
are exchanged for grain and other foods. When the livestock market 
collapses, they have-bp- other resource^for food.
Environmental Factors
Freguent crop failures in Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sahel in 
recent years have been attributed, in part, to progressive 
deterioration of the land. Deforestation, poor agricultural 
practices, and over-grazing have produced rapid desertification and 
extensive soil erosion.
As vegetation is stripped from the land, the surface dries out 
and reflects more of the sun's heat. This can alter the thermal 
dynamics of the atmosphere and suppress rainfall. More land then 
dries out. Removing grasses by overgrazing or slash and burn 
agricultural practices also erodes the land, and cutting trees 
increases the rate of wind and water erosion especially in hilly 
areas.
POVERTY AND FAMINE VULNERABILITY
The poor suffer most in a famine; they are vulnerable because 
they are poor.3 Recognizing poverty as the root of vulnerability
3 Cuny, Frederick C. Disasters and Development, Oxford 
University Press, 1983.
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to famine is the first step in creating a more rational and 
developmental approach to famine assistance.
Those aspects of poverty that contribute to famine 
vulnerability include inequitable land tenure patterns, inequitable 
farming practices (especially sharecropping), tribal or racial 
discrimination that prevents adequate resources from reaching large 
groups of subsistence farmers, exploitative merchants and land 
owners who keep the poor under control by keeping them in debt, and 
production practices (such as cheap labor and lower costs for big 
suppliers) that keep the poor in marginal circumstances.
There is also a relationship between poverty, family size and 
famine vulnerability. Generally, poorly paid workers tend to have 
large families since more family workers are needed for the family 
to survive. However, children rarely earn enough to pay for their 
cost of living so the earnings of the adults must support more 
people, leading to a smaller per capita income. When that income 
is tied to subsistence agriculture, shortfalls affect more people.
The Most Affected Groups
1 a#**Among the ■ rura-1 poor) the peopJre most at risk -in a famino are 
children between 9 months and 5 years; women, pregnant and 
lactating mothers; and the elderly. Deaths and illness affect these 
groups first, so their health and nutritional status is considered 
a reliable indicator and an "early warning" of problems affecting 
the overall population. These groups are the most vulnerable 
because:
1. Their nutrition needs are higher.
2. They are less able to provide for themselves: young
children depend on their mothers for survival, and women 
with dependent children often have a difficult time 
leaving home to work.
3. Parents often must make cruel decisions concerning who 
will get enough food to live and who will die. In these 
cases, working-age males are usually the most likely to 
receive food. Children who have reached five years —  
when their chances of survival are statistically greater 
and they can begin to earn income or share in routine 
family chores —  tend to receive preference over younger 
children.4 Often some family members must be sacrificed 
if others are to live. The first to be abandoned may be
4 Mayer, Jean. Preface to Famine: Its Effects and Management. 
John R.K. Robson, Editor. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 
N.Y. 1981.
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the elderly or the infirm, then gradually and 
subconsciously, infant children are "factored out" of the 
family's food distribution.
Among children, the most vulnerable are those who have been 
recently weaned because another child has been born who must be 
nursed. In many parts of the developing world, especially Africa, 
children at this age receive little protein-rich food, even when it 
is available.
Visitors to famine areas often don't see many people in the 
risk groups; they usually are secluded, especially if they are weak 
or ill.
POLITICAL ASPECTS OP VULNERABILITY
Amartya Sen, a renowned famine researcher, noted, "There is no 
such thing as an apolitical food problem."5 The distribution of 
food within a country is a political issue. Governments in most 
countries give priority to the urban areas since that is where the 
most influential and powerful families and enterprises are located. 
Subsistence farmers (and rural areas in general) are often 
neglected by the government. The more remote and underdeveloped the 
area, the less likely the government will be effectively meeting 
its needs. If the people in the area have any political differences 
with the government, neglect may be intentional.
Many agrarian policies, especially the pricing of agricultural 
commodities, discriminate against rural areas. Governments often 
keep prices for basic grains at such artificially low levels that 
subsistence producers cannot accumulate enough capital to make 
investments to improve their production. Thus, they are effectively 
prevented from getting out of their precarious situation.
Comprehensive agricultural policies and commodity pricing 
standards that permit subsistence farmers to accumulate capital 
must be developed if an effective strategy to counter famine is to 
be created.
Famine is often the result of drastic political or economic 
changes brought on by governments adopting new economic systems. 
The most extreme example is the Khmer Rouge regime of Kampuchea 
(Cambodia), where millions of people may have died because the 
government has attempted to harshly enforce its vision of a new 
society. However, less dramatic political or economic changes can 
also lead to famine conditions. These changes can include:
New land use policies.
5 Sen, Amartya. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement 
and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
Villagization. (The formation of new villages to provide 
infrastructure and services. It is often the forerunner 
of forced collectivization of agricultural land.)
Forced relocation/resettlement.
Changes in agricultural commodity price structures. 
Collectivization.
Changes in cropping patterns.
Changes in the cost of such agricultural items as seeds 
and tools.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Markets can create or contribute to the conditions for famine. 
A situation called "demand failure" develops when the poor don't 
have enough money to buy the food that is available; in other 
words, there is no demand. Merchants then move food stocks to areas 
where people do have money. A second problem occurs when the market 
cannot provide enough food even though the people have money to buy 
it. This is known as a "supply failure."
The extent to which regional food shortages are translated 
Q  into regional food price rises depends on the degree to which
markets are integrated.6 In an integrated market, supply and demand 
can be coordinated. When the two aren't coordinated, the market is 
called fragmented. Fragmented markets can occur, for example, when 
food can't be moved because guerrillas control the countryside and 
restricts the government to urban areas. Dramatic rises in local 
food prices (which reflect market fragmentation), are symptomatic 
of food shortages.
If markets are integrated and function reasonably well 
according to supply and demand, regional food shortages rarely lead 
to famine since shortfalls of supplies can be replaced from other 
markets with little effect on prices or consumption in the affected 
region.
As Frances Stewart points out, famines can also be caused by 
lags in price adjustment. For example, if prices rise dramatically 
and agricultural wages do not follow immediately, low income people
6 Devereux, Stephen, and Roger Hay. Origins of Famine: A 
Review of the Literature, Volumes I and II. Paper prepared for 
Food Studies Group, Queen Elizabeth House. University of Oxford 
1986.
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starve. These critical time-lags would not cause starvation if 
people could use savings to live on in the meantime, or borrow. But 
because they are poor they have no savings and little access to 
loans. This is another illustration of how poverty and famine 
vulnerability are related.7
Rising inflation and/or rising unemployment leave the poor 
with little or no money to buy goods and may lead to the collapse 
of the market system. In these cases, the government must act 
quickly to ensure that food can be distributed from relief sources 
on an equitable basis. Otherwise, imagined scarcity, hoarding, and 
price manipulation may fuel the onset of famine conditions.
TRANSPORTATION
Inadequate transportation systems or disruption of transport 
often influence price increases during food crises. Rural areas 
need cheap and constant access to transport (especially lorries) to 
ship food out when prices are favorable and to import food at 
reasonable prices when shortages exist. (In the Tigray area of 
Ethiopia, for example, transportation costs accounted for 
two-thirds of the price of food during shortages in 1990.) The 
disruption of transportation systems is more significant during 
conflicts than in normal times.
A GENERAL FAMINE MODEL
In 1985, Peter Cutler of the Relief and Development Institute 
produced a /^model^ (Figure 1-4) that approximates the sequence of 
events leading to a major famine. The major problem with this model 
is that it does not account for war —  though many of the 
disruptions that are shown could occur as a result of conflict. 
Another problem is that it gives little indication of the timing of 
these events. For example, in Asia, which has a high percentage and 
density of landless peasants, the sequence could occur in several 
months. In an African country, where people tend to have larger 
herds of livestock that they can sell and where there is more of a 
tradition of migrating in search of alternative work when food 
shortages or conflicts occur, it may take several years of poor 
harvests or war before famine conditions are established.
This model is a general one and cannot be applied to every 
country. However, detailed studies in famine-prone countries, 
especially from the point of view of the small farmer, can lead to
7 Stewart,Frances. "Poverty and Famines: Book Review."
Disasters 6(2). 1982.
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the development of models for specific areas that could help 
forecast famines and pinpoint counter-famine interventions.
Figure 1-4
Famine "Phases"
Cutler's model can be divided into three phases based on the 
types of coping strategies people use. During the first phase, 
families remain at home and convert their assets, such as livestock, 
to buy grain; during the second period, they sell critical assets 
such as tools and draught animals and may send some family members 
out of the community to seek work. In the third phase, whole 
families migrate in search of work or food.
For emergency relief managers, these phases provide a key for 
planning counter-famine and relief strategies. As long as families 
remain intact, the famine is in the developing stages and relief 
agencies should focus their efforts on providing opportunities for 
families to earn cash to increase their economic security. The 
second phase marks the borderline between hunger and disaster —  
economic interventions should continue, but some forms of food aid 
will be required. The third phase is a full-scale emergency; 
lifesaving interventions focusing on food and nutrition, public 
health, and disease control predominate. While economic assistance 
is still possible, and indeed vital, agencies will be so involved in 
emergency food aid that few will have the time, resources, or 
inclination to tackle the wider problems.
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Causes and Effects of Drought
Human activities also contribute to the development of droughts. 
Overgrazing, poor cropping methods, and improper soil conservation 
techniques often help create droughts. (See Figure 1-3) Drought feeds 
upon itself: vegetation is stripped from the land, and the surface 
dries out and reflects more of the sun's heat. This would alter the 
thermal dynamics of the atmosphere and suppress rainfall, which in 
turn would dry out more land.
The effects of drought can be divided according to the primary, or 
immediate, effects and the secondary, or resulting, effects.
Lack of water produces the primary effects of a drought. As a dry 
period progresses, existing water supplies are overtaxed and 
eventually dry up. Crops, livestock, and other animals are lost. 
Finally, there is no water for washing, bathing, or drinking.
The secondary effects of drought follow. As water supplies dwindle 
and crops and fodder are depleted, families leave their homes to look 
for better grazing lands for their herds. Some of the families may 
migrate to the cities, seeking jobs or alternative sources of income. 
If dwindling food supplies are not replaced, famine can occur, 
accelerating migration. The migration may contribute to the spread of 
the disaster, especially if grazing animals are moved with the people.
If the drought is long term, it may result in permanent changes in 
settlement patterns and in social and living patterns. For example, 
before the 1968 drought in Mauritania, 65 percent of the people were 
nomads. By 1976, that figure had dropped to 36 percent. The town of 
Nouakchott grew from 12,300 in 1964 to approximately 135,000 ten years 
later.
Box
Cuny, D & D 
Figure 1-3
Other secondary effects of drought include major ecological 
changes: increased desertification, scrub growth, likelihood of flash 
flooding, and erosion of soils by wind. Of these, desertification is 
the most serious problem. Technically, desertification occurs when 
soil reaches a certain level of dryness and the land takes on 
characteristics of a desert. In its most dramatic form, sand dunes 
encroach and most of the vegetation dies or is replaced by scrub 
brushes and other desert plants. The land becomes useless without 
large-scale and expensive reclamation measures.
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PEOPLE'S DEFINITIONS OF FAMINE
Box
Most definitions of famine come from social scientists or relief 
workers. They are often different from the definitions of those 
affected by famine. Two examples:
From Sudan: The people of Darfur often divide famines into 
famines (maja'a) and famines that kill (maja'al katale). Ordinary 
famines might be better translated as "periods of want or dearth" when 
people are forced to do unpleasant thing to survive and "famines that 
kill" are equated with starvation, (de Waal).
From Bangladesh: The culture defines three types of famine: 
scarcity is akal (when times are bad), durvickha (when alms are 
scarce) and nationwide famine is mananthor (when the epoch changes). 
(Curry)
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Chapter 2
CONSEQUENCES OF FAMINE
The consequences of famine go far beyond acute malnutrition: 
large numbers of people die.
Famines increase the risk of disease. As the human body 
deteriorates, it becomes more susceptible to disease and vitamin 
deficiencies. Measles, cholera, diarrhea, tuberculosis, and 
xeropthalmia (Vitamin A deficiency) are of special concern.
In addition, famines create economic hardship for the rural 
poor. They can lose cash, livestock, and the assets needed for 
future production such as seeds, draught animals, and breeding 
livestock. As conditions persist, an economic regression may occur 
for the entire community or region.
At some point, people may have to leave their land to search 
for food. This can lead to mass migrations within a country, and in 
conflicts, can lead to migration from one country to another. For 
example, in 1984-1985, Ethiopia witnessed both phenomena. Large 
numbers of people migrated to relief centers within the country, 
while several hundred thousand people from the provinces of Tigray 
and Eritrea crossed the border into Sudan seeking food.
These effects, if left unchecked, can set the stage for the 
next famine. In other words, if corrective measures are not taken, 
vulnerability to famine will probably increase.
Affect on the Human Body
During the history of mankind, food shortages have been 
frequent, and the human body has developed the capacity for 
resisting food shortages.
Under normal conditions, the human body requires an estimated 
400 to 600 calories (usually described as kcals) of energy daily. 
As food deprivation occurs, the body tries to maintain an adequate 
supply of energy in the brain and central nervous system by taking 
protein from tissues and fat reserves in the body.
Death from starvation occurs when about one-third of the body 
weight has been lost. Weight loss of a lesser degree can result in 
disturbances of the body's water balance leading to famine oedema 
and diarrhea caused by atrophy and ulceration of the intestines.1
1 Den Hartog, Adel P. "Adjustment of Food Behavior during 
Famine" In Famine: Its Causes, Effects and Management. John R.K. 
Robson, Editor. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, N.Y., 1981.
1
Carbohydrate-rich, protein-poor food, which is the mainstay of
nutritional situation of famine victims and is an important 
consideration when providing food relief. This is because those 
foods can complicate recovery and may lead to side effects in 
patients who are severely malnourished. This, combined with the 
inadequacy of protein in the food, may lead to severe physiological 
imbalance and to the protein deficiency malnutrition. Young 
children, whose normal protein demands are high, are susceptible to 
this pattern.2 *
tein deficiency in infancy may lead to irreversible br
In older children arid adults, the effects of prot 
deficiency may be reversible to some e x t e n t ^  --- ___________------
Starvation effects several basic mechanisms of disease 
resistance. It reduces the body's capacity to produce antibodies 
and reduces its ability to heal wounds.
Disease often accompanies famine. Infectious diseases are 
more likely to be transmitted during famines because of unusual 
population movements and the increased seceptibility of people to 
disease. Diseases are more severe when they attack malnourished 
people. In addition, unclean water and food and poor sanitation can 
compound the situation. As people move about in search of food, 
sanitary conditions in the camps and temporary settlements 
detriorate quickly.
In general, the diseases that become epidemic during famines 
are already present in the population. The most serious infectious 
disease is measles.
Famine and Endemic Disease
Famine affects the susceptibility of individuals to a 
particular disease by changing the epidemiologic characteristics of 
a community. The more social disruption occurs, the more disease 
there is. Epidemic disease develops when both individual and 
community resistance to infectious disease are lost. As people who 
are wandering in search of food are crowded into camps where 
sanitation is poor, each person is exposed to increasingly large 
doses of infectious agents. Some infectious diseases that are 
endemic (i.e., commonly found) in an area may not cause significant
2 Cox, G. "The Ecology of Famine: An Overview." In Famine:
Its Causes, Effects and Management. John R.K. Robson, Editor. 
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. N.Y., 1981.
the diet in many subsistance societies, can complicate the
Disease
2
disease because most of the people have already been exposed to 
them and have aquired a degree of natural immunization.'However, 
some endemic diseases are poor natural immunizers, such as 
bacillary dysentery, and they can become major causes of death.
Measles is an acute viral disease of children. It is normally 
lethal only to children under 5 years of age. It it the scourge of 
malnourished populations; it killed as many as 50 percent of the 
Ethiopian children who died in refugee camps in Sudan during the 
famine of 1984-1985.3 However, the severity of measles may vary 
depending on the type of malnutrition —  calorie or proteien 
deficiency —  that the population is experiencing. For example, 
studies of measles in the refugee camps of East Bengal, India, 
(1971) and famine camps in Bangladesh during the 1974 famine, 
indicated that only a small percentage of children in those 
communities died from the disease, leading many medical personnel 
to conclude that measles is less a threat in Asia than other 
continents. Nonetheless, immunication against measles should always 
be carried out at a precaution, especially in Africa, where the 
disease among the malnourished is often fatal.
Preventive measures against diseases must be considered within 
the context of each area. Anti-malarial medicines are important 
only if malaria is not common in the area where the people 
originated but prevalent in the areas where they are taking 
temporary refuge. (This is especially important when non-immunized 
populations migrate to hyper-endemic4 areas.) Supplementing food 
rations with Vitamin A and C is essential in most countries where 
the population subsists largely on grain.
Other diseases of concern are tuberculosis and various louse- 
borne diseases such as typhus. This is because their transmission 
is increased in overcrowded areas.
Diarrheal Diseases
Diarrheal diseases, primarily bacillary dysentery, quickly 
become widespread in famine. Dysentery or severe diarrhea is 
readily recognized by a bloody stool. Natural immunization of the 
intestinal tract is usually inadequate to protect the person, so 
one attack is quickly followed by another.
Diarrheal disease has been common to famines as long as 
records have been available. Effective controls for dysentery are 
clean water, sanitation and improved personal hygiene practices.
3 Toole, Michael J., Richard W. Steketee, Ronald J. Waldman, 
and Phillip Nieburg. "Measles Prevention and Control in Emergency 
Settings." World Health Organization Bulletin, 1989. (In Press.)
4 Areas where high rates of a disease are found.
3

of deaths' from diarrhea* Unfortunately, sanitation and good 
hygiene are.usually the first casualties in a starvihg community or 
in a famine camp. ‘ ' ,, ,
dehydration. Although a great array of bacteria, viruses, and 
parasites can cause diarrhea, it is usually the loss of water and 
salt from the body that brings about death. That means that 
diarrhea therapy does not require laborious and costly lab searches 
for the pathogens. Nor are drugs necessary. Normal body mechanisms 
will fight off the pathogens within two to five days; and in any 
case, there is no known drug treatment for most diarrheal 
pathogens.
In the past, fluid replacement was considered a clinical 
problem. Intravenous infusions in expensive rehydration units saved 
the majority of those few who were within reach of such treatment. 
However the same results can be accomplished using a mixture of 
ordinary sugar, salt, water and soda, costing only a few cents, and 
administered orally. f~i urn rim| i| i | j
Disease control in times of famine must compete with 
overwhelming needs for food, water and shelter. Thus, measures must 
be inexpensive, culturally acceptable, highly effective, and easy 
to administer.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGES
Psychological changes may occur in famines along with 
physiological changes. Many of the patterns of behavior noted 
during famines are caused by the unusual conditions. People in 
areas affected by famine are often depressed and apathetic. In 
densely populated or confined situations, such as those occurring 
in a displaced persons or refugee camp, these changes often 
compound the relief problem.
Starvation conditions direct people's thoughts and activities 
toward food; most other activities are inhibited. Frequently, 
food-seeking activities are directed toward the principal staple 
that the population has normally depended on, often at the expense 
of other potential sources. Usually, however, the range of foods 
sought and eaten is broadened to include many foods not normally 
considered edible. Ultimately, breeding livestock and seed grain 
may be consumed, compounding future food-supply problems.
The key fact to remember is this: diarrhea kills through
SOCIAL IMPACT;
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When family members are forced to leave home in search of food 
ties with homes, farms and ultimately, even some family members, 
are weakened. Eventually wandering bands of individuals seeking
When family members ar :o seek food, some families may
lose their breadwinners. ,_____  workers often find a large
percentage of families headed by women.
Impact on the Community
As famines progress, normal social behavior is increasingly 
affected. Initially there will be mutual help between family or 
families, but in a later stage, many tend to care only for 
themselves. In the worst cases, social cohesion begins to fail. 
Tradtional leaders who are unable to effectively redistribute food 
in the community may find their leadership challenged or ignored.
Food distribution may cause serious social and economic side 
effects. Food distribution is often handled in a way that 
circumvents traditional local leaders. When this occurs, it 
threatens to destroy traditional leadership and can effect the 
bonds of society. Too much free food over a long period can be a 
disincentive to the people to return to work, especially 
agricultural production. Numerous writers have pointed out the
5 Jackson, Tony with Deborah Eade. Against the Grain: The 
Dilemma of Project Food Aid. Oxford: OXFAM, 1982.
food begin to appear
danger of creating relief dependency.5
5
(BOX 4)
THE MADRAS FAMINE OF 1876-1878
One of the first systematic studies linking famine and 
disease was carried out by a surgeon in the British Indian 
army during the Madras famine of 1876-1878. Alexander Porter 
studied the diseases that occurred in the relief camps 
attached to his hospital. He used his spare time to perform 
459 consecutive autopsies on those who died of starvation and 
its complications. The study remains useful and thought- 
provoking a century later.
Origins of the Famine
The trouble in Madras began in 1875 after the successive 
failure of the southwest monsoon for two years. Famine 
conditions developed in a large area containing a population 
of 1.4 million. The natural calamity was exacerbated by 
merchants and speculators who were hoarding food. The prices 
were far beyond what poor people could pay. Famine followed.
Porter noted that diarrhea and dysentery were the most 
prevalent of the many diseases that occurred in the relief 
camps. Within the sheds where Porter worked, 34 percent of the 
patients who were admitted died. Dysentery and diarrhea were 
responsible for 77 percent of the deaths and were equally 
important in adults and children.
Porter published his findings in 1889, establishing a 
link between famine and dysentery as one of the principal 
causes of death. It still provides us with one of the 
major keys to understanding the interventions required.
From FAMINE: Its Causes, Effects and Management, John R. K. 
Robson, Editor. Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, N.Y.,
1981, p. 62).
6
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SERIOUSNESS OF DYSENTERY IN FAMINES
Dysentery was one of the two largest causes of death 
during the Bangladesh famine of 1974. These are shown in 
the following table.
TABLE 1-3
Cause of death by sex and disease in Dacca between 
October 1974 and January 1975 (percentages are of all 
diseases).
Cause Male Female Total Percent
Dysentery 335 393 728 36.0
Diarrhea 4 7 11 0.5
Malnutrition 172 142 314 15.0
Measles - 2 2 0.1
Exposure 14 8 22 1.1
Fever 369 466 835 41.0
Smallpox - 1 1 0.1
Other ind. 16 19 35 1.7
Others 51 31 82 4.3
Total 961 1069 2030
From: Rahaman, M.M. "The Causes and Effects of Famine in
the Rural Population: A Report from Bangladesh." In Robson
(Ed.), Famine: Its Causes, Effects and Management, 1981,
p. 138.
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Chapter 3
THE GEOGRAPHY OF FAMINE
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FAMINES
While famines can occur anywhere there is a war, they are 
most likely to develop in areas that have long dry periods each 
year followed by short rainy seasons, possibly only a couple of 
months long. If the rains are delayed or don't come, farmers can 
lose everything they've planted. Subsistence farmers don't have 
adequate resources to outlast frequent failures.
Two "famine belts" exist in the world. (See Figure 3-1.) The 
first extends from Europe into Central Asia and across to 
northern China. Food production failures can occur in this region 
because it is damp and cold and has shortened growing seasons.
The second runs from Africa around the Mediterranean eastward 
through the dry and monsoon lands of southern Asia to China. In 
this belt, droughts may trigger famines though today war is the 
primary cause.
The modernization of Europe, the former Soviet Union, and, 
more recently, China has almost eliminated the threat of natural 
famine in the northern belt. When crops do fail, the governments 
provide assistance, sometimes buying food in massive quantities 
on the world market. These assistance programs —  aided by good 
transportation systems —  buffer the year-to-year variability in 
food production and prevent local crop failures from causing 
local famine.1
This kind of development, however, has not occurred as 
extensively in the African and Asian drought belt. Transportation 
and communication in some areas are so poor that famine 
conditions may go unrecognized. Even when they become known, the 
mechanics of distributing aid during conflicts over large areas 
with primitive road networks can prove almost insurmountable.
There is nothing in North or South America comparable to the 
famine belt of Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, arid environments 
as well as those with variable year-to-year rainfall exist, most 
notably in northeast Brazil. The apparent absence of famines in 
North and South America, however, may be the result of poor
Although the threat of famine in the northern belt has 
been largely eliminated, crop failures in those regions can affect 
the availability of food in other parts of the world. The Soviet 
Union's large grain purchases in the 1970s, for example, drove the 
worldwide price of food so high that many food-short countries 
began exporting food, a situation that led to famine conditions in 
large areas of Sahelian Africa.
record keeping and the failure of governments to recognize when 
famine conditions exist. But, more importantly, highly marginal 
subsistence agriculture prevails throughout most of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The failure of these countries to diversify 
their agricultural systems —  coupled with high unemployment and 
political unrest —  leave them vulnerable to famines. An outbreak 
of violence or a natural disaster could trigger widespread food 
shortages.
Another concern in the Americas is environmental 
degradation. As it becomes more widespread, the risk of famine 
will increase in many countries. For example, massive 
deforestation in Haiti —  and the resulting loss of topsoil —  
has placed that country at the top of the list of places in the 
Western Hemisphere with a high potential for famine.
A 1984 study of displaced persons in El Salvador indicated 
pockets of high malnutrition and infant mortality that, in other 
circumstances, would indicate famine or near-famine conditions. A 
study of one San Salvador barrio showed a higher annual death 
rate than that experienced in Biafra in 1969 at the height of the 
Nigerian civil war.2 Se-vor-al Lat-in Amor lean-coirntni <=><=;,. pnr.h as 
Jieru and IIaiL±7 are rmly an incident - a r-i ndun^d 
r£am±ne\
FAMINE SHIFT
The most important things to understand about famine is how 
it shifts inside a country or region. One region may be 
recovering while another is declining. Grasping how and why 
famines move can provide planners insights on to use their 
resources to counter and prevent the spread of the famine.
Why do famines shift? Shifting occurs when food from areas 
of marginal production is drawn into areas of severe shortage 
because prices are higher. The movement of food out of an area 
causes prices to rise there, making it difficult for poor people 
in the area to buy food. When that happens, the nutritional 
status of people in the marginal areas begins to decline.
Ethiopia is an example. The Ethiopian geographer Mesfin 
Wolde-Mariam has mapped famines in Ethiopia dating back to the 
late 1800s. He notes that famines move in a "tightening circle" 
around Ethiopia. The country is perpetually in a famine 
situation, he points out. The conditions simply shift from region 
to region. Wolde-Mariam illustrates the effect of this 
phenomenon, which he calls "spatial extension," in Figure 3-2.3
2 Bureau for Refugee Programs, "Assessment of Displaced 
Persons Assistance Programs in El Salvador^ WA*knUl984.
3 Wolde-Mariam, Mesfin ....
The importance of the famine shift in Ethiopia can be seen 
when the relative extent of the famine is compared to the number 
of awrajas (sub-districts) that are experiencing famine 
conditions in any one year. In the 20-year period that 
Wolde-Mariam examined (1958-1977), only seven awrajas out of the 
102 in the country did not experience famine. Table 3-A shows the 
number of awrajas experiencing famine in each year from 
1958-1977.4 In 1958, the number of awrajas eperiencing famine 
was twelve. In most of the subsequent nineteen years, one or more 
new awrajas had famines. There were only three years —  1967,
1968 and 1971 —  in which no new areas experienced famine. On the 
average, four new awrajas each year had famines. By the end of 
1966, eighty-one of the 102 awrajas had experienced famine. This 
means that in the following twelve years, famine conditions 
revisited areas that had already had famines in the previous 
decade.5
The larger the contiguous area experiencing famine, the 
greater the destructive capacity and the greater the likelihood 
that the conditions that fuel the famine will become perpetual.
Ferr tteltep  /-tA O A yv-v .o-4
An understanding of famine shift can help relief officials *sva**M *y>. 
determine which areas need to be monitored and assessed^For 
example, a good strategy to use at the edge of a famine zone is 
increasing the amount of food available to the poor through 
food-for-work or cash-for-work programs. (See Chapter ^ ) Relief 
officials failed to increase the availablity of food in the 
markets outside the original famine zone in Ethiopia after the 
1984-1985 famine and that contributed to the continuation of 
major food shortages for the poor in adjoining areas in 
1987-1988. ,
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4 Wolde-Mariam, Op. Cit.
5 Wolde-Mariam, Op.Cit.




Chapter 4
SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO FAMINE
INTRODUCTION
Communities that have frequent food shortages often have 
developed family and community mechanisms for coping with famine. 
It is vital to understand these strategies. They are a factor in 
supplying the amount of food available in a famine zone; they can 
also indicate what stage a famine is in. Famine relief should be 
provided in such a way that the traditional means of coping are 
not disrupted.
Pastoralists and subsistence farmers store excess production 
from a good season to meet food needs during a bad one. For 
pastoral or semi-pastoral peoples, this storage is usually in 
natural form: their animals, the grasses and other forage on 
rangelands, the supplementary plant and animal foods collected, 
and the fat reserves on their own bodies.
In subsistence crop production, some food is stored in 
artificial form, such as silos and bins. Some foods may be dried 
while others are buried.1
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENTS
The subsistence food production systems of people in famine 
zones show many adaptations. The diversified and mobile systems 
of pastoralism practiced in Africa, the Middle East, and Central 
Asia provide clear examples. In the Cunene and Cuanhama regions 
of Angola, for example, pastoral people carry on a combination of 
cattle herding, farming, gathering, and fishing activities. Herds 
are moved seasonally in response to range conditions. The 
Karamajong people of northeastern Uganda show a similar pattern. 
Here the women cultivate sorghum, maize, and millet near 
permanent villages, while the men and boys herd cattle, sheep, 
and goats. Diversification has advantages. The people do not 
depend completely on crops, which could fail in any given year 
because of inadequate rainfall, or on animal herds, which could 
be destroyed by disease or poor range conditions.
Similar arguments may be made for many subsistence systems 
of farming. Mixed cropping —  planting several crops together —  
is common in areas where rainfall is seasonal. Such practices 
maximize both production and economic benefit while minimizing 
the risk of complete crop failure.
1 Cox, G. " The ecology of Famine: an Overview." In Famine: 
Its Causes, Effects, and Management. John R.K. Robson, Editor. 
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. N.Y., 1981.
Table 4-A shows the responses of farmers interviewed in 
Tanzania in 1971 which indicated they practiced a wide variety of 
adjustments during drought situations. The survey showed that 
famine-threatened communities often have attempted to adjust 
their agricultural and animal husbandry patterns by planting 
reserve famine crops and resowing cereals and other food plants. 
These actions may be repeated many times before they are 
abandoned. Alternatively, people may decide to search for more 
suitable agricultural lands and pastures.
Survival Strategies of Subsistence Farmers
Most subsistence farmers try to ensure enough grain for 
their households before they plant cash crops. And they try to 
plant sufficient grain to feed their families even if the rains 
are poor. If the rains are good, they can store or sell the extra 
grain. Some grains can be stored safely for several years in any 
one of several storage methods used in traditional societies, 
such as burying it in sealed jars. Households can also invest in 
animals, which can be sold in times of hardship. Others will 
trade their excess grain for cash or gold and hide it.
Planting decisions also show the farmers' concern for food 
security. Where possible, they plant drought-resistant strains of 
grain. If land is readily available, farmers may plant larger 
areas than they can maintain; only those fields receiving 
adequate rainfall will be weeded and cultivated. In some 
societies, farmers may have widely dispersed fields. That way, 
they can take advantage of scattered rainfalls.2
Adjustments by Pastoralists
Pastoralists usually use a variety of risk-reduction 
strategies. Herders, who are faced with the double threats of 
drought and disease, are more vulnerable to famine than farmers. 
They don't grow food staples; instead, they usually buy them in 
the market. If a pastoralist tries to grow crops to reduce his 
dependence on the market, his herding becomes less efficient. The 
herder tries to pass his farm at least twice a year on his 
migrations to leave or pick up the farming members of his 
household. The herder's most effective anti-drought strategy is 
the flexibility of his migration routes; farming clearly 
interferes or limits this flexibility. But increasing pressure on 
land has restricted this flexibility anyway, and more and more 
pastoralists now have farms.
Somali pastoralists of the drought-stricken Hararghe 
province of Ethiopia have developed ways of dealing with famine.
2 de Waal, Alex. Famine that Kills. Darfur 1984-85. Save the 
Children Fund. 1988.
Among the methods they use include dividing their herds; 
redistribution between kin of animals, cash or grain; loaning of 
cash or animals; increasing livestock sales. Under extreme 
conditions, other measures can include temporary redistribution 
of children amongst relatives and lastly, the use of force 
against groups competing for the same scarce resources.3
A common strategy of pastoralists is building large herds. 
Herders believe the larger the herd, the less likely the chances 
that drought or disease will reduce it below the critical 
subsistence threshold. Pastoralists are often criticized for 
having too many animals in normal times. But their behavior 
reflects their fear of losing animals to drought at a time when 
they have to sell animals to buy grain as the price of grain 
rises and that of animals falls. A household that can sustain 
itself on five goats in normal times, needs more than forty goats 
to see it through a year when the livestock death rate is 50 
percent and the price of grain has increased five times.
Herders also diversify their herds —  usually a combination 
of sheep and goats. This diversification makes it less likely 
that disease will affect the entire herd. Since different animals 
require different forage, a mixture is safer in an unpredictable 
climate. Small stock are also useful because they are less 
valuable and can be sold to meet small cash needs. Lending —  or 
even stealing —  animals prevents excessive inbreeding and leads 
to hardier herds.4
ADJUSTING PATTERNS OF FOOD CONSUMPTION
When faced with a food shortage, most households ration 
food. Household rationing doesn't usually lead to increased food 
prices, but hoarding by traders and shopkeepers hoping for a rise 
in prices is a widespread phenomenon with dangerous consequences.
Families confronted with famine are forced to restrict the 
amount of food they consume, in part by cutting back on the 
number of meals they eat a day. For example, a three-meals-a-day 
pattern may be reduced to two meals a day or one. In some 
circumstances, people may eat one meal every other day. These 
strategies will not relieve the situation much, especially for 
families that are already malnourished, but they are an 
indication of food shortage.
3 Seaman, J., Holt, J.F.J. and Rivers, J.P.W. Hararghe Under 
Drought, a Survey of the Effects of Drought Upon Human Nutrition in 
Hararghe Province. Addis Ababa, Ethiopian Government Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission. 1974.
4 de Waal, Alex. 1988 Op. Cit.
People may also dilute meals, such as stew or gruel, with 
more water. Food may also be mixed with unusual substances such 
as bark. In some Asian countries cereal may be mixed with grass 
seeds.
Use of Famine Foods
Many societies in famine areas have identified alternative 
foods to eat during times of scarcity. These include wild plants 
and animals. A study of the plants and animals consumed during 
food crises in India's Rajasthan Desert identified twenty-five 
plant species ranging from trees and shrubs to grasses and annual 
herbs.5 In Ethiopia, people eat parts of cactus. In addition, 
some people grow hardy, less tasteful perennials on lands 
suitable only for their growth or on sections reserved for hard 
times.
Many communities may be forced to subsist on non- 
conventional foods. In India, for example, people in the drier 
regions of the country may, during scarce times, eat plants that 
contain woody tissue and substances that are neither digestible 
nor nutritive. These plants can make people listless or ill, but 
people eat them because they temporarily appease hunger.
In the savannah zones of West Africa a grasslike millet with 
tiny seeds called "hungry rice" (digitaria exilis) is often 
consumed during food shortages. To overcome food shortage 
problems, many countries have encouraged the cultivation of 
famine reserve crops.6
When people have to eat the seeds and tubers intended for 
the next planting season, the famine can be prolonged. Famine 
recurred quickly in Ethiopia after the great famine of 1984-85 in 
part because many people had to eat their seed reserves. Most of 
the food aid imported to Ethiopia in that period was sorghum and 
wheat from hybrid varieties that cannot regenerate. Since much of 
the aid arrived after the seed stocks had been eaten, the 
government had to provide the farmers with the seeds for their 
next crops.
FAMILY SIZE AS A FAMINE ADJUSTMENT
Some populations adjust to famine by having more children. 
Since most famine-vulnerable societies experience high infant
5 Bhandari, M.M. (1974). "Famine foods in the Rajasthan 
Desert." Economic Botany, 28, No.l, p. 73-81.
6 There have been some problems associated with famine foods. 
For example, in Mozambique some strains of cassava proved to have 
levels of arsenic that were dangerous when only cassava was eaten.
mortality rates, they may have large families and high 
reproductive rates. This information is significant: societies 
that have made major advances in reducing infant mortality are 
likely to have rapid increases in their populations in a short 
period. Such increases will strain already over-stretched food 
production systems.

Chapter 5
EARLY WARNING AND MONITORING SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
Early warning is the identification and interpretation of 
events that indicate a famine may be developing. Data can be 
collected from many sources and then used to identify patterns 
that warn of an impending crisis. Planners can forecast possible 
scenarios in the affected areas, the access vulnerable groups 
will have to food supplies, and the extent to which famine 
conditions may spread.
In reviewing the repetitive crises in Africa in the 1980s, 
it is clear that early signs of a developing famine were 
recognized by most of the relief agencies and formal warnings 
were provided through official channels to the international 
donor community. Yet, despite these warnings, reaction was slow. 
It took major news coverage with pictures of mass starvation 
before international assistance was mobilized. The international 
community's slow reaction was caused not by lack of information 
but by its scepticism of the validity of information provided1, 
by political considerations and by budgetary and administrative 
constraints.
The biggest limitation on the use of early warning systems
is the fact that most famines occur as a result of war and it is
difficult to both collect the necessary information and to 
forecast how conflicts will unfold. Most of the theoretical base 
that led to the development of warning systems arose out of work
that was carried out in the famines of the 1970s in areas where
there was no fighting. However, it is still possible to apply 
the early warning techniques to conflict areas, especially if 
agencies are working in areas that are effectively controlled by 
one side or the other. There are also a variety of techniques 
that enable agencies to detect what is happening inside an area 
by gathering data from refugees or displaced persons and 
comparing it to information obtained from satellites. Famine 
warning systems can also be used to monitor ongoing food 
emergencies. For this reason, it is important to grasp the 
fundamentals of the warning systems, how they work, their 
capabilities and their limitations.
PURPOSES
Early warning has two aspects:
1The government of Ethiopia was then a radical socialist 
government distrusted by the West.
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(1) Assessment of vulnerability.
(2) Prediction or early recognition of the triggering 
events.
Identification of Vulnerable Areas
To determine where early warning systems should be 
established, identify areas that have a history of famines. If 
famines have occurred recently, the underlying causes of them are 
likely to remain.
The conditions that lead to famines are also easy to 
identify. These conditions include a high percentage of 
subsistence farming; extreme ecological changes, such as 
increased desertification or extensive deforestation; economic 
indicators such as declining household income and increasing 
household debt; and high incidence of infant mortality and 
morbidity.
While one of these conditions alone is not serious enough to 
make an area vulnerable to famine, the presence of several of 
them is.
Famine monitoring systems should be established in all areas 
where the most common famine triggers —  drought and widespread 
civil conflict —  are occurring.
Regions where other famine triggers exist should also be 
automatically monitored. These include areas of widespread insect 
infestation, especially locusts; areas where agriculture is 
dependent on rain-fed irrigation and seasonal rainfall is subject 
to extreme variations; and areas bordering on economic collapse 
(such as Haiti).
The areas where vulnerable conditions are prevalent should 
be delineated and mapped. This process is known as "vulnerability 
mapping." If a famine were to occur, these maps would be used to 
plan programs and plot the geographic extent and shift of the 
famine. The maps can be important in planning logistical support; 
they can also be used to help determine the measures to be taken 
in adjoining areas to contain the spread of the famine. (See Box 
1) •
Famine Indicators
Until recently famines were assessed in terms of medical 
cases, rates or degrees of malnutrition and/or numbers of deaths 
from malnutrition and disease. Such indicators guantify the 
suffering that has already taken place and thus are called 
"trailing indicators." They are of only limited use in predicting 
and preventing famine.
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Unfortunately, most famine warning systems today rely more 
heavily on trailing indicators than data or indicators that 
preceed, or lead, a famine. This happens, in part, because 
trailing indicators are easier to detect and monitor than leading 
ones. In addition, monitoring leading indicators requires a 
sophisticated system of data collection and analysis. Factors 
such as political instability, economic crisis, and income 
decline require advanced analytical tools.
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Table 5-A
Indicators for Action
Indicators of Vulnerability:
Subsistence cultivation 
Recurring rainfall shortages 
Heavy debt burden among farmers 
Low food reserves 
Political instability
Farmers required to work part-time off their lands 
Increasing desertification, soil erosion or 
deforestation
Increasing salinity of soils 
Indicators of Imminent Crisis:
Prolonged drought
Onset of a natural disaster (floods, insect infestation, 
etc.)
Crop failure
Increased price of staples 
Rise in price ratio of staple grain 
to prevailing wages
Increase in lending rates in the informal 
lending sector
Increase in sales of livestock (and decrease in 
average sale price 
Increase in deaths among livestock
Unusual sales of possessions (jewelry, ornaments, etc.) 
Seed shortage or increased cost of seeds 
Widespread sales of land at abnormally low price 
Increased hoarding of grains by dealers 
Consumption of animals by pastoralists 
Consumption of famine foods
Indicators of Famine (trailing indicators):
Increased rates of death 
Migration
Families sending some members to urban areas to work 
Increased rates of low or abnormal growth in children 
Increased rates of famine-related disease (e.g. measles) 
Edema in young children
Increased rates of vitamin deficiencies 
Increased rates of nutritional disorders 
Sale of traction animals (e.g. oxen)
Consumption of seeds
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FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS (FEWS)
In recent years there has been a proliferation of famine early 
warning systems. On an international level, the two most important are 
the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) sponsored by U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Global Information and Early 
Warning System of the United Nations' Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO). Several countries have established their own 
famine early warning systems and a number of private voluntary 
organizations have also set up systems at various times. Each varies 
according to the factors monitored and the responses they trigger.
Each system is unique; the differences reflect the requirements 
of the country that is being monitored. In some cases they differ in 
the approaches used to link the warning indicators with specific 
responses. Box 2 describes three systems in use in Africa and 
describes how they differ.
Types of Warning Systems
Most famine early warning systems focus on trigger mechanisms, 
using food supply and food demand models as predictors. This is 
logical: accurate predictions of the timing of a famine can't be made 
until the trigger event occurs. Only the increasing possibility of 
famine is evident.
Food supply models use national harvest predictions and 
measurements of stored food and food imports, balanced against 
expected national food consumption, to assess whether sufficient food 
will be available in a country. This approach, known as the food 
balance sheet, is often too simplistic to be applied universally. Too 
many factors intervene between the existence of food in a country and 
its consumption by those who need it. Such models cannot, for example, 
take into account food stored in private rather than public hands or 
the role played by food merchants.
Food demand models recognize these intervening factors. They 
don't try to measure how much food is available; instead, they attempt 
to find out whether people have reasonable access to that food. For 
most people access to food is the ability to buy it. Access is 
measured by the market price and whether people have the money to buy 
it or something to barter for it. A rapid increase in food prices 
and/or a drop in family income may indicate the onset of famine. This 
approach does not necessarily contradict the availability approach, 
but provides a framework for understanding famines caused by food 
production failure and those caused by other economic or political 
factors. This model can be applied to more areas since it is not tied 
to one trigger mechanism. It has the potential to locate both the 
geographical area of famine and those social groups that will suffer 
most.
Food demand systems have limitations. Market data is not often
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subjective. For example, livestock can be sold and resold in a village 
market a number of times in one day. Therefore, figures for livestock 
sales and prices may not reflect the income that the original seller 
got for his animals. Equally, grain prices are usually recorded by the 
sack, but the famine victim buys food by the cupful at a unit price 
that may be many times higher than the quoted market price.2
A number of observers argue that most famine warning systems are 
mechanisms that allow people outside a society to look inside. They 
point out the systems are structured to gather information that will 
improve the efficiency of externally derived and controlled relief 
measures. These critics contend that neither approach helps prevent 
the famine or suggests effective forms of relief that will decrease 
the vulnerability of the society to famine in the future.3
To achieve these broader aims, a FEWS must look at what causes a 
community and its members to be vulnerable to famine, how the coping 
mechanisms that have evolved can be strengthened, and what alternative 
strategies based on that community's point of view can be adopted.4
FEWS should aim to do three things:
1. Define the most effective counterfamine interventions and 
identify the locations where they should be applied.
2. Put the relief structures in a country on alert so they 
are able to cope with the relief needs if they are 
necessary.
3. Provide the information needed to effectively lobby donors 
so that the required assistance arrives in time.5
"The issue is not early warning; it's early response." 
(Don Krumm, 1983)
2 Walker, Peter. Famines: Family Warning and Preventative
Action - The Need to Listen to the Victims. IIED London 1987.
3 Devereux, Stephen, and Roger Hay. Origins of Famine: A
Review of the Literature, Volumes I and II. Paper prepared for Food 
Studies Group, Queen Elizabeth House. University of Oxford 1986.
4 Walker, Peter. Op.Cit.
5 Walker, Peter. Op.Cit.
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HOLD on these.
BOX 2
SOME EXAMPLES OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 
The Sudan Early Warning System:
The Sudan EWS is a national system utilizing secondary data,
i.e., it does not collect its own information. To identify areas 
facing food crises, it collects data that affect food and markets: 
meteorological, nutritional, and agricultural progress data. First, 
historical and current information are examined to establish the 
context within which change is occurring. When areas of stress are 
detected, the staff conducts surveys in those areas to verify that a 
problem exists. If the surveys indicate that food or market problem, 
further studies are taken to quantify assistance requirements. The 
initial data is provided by governmental and non-governmental groups 
within Sudan. The main problem with this system has been that it is 
not effective in identifying pockets of need.
Botswana Early Warning and Response System:
The EWRS of Botswana is designed to initiate relief programs as 
soon as stress is detected in pre-identified vulnerable areas. 
Operatons are triggered on the basis of rainfall/agro-meteorological 
data and crop forecasts/grazing conditions. The program begins 
promptly, at the time a failed harvest would be gathered. Nutritional 
surveillance is used as a monitoring and targeting tool; not an early 
warning indicator. NGOs provide little if any data to the EWS since 
their presence in Botswana is limited.
Kenyan Plan Against Drought and Famine in Turkana:
As a result of a severe drought and food shortages in Kenya's 
Turkana district, the government and OXFAM developed a drought 
contingency plan modeled on the Indian famine codes of the 1900s. It 
consists of a district drought policy, a set of advanced preparations, 
and sets up a rudamentary EWS. The plan lays out actions to be taken 
by government authorities during a drought to ensure food 
availability, guarantee employment for destitute people via public 
works, and to buy animals from herders at reasonable prices (to help 
maintain their purchasing power). It also specifies rural 
reconstruction measures for use after the drought. The measures are 
coordinated by a District Drought Contingency Officer. Other 
strategies are suggested to reinforce the regional plan, including: 
advanced negotiation of commitments from donors; construction of 
infrastructure such as stores, roads, etc.; technical training 
seminars for district and governmental staff; and standardization of 
nutritional surveillance techniques.
The systems in Botswana and N. Kenya are geared to activate 
counter-famine programs and create barriers against famine with
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employment- guarantee schemes and other food aid programs. Systems 
that focus on social security rather than solely on food relief 
require different organization and information from those systems 
designed to guide traditional relief efforts.
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Box 2
Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP)
Since 1984 MSF Belgium has worked on information systems based on 
their rapid nutritional assessment system (the "score system"). Their 
EWS efforts are designed to develop data that can help governments to 
prevent food crises. MSF and AEDES have been involved in providing 
technical assistance to the national authorities in Mali and Chad to 
establish national EWS.
The EWS is organized within the national governments and their 
offices. The system is complementary to existing systems 
used to develop national food balance estimates by comparing the total 
food available with the food needs of the population.
The project focuses on the traditional "at risk" zones in the two 
countries. In Mali it covers the northern and the northwestern parts 
of the country; approximately 4.000,000 people.
The main objectives of the EWS are to:
1. detect and predict food shortages and affected populations, the 
number at risk,
2. to infrom national authorities and international organizations of a 
developing crisis, when a response should be made, what actions are 
necessary and possible in order to prevent or solve the problem.
- ave—the—Children_Fund (U.K.) funded Sahel NGO information
network.
As already indicated this system is based on work carried 
out with the NGO committee in Bamako to build an NGO network 
of information which would fill the perceived information gap.
This networking of information is being carried out through 
the collection of regular data for the regions of Gao and Mopt 
by participating NGOs on basic data covering the following six 
areas:
1. Qualitative state of agriculture and pasture.
2. Principal sources of food for the local population, i.e. 
family stocks, harvest stocks, exchange, market, food aid or 
wild foods.
3. Price of cereals on the local market.
4 Price of animals on the local market.
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5. Daily labor prices, changes in casual labor employment.
6. Unusual migrations.
All the data is qualitative except for prices and should be 
easily available. The aim is that regular information will 
flow from the field centers to Bamako. Therefore the 
questionnaires are kept short and should take as little time 
as possible to complete.
The project is now also interested in other questions 
relating to food security. This relates to the general trend 
away from interest in purely early warning as has already been 
remarked on. Several areas of interest arei
1. "Pockets of distress" is a concept that has been talked 
about frequently. What does this mean? Is it literally 
pockets of a few people; certain types of people; or is it 
a permanent situation? Since the early 1970s there have 
been permanently displaced people - who are these people?
What is the prognosis for the future?
2. In terms of food availability, how are they surviving, what 
are they depending on, is the situation changing? What 
options are groups of people following? Is it, in fact
necessary to define the different economic groups in each locality?
3- what is the effect of food aid? It was pointed out that 
there appears to be a great anti-food aid drive in many 
quarters in Mali this year. Government stocks are full and 
many peasant stocks are full. The Government cannot sell at 
its bottom price to farmers, but a lot of farmers (at a quess) 
are not eating well because they cannot buy.
4. The notion of "purchasing power." What is it and how does 
it affect the current situation in Mali?
The SCF-funded information network will now focus its 
attentions on these types of questions about food security 
which can only be viewed over time. One constructive step is 
to define some of these population groups and their positions 
and make that an important part of the network system.
3. OXFAM - Early Warning System (EWS)
The OXFAM EWS is, like many of the other systems, at an 
early stage of development. It differs from the other systems 
in Mali in that it is not a national system (although linked 
into the national system) and it aims at a much smaller
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population area. Its aims are to "try to develop a famine 
monitoring response strategy for a cercle (subdistrict 
administrative unit)." An emphasis is put on the development 
of the capacity of the local community to respond to and 
control what happens in their locality. This approach looks 
towards an alternative way of responding to a crisis than the 
usual process of providing emergency aid at a late stage. It 
is an example of a "local participation" focused program which 
would take into account the indigenous view of the situation 
and what was needed in response to a local crisis.
The OXFAM EWS is based on the four premises that:
1. Famine develops over several years and therefore it should 
be possible to identify early signs of food crisis at the 
local level well before emergency aid is needed.
2. Early warning information and response should be integrated 
so that the agency collecting data should be able to act on 
it.
3. The response should aim to reinforce the population's 
ability to face a crisis, rather than providing purely 
emergency aid.
4. Local populations should play a role in the collection of 
data.
The OXFAM EWS is therefore based on its project partners, 
i.e. cereal banks, cooperatives, associations. Groups are 
being asked to collect rainfall and market data four times a 
year. OXFAM personnel then collect this data when they visit 
the groups and discuss the current situation. This would be 
the moment to propose interventions if necessary. The OXFAM 
EWS project has recently been started in the 4th region of 
Mali with ten cereal banks. At the time of the workshop, 
had not yet been collected.
Another aspect of this project is to further research the 
local level "dynamics" of early warning indicators. Currently 
work is being carried out on livestock prices.
Several limitations of this approach were identified by the 
project staff. A project covers a small geographical area and 
thus a limited number of people. There is always the risk of 
local populations distorting data to gain assistance. After 
the project ends, or when there is a series of good years, can 
a continuation of data collection be ensured. The local 
institutions are not yet collecting data, so it is difficult 
to judge their capabilities
___________________________________________ i|
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Chapter 6
APPROACHES TO FAMINE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
Famine interventions fall into two categories:
1) Conventional relief, which primarily provides food 
directly to famine victims.
2) Counter-famine efforts, which are a variety of economic 
actions taken to stabilize local markets and to increase 
poor people's ability to buy the food they need or to 
obtain it through alternative methods. Counter-famine 
efforts usually rely on existing market systems.
CONVENTIONAL RELIEF
Conventional famine relief usually consists of three elements:
1) Dietary supplements in the form of food or vitamins.
2) A variety of health care and public health assistance
programs.
3) Where migration has occurred, such support as temporary 
shelter, water, and sanitation facilities to new 
settlements and camps.
Food aid programs usually provide rations to families. When 
conditions are severe, supplementary foods are also distributed to 
vulnerable groups. Relief agencies often use special foods such as 
blended grains, vitamin-reinforced flours, and high-protein 
products.
Famines caused by war or civil conflict almost always require 
conventional relief strategies in their early stages —  especially 
for refugees and displaced persons who have fled to relief camps or 
temporary settlements and are unable or not permitted to find jobs. 
Conventional strategies are also frequently used in the advanced 
stages of famine.
Overall, conventional relief is not successful in controlling 
high mortality (deaths) unless there are ample food supplies to buy 
or use in the country at the start of the operation. Most food aid 
is imported from the major grain-producing countries, and it can 
take as long as six months to ship the food and set up a 
distribution system. Studies have shown that the chances of saving 
lives at the outset of an operation are greatly reduced when food 
is imported. By the time it arrives in the country and gets to the 
people, many of them will have died.
A successful conventional relief program requires: 
a nearby and available source of food;
the cability to transport and distribute the food; and,
most importantly, an early decision to use this strategy 
instead of others.
COUNTER-FAMINE INTERVENTIONS
Counter-famine actions are designed to prevent the famine from 
developing into a full-scale disaster and to limit its geographical 
spread. Such measures attempt to do this by increasing income and 
food for the poorest people and by attacking the underlying causes 
of the people's poverty. These interventions are aimed at keeping 
the local market system from collapsing, preventing people from 
having to sell their assets, stopping migration, and maintaining 
the family.
The actions, which should start in the early stages of the 
famine, include:
Income transfer programs.
Support for existing market systems.
Interventions to maintain transportation systems.
Interventions to maintain rural trade patterns.
Investments in increasing household economic assets.
Investments in community infrastructure that will support
agricultural production.
Until recently it was believed that counter-famine 
interventions like these would work only in famines outside of 
conflict zones and especially those that take a long time to 
develop, such as drought triggered famines. However, a number of 
measures associated with this approach were used successfully in 
northwestern Somalia in 1989 and the liberated areas of the 
northern Ethiopian war zones in 1990. In 1992, the US government 
made market interventions its primary relief strategy for the 
famine sparked by the Somali civil war.
The sole prerequisite for using counter-famine interventions 
is a ready supply of cash and food aid that can be used in 
unconventional ways, such as direct sales to the victims or to food 
traders and merchants. A well organized information collection 
system with the capabilities of a famine early warning system (see 
Chapter JfJ also helps in targeting the specific interventions.
CONVENTIONAL RELIEF VS. COUNTER-FAMINE INTERVENTIONS
Which strategy is the more effective? There is growing 
confidence that the counter-famine approach is more effective than 
conventional relief. But full-scale counter-famine operations have 
not been widely used, because most relief agencies and the public 
have not understood the underlying causes of famine, the reasons 
why people are vulnerable, and the alternate opportunities 
available.
There is another reason counter-famine efforts are not 
widespread. Major donor countries have an excess of food, not cash, 
and their food aid policies are designed, in part, to support their 
own agricultural production.
Consider the position of a typical relief agency official in 
a country where famine conditions have developed. If he chooses to 
use counter-famine measures, he probably will have to raise the 
money through his agency. This usually means soliciting donations 
from the public and requesting grants from major donor governments. 
Public appeals can take months, and they often don't work until the 
agency can show photographs of severely malnourished people —  
people near death. If the relief official requests money from donor 
governments, the amount of cash available is usually small, rarely 
more than a million dollars.
However, if the relief official approaches a major grain 
exporting country, he might get millions of dollars worth of food, 
as well as the money to administer and monitor its distribution and 
to buy trucks and fuel for distributing it.
The choice is usually an easy one. The average relief official 
will choose the latter course. For this reason, today's famine 
relief strategies are said to be "food driven" as opposed to "need 
driven."
However, counter-famine strategies are becoming more 
acceptable because of the large number of local currency reserves 
now held jointly by the donor country and the host country. These 
reserves have been accumulated from the sale of food and other 
commodities under aid agreements. These monies, known as 
counterpart funds, can often be used in emergencies. Furthermore, 
it is increasingly possible to obtain permission to sell donated 
foods that are inappropriate for use in the famine to raise cash to 
buy foods that can be monetized (sold to local merchants).
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the limits of food aid is the most important 
prerequisite for understanding how to improve famine response. If 
food is available, or can be made available, through market 
interventions, most conventional food aid approaches are
unnecessary. More important, food aid usually arrives too late to 
make a significant difference. There is evidence to suggest for 
example, that the massive food shipments sent to Ethiopia in 1985 
had very little impact on the outcome of the famine. It took 4-6 
months to ship the food to the country and by the time that it 
arrived in sufficient, steady quantities in the rural areas, the 
death rates had peaked and were already declining —  evidence that 
those who were most at risk of dying had already perished. For 
this reason, many relief specialists believe continued emphasis on 
procuring, shipping and distributing food from surplus-producing 
nations as the primary famine intervention is not only unwarranted 
but possibly risky.

Chapter 7
COUNTER-FAMINE OPERATIONS: 
PREEMPTIVE AND CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of counter-famine measures is to prevent or stop 
famines from spreading. They can be applied as soon as it is 
evident that a situation is deteriorating. If actions can be 
initiated before events get out of hand, a range of strategies is 
available that can not only preempt the famine but assist the 
affected communities and families with developmental (vs. relief) 
aid. These measures will have more impact than the crisis 
interventions that may be reguired once a famine becomes 
pronounced.
Counter-famine strategies work best in the early stages; once 
things get out of hand, interventions that rely heavily on food 
relief will predominate. In the normal realm of famine relief 
operations, developmental assistance is usually given lower 
priority than food relief, especially during conflicts. Therefore, 
it is important that counter-famine operations begin as soon as a 
problem is detected.
Counter-famine interventions are based on the premise that 
employment and income are the central issues that must be addressed 
in a famine. If sufficient income can be provided to families, they 
will not need to liquidate family assets and the people's ability 
to purchase food can be restored. If sufficient cash is provided - 
- for example, through cash-for-work projects —  and the people's 
purchasing power is maintained, the market will respond and food 
will be brought into the area. Assistance should be directed 
toward those activities that will lead to a sustained rise in rural 
income as well as encourage people to use their earnings to 
continue their farming or other productive enterprises.
A multitude of diverse, small-scale activities should be 
spread throughout the vulnerable areas. Usually, the number of 
projects and the rapidity with which they must be implemented is 
beyond the capacity of any government or relief agency to execute 
through the normal project planning and implementation process. 
The best alternative is to place as much of the responsibility for 
planning and the resources for carrying out the projects in the 
hands of the communities and affected families
THE ELEMENTS OF A COUNTER-FAMINE STRATEGY
A counter-famine strategy should address the causes as well as 
the effects of famine. Families who have lost their income require
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alternative earnings. Thus, agencies should undertake projects 
designed to:
Create alternative sources of income and promote a 
sustained increase in average family earnings.
Prevent a decrease in the value of a family's assets, 
especially livestock.
Rehabilitate local markets and fill them with food that 
is affordable to the majority of the poor.
They should also promote investments by the people in 
activities such as gardening or milk production that will make it 
possible for the most vulnerable families to expand the range of 
foods they consume, develop skills that will enable them to 
diversify their sources of income, and, where possible, reduce the 
vulnerability of their cultivation and livestock practices.
Counter-famine activities should be designed to achieve 
multiple objectives. They utilize the principal resource —  labor 
—  that is most abundant during a famine. They address the most 
immediate effect of famine, an overwhelming increase in the number 
of unemployed people. They provide income by paying, preferably in 
cash, for work. And they prevent the development of full-blown 
famine conditions if put in place in time and in the areas where 
the people live.
When properly planned, counter-famine measures can prevent the 
social and economic disintegration that accompanies mass migrations 
of people searching for food and the pattern of dependency that 
often develops when free food aid is handed out.
Counter-famine actions are divided into two sets of economic 
interventions: Income support projects and market interventions.
INCOME SUPPORT PROJECTS
A number of projects should be set up in the famine zone to 
provide the poor with cash to help restore their purchasing power. 
Wages should be paid principally in cash. Cash and in-kind grants, 
and where possible, loans may also used to inject resources into 
the community. These are known as "income support" projects.
Although the counter-famine strategy depends on employment 
generation and cash-for-work projects, it differs in a number of 
significant respects from conventional public works schemes* The 
majority of the projects should focus on improving the productivity 
of the lands, crops, or livestock herds and rehabilitating the 
market and food distribution system. Priority should be given to 
paying people to improve their own assets, particularly land. While 
a road building project may help the community, and can certainly
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create income for workers, it will not do much toward reducing the 
vulnerability of area farms to drought, crop failures, etc. The 
projects should also develop means for communities to decrease 
their collective vulnerability to famines, e.g., the establishment 
of community-based food banks.
The projects must be designed to yield rapid returns. This is 
essential if the projects are to result in immediate protection for 
the poor and reduce their vulnerability to the famine.
An important aspect of the projects is the mobilization of 
community labor. They should use traditional labor organization 
techniques or institute cooperative labor schemes that the 
villagers can continue after the crisis. The people should be 
involved in organizing and structuring the labor force and the 
normal lines of authority should be respected.
It is critical that the projects not divert labor from 
essential agricultural activities. If projects must be carried out 
during times when people are fully occupied with their usual work, 
the activities should be organized so that they can be interrupted 
to allow people to work their land or to work on a part-time basis.
The Role of Food Aid
The counter-famine approach does not exclude the need for food 
aid. Some households will probably require supplementary food, 
especially families living at the margins of the famine zones. 
Strategies that employ alternative food-for-work schemes may be 
required to increase food supplies in some areas. (See Chapter __).
Some families may need to receive free food supplements, but 
these should be limited to people who are most in need. The mere 
perception that free food is available can create expectations that 
can undermine other intervention strategies. Furthermore, if the 
food aid is not targeted properly, large portions may end up being 
sold on the market and could contribute to food price fluctuations 
that could have a negative impact, situation in the community.
Generally, food aid serves two purposes. First, it can be used 
as the equivalent of income to give to families who have lost their 
normal source of income. Second, it can be used to finance, or 
partly finance, relief or rehabilitation activities. Food aid 
should be limited so that supply doesn't exceed demand —  otherwise 
it will push prices too low for food producers to make a profit and 
thereby retard agricultural recovery. In general this means that 
food aid should only be used if it is clear that the local market 
can't meet the demand for food —  in other words, that famine is 
developing as a result of food, not income, deficiencies.
When the food is being supplied from abroad, it is usually 
preferable to exchange the imported food for locally purchased
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food, if it is available. This helps to maintain demand for locally 
produced food (and can result in major savings in transport costs).
It is important to understand food aid from the point of view 
of the beneficiary. Most relief personnel see food aid as an 
alternate source of food for starving families. The recipients 
however, view it in a broader way. They see it as income and a 
transfer of assets. Since the majority of the people are farmers 
who normally sell food for income, receiving food from a relief 
agency is like receiving cash. Even in the most extreme 
circumstances, people will barter relief food for other commodities 
or needed services. It is not unusual, for example, to find people 
selling food for water; household items such as soap; other foods, 
such as spices or salt; and for essential services such as grain 
milling.
For these reasons, food aid distributed to meet a nutritional 
target, rather than income security, is likely to fail. (When 
viewed in this context, measuring food aid in caloric standards is 
generally meaningless.)
MARKET INTERVENTIONS
Many agencies view the selling of emergency food aid with 
alarm. This tends to restrict the use of food as a general resource 
with broad applications, and it limits support for the kinds of 
activities central to a counter-famine and containment strategy.
There are many situations where the sale of food is desirable. 
This is the case when food supply is inadequate to meet demands. 
When supplies are scarce, there is a corresponding increase in food 
prices that erodes the purchasing power of the poorest families. 
Giving food away will not reduce the food crisis unless the people 
sell the food, creating a surplus that will bring market prices 
down.
The distribution of free food rations requires that a major 
logistical supply system must be developed at great cost. Such 
systems can rarely be put in place rapidly, and lives are 
endangered while they are being set up. In such cases, it would be 
simpler to sell food aid using the normal markets as the 
distribution system. There is no reason why food aid should not be 
sold to local traders, especially the micro-entrepreneurs such as 
women vendors, who usually sell their own produce in the markets. 
These local traders will resell the food aid at prices affordable 
to the poor. The sales generate funds that can be used to help 
finance cash-for-work projects. Thus, sales achieve multiple 
objectives —  cash for the counter-famine projects and support for 
the small traders.
An example of how this can work is the program initiated by
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CARE in western Sudan in 1990. The program consisted of the 
following activities:
1. Market interventions: The primary action was to
revitalize village markets. Supplies of grain were 
procured and delivered to village councils, where they 
were sold at subsidized prices to the small retail 
vendors in the market. The selling price was initially 
equivalent to the previous year's highest wholesale 
price. Sales were limited and purchasers were asked to 
agree to sell their grains within a certain price range, 
roughly equivalent to the previous year's retail sales 
price, adjusted for inflation (approximately LS200 - 
LS250 or $5 per sack) . The amount sold to each vendor 
was limited, and the retail market monitored to ensure 
that vendors sold the grain within the agreed limits. 
Any vendor selling above that level or selling to 
wholesale merchants was disqualified from subsequent 
sales.
Proceeds from the sales were assigned to village councils 
to organize cash-for-work projects. Families that could 
not afford to buy grain even at the depressed price were 
given priority for employment in the cash-for-work 
projects. Projects were selected by the village council 
and monitored by NGOs assigned to the area.
2. Food Loans: In the initial stages of the program, it was
difficult to organize sufficient cash-for-work projects 
to meet the needs of all families whose convertible 
assets had been sold. Rather than giving food away, 
families were loaned the food with an obligation to repay 
it into a village food bank in increments during the next 
good harvest.
3. Food-for-Work: Food-for-work programs were initiated in
the towns and areas where large numbers of migrants 
accumulated. They were also carried out in the 
peripheral areas of the food-deficit zone, i.e., in those 
communities where harvests were reduced, but no more than 
50% of normal. (If losses were more than 50%, more direct 
aid programs were used)
4. Price Supports for Livestock: A program of interventions
designed to push up prices of livestock was carried out 
using local currency accounts from the major donor 
nations. Interventions included buying livestock at fair 
prices, redirecting livestock away from the towns and 
urban centers (using the long-haul food lorries that 
brought the food to the area to take sheep and goats back 
to Port Sudan for export, bypassing the Khartoum market),
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oand in certain cases purchasing goats and redistributing 
them among the rural poor whose herds had been depleted.
5. Food Supplements: A program for identifying people or
groups who required emergency nutritional support such as 
the elderly, lactating women, and children under 5 who 
are immediately threatened was instituted by NGOs.
As a result of these interventions, famine conditions were 
contained and the markets functioned normally until the end of the 
drought.
Market interventions can also work in conflict zones. An 
example is the program launched by USAID in Somalia in 1992. Food 
was given by donors to the World Food Programme which then 
transferred it to CARE. CARE representatives in Kenya sold and 
delivered it to Somali traders who then took it to the famine zone 
and resold it to the small retail vendors. By traveling at night 
and using pack animals or armed convoys, the traders were able to 
pass through contested areas to reach villages that were largely 
inaccessible to relief agencies. The proceeds of the sales were 
transferred to NGOs working in the area for use in a variety of 
income generating projects as well as agricultural rehabilitation.
Uses of Food Aid To Support Market Interventions
Food aid can be used in other ways to support local trade 
patterns. Three innovative methods are the payment in kind (PiK) 
program, animal-grain exchanges for pastoralists, and barter 
schemes.
1. The PiK Program —  PiK programs are designed to help 
support local farmers and to maintain the normal 
marketing system. Farmers are paid in grains to improve 
t h e i r  l a n d  w i t h  c o u n t e r - d r o u g h t or 
counter-desertification methods such as contouring, 
terracing, or planting wind breaks and for participating 
in community development projects such as developing 
water harvesting measures, etc. Instead of receiving 
wages, farmers receive payment in grain equivalent to the 
amount they would have produced under normal conditions. 
If their harvest has totally failed, they receive the 
full amount. If they harvest a percentage of their normal 
yield, they receive the balance.
The grains they receive are un-milled. The farmers 
can sell the grain at whatever price they can negotiate 
with their usual buyers. In this way, all persons and 
institutions usually engaged in the marketing system can 
carry on as if the drought had not occurred. Thus, the 
negative impact of drought on the market system can be 
substantially reduced.
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The PiK program provides an excellent way of 
informally controlling prices in local markets. This is 
done by adjusting the percentages of food provided 
according to the normal yield. By providing a greater 
percentage, prices should move downward; by providing 
less, prices move upward. PIK programs can be adjusted to 
permit farmers to retain any grains they have produced to 
use as seeds the following season. This reduces the 
amount of seeds that relief agencies or the government 
would need supply later.
The management requirements for PiK programs are 
substantially less than for other food distribution 
programs since the food is being handled through the 
normal market system and not by artificial distribution. 
Usually the grain is not delivered to the individual 
farmers but to granaries, where it is allocated to the 
farmers at the time their normal harvest would have been 
brought in for sale. In some cases, the grain is not 
delivered; it is simply a paper transaction with the 
price cooperatively negotiated and the proceeds going to 
the farmer in cash.
While PiK programs can be used throughout a famine 
zone, they are most effective in stabilizing grain 
markets on the periphery of drought-affected areas and 
for countering the development of famine conditions in 
isolated food-deficit areas. They are especially useful 
in areas where only small farmers are experiencing 
shortages.
As a famine control measure, PiK programs are 
effective in countering famine shift (See Chapter _ ).
2. Grain for animal exchanges —  The provision of relief 
grain in exchange for animals at fair prices achieves two 
objectives:
a) It preserves the value of animals and thus the 
pastoralist's income.
b) If the animals can be slaughtered and the meat 
preserved, the project transforms deteriorating 
food stocks into food reserves.
3. Barter —  Grain can often be used to barter for other 
commodities such as more appropriate foods or seeds and 
agricultural inputs. For example, wheat which has a 
relatively high value in many countries may be bartered 
for sorghum or other lower value grains at exchange 
ratios that increase the amount of food available for use 
in the relief program.
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OTHER STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO FOOD
Releasing Government-held Food Stocks
One strategy that governments use to increase food supplies 
and to decrease prices is the release of government-held food into 
the private market.
Sales at Controlled Prices
Governments often establish outlets for selling food at 
regulated prices to the poor. An example is the "fair price" shops 
in India during the Bihar drought of 1966-1967. The government set 
up over twenty thousand stores.1 Such approaches guarantee supplies 
to those with limited income.
Related to this option is the free or subsidized distribution 
of a special ration to specific classes of people —  women with 
dependent children, the sick and the elderly —  who cannot 
otherwise obtain food.
Food Subsidies
In the 1960s, Sri Lanka implemented a guaranteed food subsidy 
program for its entire population. Under this scheme, each low- 
income family receives food stamps that can be redeemed for free 
weekly rice rations. The rations provide slightly less than the 
minimum requirements for a complete balanced diet so the program is 
considered a supplement to what a family can buy. Such a program 
has its costs —  both fiscally and socially. But the subsidy 
program has improved food security for the poor. Food stamps are 
credited with substantially reducing the risk of famine among 
displaced populations during the long civil war in that country.
Countries with long term food subsidy and distribution schemes 
are better prepared to face major food shortages than others. 
Clearly, design of a subsidy program is a complex task, but 
overall, it is a good strategy to consider.
Price Controls
Price controls are often proposed as a means of ensuring the 
poor's access to food. In most cases, however, controls have been
1 Berg, A. "Famine contained: Notes and lessons from the Bihar 
experience," in Blix, G. Y. Hofvander, and B. Vahlquist (Eds.), 
Famine. A Symposium Dealing With Nutrition and Relief Operations in 
Time of Disaster, Swedish Nutrition Foundation, Symposium No. IX, 
Almquist and Wiksells, Uppsala, 1971.
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a failure, and in many cases it creates a black market or, worse, 
results in food being hoarded or smuggled to other areas.
TARGETING COUNTER-FAMINE MEASURES
Commonly, three situations are encountered in the early stages 
of famine:
1. The loss of agricultural incomes in areas where it is 
possible to increase or at least resume normal production 
by making land improvements and introducing improved 
farming or animal husbandry techniques. In these cases, 
the priorities are mobilizing labor for land 
improvements, construction or rehabilitation of
irrigation systems, improving drainage and reducing 
erosion, etc.
The loss of agricultural incomes in areas where land is 
scarce and it is unlikely that all the people will be 
able to resume production at the previous level. This 
situation may have developed as the result of poor land 
management, increasing population pressure,
desertification, or increasing salinity of soils. The 
priority in this case is to identify families that 
require alternative sources of income. Alternative work 
can be developed by providing start-up capital for new 
enterprises and extensive training in new skills.
A situation where large population migrations have 
occurred and agriculture cannot provide a stable source 
of income for the majority of the people. In this 
situation, emphasis should be placed on providing long­
term alternative sources of income. (In some cases, 
government may propose resettling people to more 
productive areas. The measure is disruptive, has no 
impact on the immediate food needs, and ultimately adds 
to the relief burden.)
Tables 7-A and 7-B summarize some of the types of projects 
that can be used to counter the development and spread of famine 
conditions.
Proper targeting of counter-famine aid is critical to a 
successful program. Often relief agencies fail to select the 
correct beneficiaries for projects or overlook key aspects of a 
society that play a factor in the outcome of the project. A common 
example of poor targeting occurs in the projects that use food- or 
cash-for-work. Often the projects simply build public 
infrastructures rather than focusing on improving the farmers' 
lands or increasing output on subsistence plots. As a result, the 
impact is limited to the provision of income or food support.
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Food-for-work programs have a checkered history in targeting 
beneficiaries. Great care must be exercised to ensure that the 
people working are from the families most in need and that the food 
reaches family members with the greatest need.
Some counter-famine technical assistance programs have failed 
because the intended recipients of assistance were incorrectly 
identified. This often occurs when relief agencies focus their 
attention exclusively on men. They assume that as the heads of 
households, men usually make all the critical decisions about food 
production. In many societies, however, it is the women who decide 
questions concerning the growing of subsistence foods. This is 
especially true where food and cash crops are grown simultaneously. 
Women tend to manage their own fields, where they grow subsistence 
foods, while the men manage fields for cash crops. De Waal reported 
that in western Sudan "even on farms which are jointly managed by 
husband and wife, the man is usually solely responsible for major 
cash crops such as ground nuts and sesame, while the woman spends 
most of her time in the fields working on the grain crop."2
ISSUES IN COUNTER-FAMINE OPERATIONS
Political Obstacles to Counter-Famine Approaches
Perhaps the most difficult obstacles to overcome when planning 
a counter-famine program are political ones. Political constraints 
are usually obvious: they come in the form of government policies, 
inflexible program guidelines that seem etched in stone, and 
bureaucratic procedures that make innovation all but impossible. If 
the famine is in a conflict zone, political obstacles may prove 
formidable.
There are many hidden political agendas that make it difficult 
to work. These usually occur at the international level and involve 
relations between donors and the affected country. A good example 
happened during the famine in Ethiopia in 1986. The primary food 
aid donor was the U.S. government. Due to political hostilities 
between Ethiopia and the United States, American assistance was 
limited to humanitarian aid; a Congressional ban prohibited 
"developmental" assistance. The U.S. mission in Addis Ababa 
interpreted this ban to mean that assistance was limited to 
providing food directly to the famine victims —  approaches such as 
cash-for-work were strictly prohibited. Such political obstacles 
only penalize the poor and are shortsighted.
2 Roger W. Hay, "Food Aid and Relief/Development Strategies", 
a paper presented at the WFP-ADB seminar "Food Aid for Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa", Abidjan, 1986.
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TABLE 7-A
INTERVENTIONS TO COUNTER THE DEVELOPMENT 
AND SPREAD OF FAMINE CONDITIONS
Tvoe of Intervention Methods (in order of Priority)
Income Support Cash-for-work 
Temporary jobs 
PiK
Food for work (Coupon store 
approach)
Food-for-work 
Cash grants 
Direct food aid
Price Supports for Animal - grain exchanges
Cultivators and Pastoralists Subsidized purchases
Market Support Subsidized sales of food (through 
micro-vendors) in local markets 
Subsidized sales of food in national 
markets
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Direct Investments:
TABLE 7-B
INCOME SUPPORT PROJECTS
Land Improvements (contouring, terracing, soil
improvements)
—  Erosion Control (planting trees for windbreaks, erecting 
sand fences, etc.)
Irrigation Improvements
—  Alternative Crops (distribution of seeds)
Crop Salvaging (alternative uses of stunted crops; e.g. 
fodder)
Construction of On-Farm Grain Storage Facilities 
Distribution of Replacement Seeds, Fertilizers, 
Pesticides
Indirect Investments:
Farm-to-Market Road Construction
Construction of Cooperative Grain Storage Facilities 
Construction or Improvement of Public Water Systems
Lower Priority Projects:
Construction of Schools, Market Facilities, Health 
Facilities
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Doctrinal Obstacles to Counter-Famine Approaches
Some formidable obstacles are doctrinal: policies set up with 
good intentions that in practice are counterproductive. Relief 
agencies abound in them. For example, food given by donors is 
usually restricted to free distribution.
"Not to be marketed or sold."
A GIFT FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(A typical label on donated food.)
Other donors have established artificial classifications for 
their assistance, dividing aid into "relief" and "development." 
Unfortunately, many of the more important counter-famine approaches 
have been classified as development aid, making them unavailable 
for use in emergencies.
The biggest doctrinal obstacles, however, stem from the limited 
understanding people have about the processes at play in famines. 
For example, a common attitude is that people who are in distress 
should not have to pay for food. Thus, many agencies are unwilling 
to use cash-for-work approaches.
Doctrines spring out of "conventional wisdom" or long held 
beliefs about famines. If people are starving, it is assumed their 
is a food shortage so food is imported. Few look for food in the 
famine zone and thus miss the opportunity buy food locally and 
speed the famine relief process.
Until the origins of famine faced for what they are, and the 
cause and effect relationships are more clearly understood, relief 
agencies will continue to bind themselves to inappropriate, 
expensive, and largely ineffective responses.
SUMMARY
Counter-famine strategies are based on the understanding that 
famines are principally a problem of income and employment; 
interventions should be concerned with short and long-term 
solutions to low and unstable incomes and declining job prospects. 
The principal approaches required are economic interventions, 
rather than food aid. The process begins by determining to what 
extent family income has collapsed and where the appropriate
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interventions can be made. Interventions that focus on increasing 
food security at the household level by replacing lost income are 
the best means of countering the most prevalent forms of famine.
If food aid is required, it must be approached with caution and 
targeted effectively. The arbitrary restrictions on sales of food 
aid are often counterproductive and deny relief agencies a vast 
array of counter-famine measures. If donor rules do not permit 
considerable flexibility, counter-famine strategies will be 
difficult to implement.
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Chapter 8
E M E R G E N C Y  R E S P O N S E
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Emergency response is the term used to describe the steps that 
need to be taken to respond to a fully developed famine.
The initial response is similar to the opening moves of a chess 
game. It is dictated as much as by what is unknown about the 
situation as by what is known. In a chess game, no matter what the 
players' eventual strategy, pawns must be moved to create openings 
and flexibility for the capital pieces. Likewise, in an emergency, 
certain moves must be made and certain systems must be established 
before other options can be brought into play —  lives cannot be 
saved unless certain interrelated measures are taken immediately. 
For example, diseases cannot be controlled unless there is an 
adequate food supply. Provision of food will have a reduced effect 
unless diarrhea is controlled. Diarrhea cannot be prevented unless 
there is an adequate supply of clean water. Clean water depends on 
adequate sanitation and good hygiene practices.
Emergency response should begin as soon as it is clear that 
counter-famine measures cannot prevent or contain the continued 
decline in people's nutritional status. At the same time, an 
assessment of the situation should be conducted. The information 
developed by the assessment is then used to further elaborate the 
plans. Initial response should follow a prescribed pattern and 
continue until on-site assessments prove beyond a doubt that a 
specific set of interventions is not required. These actions should 
always be taken until accurate information is developed that 
indicates other measures should be employed.
Each of the main actions is complementary to and supports the 
others. One strategy alone usually won't solve a particular 
problem; a concerted attack involving several approaches is usually 
necessary. Furthermore, one program can rarely accomplish its goals 
unless it is supported by programs in other sectors. For example, 
death rates from diarrhea cannot be brought under control solely by 
providing clean water; oral rehydration therapy (ORT) plus 
sanitation and good personal hygiene practices will also be 
important.
E p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
Research has shown that the primary causes of death in a 
famine are malnutrition, measles, and diarrhea. Each affects the 
others. A severely malnourished child will not be able to survive 
a case of measles. Severe diarrhea can quickly dehydrate and kill 
a malnourished person or someone with measles. To save lives, these 
three killers must be brought under control.
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The interrelationship of the three causes of mortality are 
depicted theoretically in Figure 8-1.
Malnutrition
/ \
/ \
Measles —  Diarrhea
Figure 8-1
P R I M A R Y  R E S P O N S E S
The priorities in the initial phase of the emergency are those 
that address the major killers. These actions include the provision 
of food, immunization and diarrhea control through the provision of 
clean water, sanitation, hygiene and oral rehydration. The 
relationship of these actions to the primary causes of mortality 
are depicted in Figure 8-2 below.
Food Supply
/ \
/ \
Immunization --- Water, Sanitation, ORT
Figure 8-2
These responses are the foundations of an initial response 
doctrine. Each of these responses —  food, immunization, and 
diarrhea control —  requires a distinct set of activities.
F o o d  S u p p l y
Adequate supplies of food are required to ensure that famine 
victims recover and maintain a good nutritional condition. This 
includes providing a general ration and, in some situations, 
supplementary food for special groups. 1
1. General Ration. This is the ration designed to provide 
families with their basic food needs. Of all the food 
supplied in emergencies, the general ration is the most 
important. If it is possible to supply enough food so that
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the general ration can be maintained without interruption, the 
vast majority of families can recover and survive on this food 
alone.
The general ration is composed of a mix of foods —  known 
as the "food basket" —  designed to provide sufficient 
calories as well as protein, vitamins and minerals. The 
primary requirements are:
A basic grain, oil, and minimum caloric content of 2250
to 2500 calories per day.1
A source of protein.
A mix of vitamins (especially A) , minerals and other
nutrients to ensure healthy development of children.
The key to a successful general ration during the initial 
emergency is supplying enough food for people to survive 
without relying on supplementary sources. Usually, a general 
ration is based on giving every member of the family, even 
children, enough food to meet the needs of an adult. This 
permits families to apportion the food according to 
nutritional needs and provides a small buffer against 
shortages and spoilage within the family's supply.
The amount of food provided is determined by its caloric 
content —  the lower the number of calories in a food, the 
more food required. Most relief agencies calculate the amount 
needed on the basis of an average worker's nutrition 
requirements and adjust for inter-family distributions.
Rations should be distributed at regular intervals to 
build confidence in the food supply and reduce hoarding. If 
relief camps have been set up, distributions should be made 
approximately every 10 days. This reduces the likelihood that 
malnourished people who over-consume will not have enough food 
between the time they run out and the next distribution. 
Longer intervals will result in higher mortality.
Unless an adequate registration program is developed and 
instituted immediately, major problems in food distribution 
will occur quickly. 1
1 In most guides to relief operations, the recommended average 
emergency ration is 1900 calories. However, food is more than a 
dietary need; the poor also see it as a source of income. If the 
basis for planning the ration does not consider that people will 
sell a portion of the food and adjust the allocation upward, 
ultimately, some members of the family will not have enough to 
survive.
3
2. Supplementary Feeding. Supplementary feeding is a food 
distribution program targeted for those who are malnourished 
or have special nutritional needs. A supplementary feeding 
program should be carried out:
When malnutrition is high (over 10 percent of those under 
5 years).
When there is evidence that families are not distributing 
the food equitably among all family members and the 
problem cannot be corrected by other means (such as 
changing the mix of foods distributed).
When the general ration is less than 1900 calories for 
any reason.
There are two ways to carry out supplementary feeding 
programs. One is to supply special supplementary foods to the 
target populations (usually women and children under 5). The 
other is to set up feeding centers where the people come daily 
to receive prepared meals and consume them on the spot. Of the 
two programs, the latter is usually the most effective in the 
advanced stages of an emergency. However, it is only as 
effective as the efforts made by the staff to identify those 
most in need and to enroll them in the program and monitor 
attendance.
Weighing and measuring children to ensure they are 
gaining weight is important. Normally, middle upper arm 
circumference (MUAC) measurements are used for rapid community 
surveys to qualify children for supplementary feeding; once 
they are enrolled, the children are measured using 
weight-for-height standards.
If the program is being carried out via feeding centers, 
all children should be immunized against the primary childhood 
diseases (measles, DPT, etc.) when they are enrolled. (The 
minimum is measles.)
In the initial stages of an emergency, the routine 
monitoring that is carried on as a part of the program may be 
the best way to determine other health and nutritional 
problems in the population. By monitoring diarrhea in children 
and noting where the people live, it is usually possible to 
identify impure sources of water. By noting women or children 
who do not gain weight despite supplementary feeding, problems 
can often be detected within the general ration or in the way 
food is distributed within the family.
The key to a successful supplementary feeding program is 
outreach. Health workers must go into the community, identify 
women and children who require supplementary feeding, and
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ensure that they are enrolled in, and regularly receive, the 
supplementary food. Without an outreach effort, supplementary 
feeding will have only minimal impact.
3. Therapeutic (Intensive) Feeding. Therapeutic feeding is 
an intensive, round-the-clock feeding program usually carried 
out under the supervision of health workers. In recent years, 
therapeutic feeding programs have attracted much criticism 
from epidemiologists who note that few children survive 
despite the best efforts of medical staff. Therapeutic 
feeding requires special facilities (normally attached to an 
outpatient dispensary or hospital) and a skilled staff to 
monitor the feeding effort.
As a general rule, therapeutic feeding programs should be 
given a low priority in relation to other food and nutrition 
efforts. They should be established only after supplementary 
feeding is under way. Remember, in an emergency the goal is to 
save as many people as possible, and efforts must be focused 
on keeping people from deteriorating to a point where only 
radical interventions such as therapeutic feeding are 
necessary.
4. Indirect Food Supply. Throughout the emergency, relief
agencies should develop and expand indirect ways of increasing 
food supplies in, and adjacent to, the famine zone. These can 
include income support projects, cash-for-work, food-for-work, 
and other indirect approaches. After the emergency has abated, 
direct food aid programs should be phased out and indirect 
food programs should be expanded as a residual means of 
building food security. (Indirect food assistance is described 
in detail in Chapter __.)
Remember, food aid can only relieve the food needs and not 
eliminate the causes, nor in itself, promote recovery. 
Furthermore, unchecked food aid can have adverse consequences, 
delaying agricultural recovery and creating dependencies on food 
aid. Therefore, it is important that a balanced famine-fighting 
strategy be developed that includes not only provision of food aid, 
but also agricultural recovery and development assistance.
Timnuni z a t io n
Vaccinations to prevent communicable diseases, especially 
measles, are the second component of emergency response. To be 
successful, a vaccination program requires:
Surveillance and detection of communicable diseases.
Vaccines.
A cold chain to ensure that the vaccines are not damaged
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or loose their strength from the point of origin to the 
time of injection.
Effective promotion, mobilization, and coverage of the 
population.
In recent years, major efforts have been made to build 
adequate supplies of vaccines in all Third World countries. The 
Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) spearheaded by UNICEF and 
the World Health Organization has resulted in the building of 
national stockpiles of many of the most important vaccines used in 
emergencies, and this has greatly reduced response times. By 
borrowing from EPI warehouses, there is no reason why effective 
immunization campaigns cannot be carried out from the start of most 
emergencies.
A vital component is maintaining a continuous cold chain from 
the EPI warehouse to the recipient's arm. A cold chain requires the 
use of specially designed cold boxes (dedicated exclusively for 
holding vaccines) for transferring vaccines, refrigeration 
equipment, and adequate stores of fuel for the refrigerators at the 
immunization centers.
D i a r r h e a  C o n t r o l
Diarrhea control consists of both preventative and curative 
activities. Preventative actions focus on the relationship between 
clean water, sanitation, and hygiene —  a relationship known as the 
"hygiene loop," illustrated below in Figure 8-3. Anywhere 
contamination occurs within this loop, diarrhea will result.
Figure 8-3 
T H E  H Y G I E N E  L O O P
Curative actions focus on oral rehydration therapy; a simple 
solution of sugar, salt, bicarbonate of soda, and water that helps 
restore the body's electrolyte balance and treats dehydration. In 
the long term, it is more effective than most costly anti-diarrheal 
medicines.
Use of oral rehydration solution (ORS) is becoming more 
widespread each year. (In some countries, the packets are so 
commonplace that they are used for curing hangovers.)
There are numerous sources for ORS packets. They are usually 
included in the standard medical kits provided by UNHCR, WHO, 
UNICEF and many private voluntary organizations. Large stores of
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ORS packets are often on hand at the EPI warehouses, and they are 
commercially available in a growing number of countries. In a 
situation where supplies are inadequate, it is possible to make the 
solution from the basic ingredients. The formula is shown below.
Figure 8-4
O r a l  R e h y d r a t i o n  S o l u t i o n
Sodium Chloride (Table Salt) 3.5 Grams
Sodium Bicarbonate (Baking Soda) 2.5 Grams
Potassium Chloride 1.5 Grams
Glucose (sugar) 20.0 Grams
To be mixed with one liter of clean water
L O G I S T I C S
Now that the three primary sets of interrelated activities have 
been identified, it is time to link them with one final activity: 
logistics. The delivery of food, medicines, and materials are 
dependent upon logistics. Unless an effective logistics system is 
established from the outset, it will be impossible to implement 
other actions smoothly. Logistics systems entail the management of 
vehicles, fuel, parts, warehouses, cold storage facilities, and 
pharmacies.
SU M M A R Y
To successfully control an emergency, the initial response must 
move forward and in unison along set lines. All the activities 
mentioned above are interrelated and interdependent. If these 
programs are implemented swiftly and backed by a sound logistics 
system, lives can be saved and a base can be laid for a balanced 
and effective assistance program.
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Chapter 9
FOOD RELIEF PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
There are many ways to ensure that people get the food they 
need during famines. They can generally be categorized as either 
direct and indirect methods. No one method will meet all the 
people's needs at the same time, thus, program planners should 
consider using a mix of programs in different phases of the famine. 
Figure 9-1 depicts a typical famine cycle and shows how different 
approaches might be applied at different phases to improve the 
targeting of food aid and, at the same time, promote agricultural 
recovery.
Figure 9-1
There are many alternatives to direct distribution of food 
during times of famine or conflict. They include:
Market interventions such as
internal purchase programs,
direct sales of food to local vendors at subsidized 
rates (i.e., monetization of food aid),and 
livestock interventions
—  Income support programs such as cash-for-work;
—  Food-for-work programs (FFW);
—  Food stamp or food coupon programs; and
—  Payment in Kind (PiK) programs.
The value of these programs is that if properly planned, they 
are less stressful to individual families than receiving handouts. 
Much of the food provided in food-for-work or food coupon programs 
will eventually be bartered and find its way into the marketplace 
thereby increasing the overall availability of food in the 
community. If proper allowances are made and if the beneficiaries 
are targeted properly, alternative distribution programs can often 
serve to help stabilize food prices.
Direct Monetization
Direct monetization is an approach that is used to revitalize
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village grain markets. Supplies of grain are procured and 
delivered to the target villages where it is sold at subsidized 
prices directly to the small retail vendors in the market. The 
selling price should be an amount equivalent to the normal 
wholesale price. Sales to each vendor should be limited and 
purchasers should agree to sell their grains within a certain price 
range, roughly equivalent to the normal (or previous season's 
retail sales price, adjusted for inflation. The retail market 
should be monitored to ensure that vendors sell the grain within 
the agreed limits. Any vendor selling above that level or selling 
to wholesale merchants would be disqualified from subsequent sales.
Proceeds from the sale should go into a village fund to be 
used for cash-for-work projects. Families that cannot afford to 
buy grain even at the depressed price would be eligible to apply 
for employment in the cash-for-work projects. Projects would be 
selected by the village council or elders and monitored by NGOs 
working in the area.
Indirect Monetization
In areas that are insecure, monetization can be used as a 
strategy to reach people in areas that are inaccessible to relief 
agencies. Merchants and others who remain in the areas are often 
willing to buy food and take it back to the area on their own. 
Many private merchants from Eritrea came to Sudan to buy grain and 
took it back into the besieged areas throughout the civil war. 
Sometimes they would carry the grain by lorry, but often they would 
take it in by camel or donkey. Other examples where merchants 
managed to get food into areas unreachable by relief agencies 
include Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and the famous "land bridge" 
operation in Cambodia. The merchants are often able to negotiate 
deals with the warring parties that allow them to cross the lines 
and larger merchants can usually organize protection for the 
shipments. The smaller village traders who utilize pack animals 
can usually reach areas off the main roads and can travel at night 
so that they can avoid bandits and irregular forces.
Food sold in an indirect monetization program will cost more 
in the retail markets because of the wholesale traders added costs. 
However, merchants are mindful of what prices the market can bear 
and will usually recognize that there is more profit in volume 
sales than in limited, high price sales. What usually happens is 
that the prices for the first deliveries are relatively high, but 
as the wealthier people's food needs are satisfied and deliveries 
continue, the price begins to drop. Unfortunately, this means that 
those who need food most, i.e., the poorest and the people who are 
out of cash usually have to wait the longest for food. In 
Afghanistan, agencies tried to offset this by working with the 
merchants to get them to allocate a portion of the food to the 
poorest and low prices but this proved difficult to monitor.
Indirect monetization may not be the best approach but 
sometimes, its the only choice.
Internal Purchase
In many situations, the purchase and distribution of
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internally available food reserves is a viable alternative to 
imported food aid. In most conflicts and famines, the amount of 
food available is far more than outsiders realize. Often cereals, 
pulses and livestock may be available. Since famines are usually 
the result of market disturbances and conflicts have the effect of 
disrupting normal marketing, food is often trapped in pockets where 
it cannot be sold or transported as usual. In internal purchase 
program, a relief agency locates sources of supply, imports cash 
(local currency) to buy the food and then purchases and 
redistributes the food either by selling it at lower prices or 
giving it to relief agencies or committees in the famine or 
conflict zone to distribute through selective feeding or targeted 
food programs.
Internal purchase has many advantages. It is faster than 
importing food, is less costly, and can usually be managed by a few 
people working with local merchants and traders. Usually, once 
merchants start to release food that they are hoarding, others will 
also start to sell, especially if the agency is reselling the food 
to local vendors at low prices. Thus, the primary advantage is 
that it can help to reactivate the normal market system.
The food obtained through an internal purchase operation is 
often more compatible with local tastes than imported foods. When 
the food is sold, the proceeds can be used to buy more food or to 
support cash-for-work projects that give the poorest an chance to 
earn money to participate in the sales.
While the acquisition of internal food supplies is often more 
effective than external food aid, it is important to ensure that 
buying and distributing it does not significantly disrupt the local 
economy. Remembering that famines shift geographically, it is 
important to carefully analyze food availability before purchasing 
internally. For example, villages outside the famine zone may 
produce a surplus. However, if villages next to them are producing 
at a marginal or subsistence level, those villagers may depend on 
the surplus for their own protection. Thus, careful analysis is 
required before initiating an internal purchase program.
Cash-for-Work
Cash-for-work, when properly organized is the easiest means of 
providing people with food on a widespread basis. Programs are 
relatively easy to plan and execute and monitoring is simple. The 
only major concern is the types of projects selected: they must not 
take people away from normal agricultural activities and should be 
designed to improve both near and long-term agricultural prospects.
In comparison to food-for-work programs which are generally 
more popular with relief agencies, cash-for-work is less disruptive 
of the local economy. The program is easier to administer —  there 
are no commodity logistics to manage —  and the projects are easier 
to terminate and to move from one area to another as needs dictate.
Cash-for-work also can infuse much-needed cash into economies 
that have been depleted of cash resources by drought and famine 
conditions. In some cases, this can stimulate local economic 
recovery.
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Culturally, cash-for-work is not an alien concept, people 
normally work for wages. Therefore, the program is the best way to 
help maintain people's dignity for it removes the stigma of working 
on a relief program and gives people a choice about how they use 
the money. Since it is known that some of the food in 
food-for-work and other food distribution programs is sold in order 
to buy household commodities such as soap, cooking fuel, etc., 
cash-for-work does away with the restrictions imposed by the other 
programs.
Critics of cash-for-work claim that the people do not spend 
all the money on food; the purpose of the program is basically to 
fight famine and food is what is needed. However, studies of 
cash-for-work programs show that most money is spent for food; 
claims that people spend all their money on alcohol, tobacco and 
other nonessentials are exaggerated. Critics also point out that 
money can have the effect of making it more profitable to work for 
cash than to work in the fields, if the projects pay more than 
farming. Also, in a country like Ethiopia where there are 
restrictions on the movement of food between agricultural areas, 
and where natural market forces that would move surpluses to 
food-deficit areas do not exist, there may not be enough food to 
buy in the food-deficit areas. This could have the effect of 
pushing up prices in local markets and lowering the buying power of 
the cash received.
Cash-for-work projects should: (a) be short-term; (b) be paid 
on a piecework basis; (c) include women as workers, and (d) use a 
screening process to determine the persons eligible.
Projects may be carried out at any time in the planting cycle 
but if off-farm projects are planned during peak cultivation or 
harvest periods, allowances, such as part-time work, must be made 
so that people can work their lands at the critical times.
When the program is being used as a containment measure, it 
should be targeted for zones where crop yields will be at least 60% 
of normal.
Cash-for-work programs should be considered as an "exit” 
program in areas where food aid is being phased out. This will 
inject much-needed capital into the local economy and help continue 
both agricultural and economic recovery.
Food-for-Work
Typically, FFW projects pay people with food for working on 
public works or community development projects. Ideally, 
food-for-work projects are used as a means of improving the land or 
making improvements that will aid agriculture, such as terracing, 
building water catchments, erosion control measures, and 
irrigation. On a larger basis, FFW may be used for community 
improvements such as building or upgrading farm-to-market roads.
Food-for-work proponents claim that food-for-work is less 
likely to create dependencies than direct food aid and is more 
developmental than direct handouts.
Food-for-work accomplishes multiple objectives: getting food
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into the hands of those most in need, and carrying out projects and 
improvements that benefit everyone. Thus, both individuals and 
communities are served.
Projects are not difficult to organize, though paying in food 
means that a food logistics system must be set up to transport and 
store the food prior to distribution. The only difference 
logistically between FFW and direct distribution programs is that 
final distribution in easier and does not require the same degree 
of monitoring..
However, food-for-work has critics. They point out that, 
unless properly planned, FFW often takes on a life of its own. As 
more food enters the community, some will inevitably be sold on the 
local market to buy things that people need other than food. The 
food is normally sold below the market price, which depresses the 
prices the farmers can get for the food they have been able to 
produce —  thus that group is added to the overall caseload. As 
prices for agricultural products decline, it soon pays more to work 
for food than to grow crops. Gradually, production drops, causing 
more hunger and forcing more people to go to work for food. More 
food is needed to meet the need, and soon a vicious cycle is 
established. Critics have noted that dry ration distribution is 
often easier to stop than food-for-work programs.
The objective of any feeding program is to feed those most at 
risk and, in famines, those most at risk are children. Critics of 
FFW point out that it is difficult to establish a correlation 
between food-for-work programs and nutritional improvement. 
Usually able-bodied men participate in the food-for-work programs 
and, because they are undertaking strenuous work, they take a 
larger portion of the food. To compensate, more food may have to 
be given out. This in turn means that more food will be necessary. 
In a situation where food resources are scarce, it may be more 
expeditious to continue dry ration distribution than to phase into 
a more resource-consuming program.
Food-for-work is normally used: 
as a counterfamine measure;
as an complementary approach to increasing food in a 
community during a famine emergency;
as a means of increasing food security at the periphery 
of the famine zone in order to contain the spread of 
famine conditions.
Food-for-work is most often compared to cash-for-work, with an 
increasing number of advocates for the latter. In reality, both 
types of projects can be appropriate under certain circumstances, 
if properly planned and carried out. The reality for most agencies 
is that western countries produce surpluses of food, not cash and, 
thus, it is food that the agencies can obtain for distribution, not 
cash. Therefore, agencies are more likely to be carrying out 
food-for-work programs than cash-for-work, and NGOs, the primary 
consignees of food for this purpose, will be involved in numerous 
food-for-work projects. It is important for an organization to 
establish criteria for the formulation of food-for-work projects 
that will make the program as non-disruptive as possible, and to 
explore options which could provide an alternative food
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distribution mechanism.
Critics of both approaches feel that food-for-work projects 
are often "make work" activities and, if they are not really 
needed, can consume valuable resources. Many projects require 
detailed study and planning, and food-for-work programs are often 
conceived and planned by persons without proper training and skill. 
Therefore, the programs may not be environmentally sound and can 
have an adverse affect on local ecologies and agriculture.
Food-for-work programs should be designed to provide 
short-term work only. To ensure that this happens, projects should 
be small-scale activities that can be completed in a short period 
of time. Projects such as road construction that take many months 
or even years to complete, or that could be intentionally prolonged 
by workers or program administrators, should be avoided.
Projects should be conducted between planting and harvest 
periods, or during the period beginning three months after the 
normal harvest until the next planting season begins. If projects 
are carried out during the planting season, they could conceivably 
reduce the amount of food being planted. If run during the harvest 
season or immediately thereafter, the food could have the effect of 
depressing local prices.
An appropriate mix of different types of projects should be 
planned for the same area. Not all projects should be targeted 
strictly to the agricultural sector but should also include works 
that will improve overall living conditions in the famine zones.
Payment for work should be according to production rather than 
a daily wage (i.e., piecework).
When farmers are the primary target group, the work should be 
on a part-time basis only (two or three days per week) in order to 
permit the farmers to work their fields.
In areas where agricultural recovery is taking place, 
food-for-work should be seen as a preliminary step to phasing out 
all food aid. The criterion for determining when this should occur 
is when nutritional levels have stabilized and remained high for a 
period of 3 months or longer.
In order to ensure that the vulnerable groups receive food, 
food-for-work projects should be developed for women.
Effective screening procedures should be established to ensure 
that the men working in food-for-work programs represent the 
neediest households and those with a high percentage of vulnerable 
individuals.
Food Store and Coupon Approach
A variation on food-for-work is the "food store and coupon" 
program. This program has been used with variations in several 
countries with quite a degree of success. A number of experts have 
suggested that this approach can help to remove many of the 
negative aspects of both food-for-work and cash-for-work programs.
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Under the program, income generating projects, similar to 
those established for food-for-work programs, are identified and 
organized. However, the workers are paid in coupons which can be 
redeemed only at a special relief store set up in each community. 
These stores stock food, but also carry other supplies such as 
health care items, charcoal, household utensils, and personal 
articles that can contribute to health and hygiene (soap, 
toothpaste, etc.). In addition, a limited number of personal 
luxury items may also be sold at the store, for which cash or a 
combination of cash and coupons can be used.
The rationale for this approach is that people will buy only 
what they need. This serves as a natural "regulator” of the amount 
of fp°d coming into the community. Also, people will have the 
ability to buy those things which they would otherwise obtain by 
selling food. Therefore, food provided by the relief program will 
not be as likely to end up in the local market competing with food 
produced by local farmers.
n:f the luxury items are procured from the local market by the 
participating agencies, local shopkeepers will also benefit. The 
amount of input from the agencies should be minimal and, by having 
a greater range of items available at the food store, the program 
should be popular and a greater incentive to work should be 
promoted. Finally, the range of foods provided at the coupon store 
can include those that are specially targeted for vulnerable 
groups, theoretically ensuring that a greater number of those most 
in need of calorie and nutritional inputs will receive them. With 
items in the store being controlled by the relief agencies, it will 
be possible to ensure that the workers principally take home food.
Proponents of the coupon store programs also point out that it is 
easy to establish nutrition monitoring activities in conjunction 
with, and physically adjacent to, the relief store. Open hours can 
be established and redemption days can be printed on the coupons.
The criteria for the coupon food store program are the same as 
for establishing food-for-work projects. However, since the food 
store concept is less likely to put surplus food into the market, 
the program may be carried out on a year-round basis.
Payment in-Kind (PiK)
PiK programs are designed to help support local farmers and to 
maintain or reconstruct the normal food marketing system. In this 
approach, farmers are paid in grains to improve their land with 
counter-drought or counter-desertification measures such as 
contouring, terracing, or planting windbreaks, and for 
participating in community development projects such as developing 
water harvesting measures, etc., for a specified period of time. 
Instead of receiving wages, farmers receive an amount of food that 
is equivalent to the amount of grain they would have produced had 
conditions been normal. If their harvest has totally failed, they 
receive the full amount. If they harvest a percentage of their 
normal yield, they receive the balance.
Normally, the farmers are paid in un-milled grains. They can 
sell the grains at whatever price they can negotiate from their 
normal buyers. In this way, all persons and institutions normally
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engaged in the marketing system can carry on as if the drought had 
not occurred. The negative impact of drought on the normal market 
system can thus be substantially reduced.
The program should be closely monitored to ensure that farmers 
or merchants do not hoard the grains. If hoarding does take place, 
agencies can make free food distributions in the community to lower 
the cost to the poor and force the hoarders to release their 
reserves.
Advocates point out that PiK provides an excellent means of 
informally controlling prices in local markets. This is done by 
adjusting the percentages of food provided according to the normal 
yields. By providing a greater percentage, prices should move 
downward; by providing less, prices would move upward.
A PiK program is designed to be used in those areas that are 
beginning to experience drought conditions or where some 
agricultural recovery has been possible in the aftermath of 
widespread crop failures. It should not be used in an area where 
almost total crop failure is occurring beyond one year.
Proponents of PiK claim that the program is the least 
disruptive to the local market system. They also point out that 
having additional grains will enable farmers producing limited 
amounts of locally-acclimatized grains to reserve an adequate 
portion of their yield for seeds for the following season. This 
reduces the amount of seed to be supplied by relief agencies or the 
government.
Proponents also point out that, because the food system 
remains intact, the overall agro-economy can benefit others, not 
just the farmers. Some proponents also estimate that management 
requirements for PiK are less than for other programs since the 
food is being handled through the normal market system and not 
through an artificial distribution system. (Food does not need to 
be delivered to each farmer but could be delivered to the granaries 
and allocated to farmers when their harvest is brought for sale.) 
In Ethiopia, PiK programs could have the effect of stabilizing 
grain markets in areas that are marginally affected by drought and 
countering famine conditions in isolated food-deficit areas. PiK 
could also be used in those areas where food is growing, but not in 
sufficient quantities.
The success of a PiK program in countries with tightly 
controlled state agricultural marketing however, would be dependent 
upon the government's willingness to permit foods allocated to a 
region to remain in that region and not be transferred to the urban 
areas.
PiK programs should be targeted for areas where:
a) famine conditions do not currently exist but food 
availability is decreasing;
b) famine conditions do exist but food deficits are 
decreasing (i.e., agricultural recovery is taking place) ;
c) food deficits occur adjacent to acute famine areas; and
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d) isolated pockets of food deficit are surrounded by areas 
of food sufficiency (though not major surpluses).
Principles for Employing Indirect Food Aid Strategies
The following principles should guide agencies in determin­
ing when to use and how to target alternative food aid
programs.
a. Alternative food aid strategies may be used when 
nutrition-based distribution systems are being employed 
for the larger community.
b. Alternative food programs should be used as the primary 
vehicle for transition from intensive to limited food aid.
c. Food aid should not be used to employ people for work that 
they would normally do without pay, such as improvements 
to their own land, traditional community labor, etc.
d. Food-for-work programs should be carefully monitored to 
ensure that people that need the food receive the first 
priority for jobs.
e. The food-for-work programs should be monitored to ensure 
that the amount of food being provided does not have a 
disruptive effect on agricultural activities, such as 
terracing, building water catchments, erosion control 
measures, and improvement to farm-to-market roads.
F a i r  P r i c e  S t o r e s
The "fair price" store is a popular way of providing indirect 
controls over food market prices while making commodities available 
at reasonable prices to those most in need. This approach has been 
used in a number of countries, but it is most often associated with 
India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The concept grew out of the 
famine codes that were developed following the food crises in that 
region at mid-century.
Fair price stores are places where staples are sold at 
"normal" prices. The objective is to stabilize prices in the market 
during times of scarcity by providing a nearby distributor who 
sells at a fair price. By charging less, the fair price store 
forces others in the market to lower their prices or lose business.
The stores can operate in several ways. On the subcontinent, 
the governments ran the stores. In Haiti, similar stores have been 
run by cooperatives for their members. In Kenya, the government
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sells grain at low prices to dealers in the village markets. The 
dealers, in turn, agree to resell the grain to the villagers at a 
fair price negotiated with the government. In several countries, 
NGOs have operated the stores, using grains they obtained as 
commodity aid from major donors.
In many cases, access to the fair price stores is limited to 
registered beneficiaries who must present a ration card or other 
form of identification to purchase food. In several countries that 
use food stamps, anyone who qualifies for the stamps can shop at 
the stores. Several programs allow anyone access to the stores but 
the amount they can purchase at one time is limited.
The primary advantage of the fair price store is that it uses 
a familiar mechanism, with minimum disruption of the normal 
markets, to ensure people access to food.
DIRECT FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
There are many ways to distribute food during a famine, and 
there are many models and programs that have developed over years 
of practice that can be adapted for specific situations.
The choice of approach is usually dictated by:
The severity of the famine.
—  The geographic location of the people.
Whether people are living in their villages or have moved 
to relief camps in search of food.
Generally, direct programs distribute food directly to the 
famine victims, usually free of charge although sometimes a token 
payment or service may be encouraged.
Direct food distribution systems can be divided into two 
categories: village and camp systems. During widespread famine, 
relief agencies are often involved in both.
There are major differences in the approach to village and 
camp distributions. Village systems are designed to help people 
remain in their homes and to continue living as normally as 
possible. This assumes that people usually have access to other 
food sources; therefore, the system is supplemental. The agency 
attempts to put enough food into the community to meet all its 
nutritional needs and to allow natural adjustments to take place —  
in other words, to provide enough food so that people can sell or 
barter food for other services. Under this approach, however, food 
distribution should not be so great that farmers slow or cease 
agricultural production; food distribution also should not 
adversely affect the prices that farmers can get for the food they 
manage to harvest. At the same time, it is important that those who 
need the food most get adequate amounts so that they will gradually 
improve nutritionally.
Village distribution systems are the more difficult 
logistically and administratively to carry out, but the advantages 
of this program over camp-based systems far outweigh the 
inconveniences. People who remain in their communities can continue
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their lives. They will also be present when conditions in their 
area have improved enough to permit resumption of normal activities 
and food production can be restored to its normal levels. Village 
systems are therefore more "developmental" than camp systems, which 
are better described as "relief programs."
Camp systems are required when people leave their homes in 
search of food and congregate in relief camps or in highly dense 
settlements adjacent to cities. Because they have left their homes, 
the program must assume that the people do not have access to other 
food sources and that the relief agencies must meet the total food 
requirements of the victims. Even if the settlement or camp is 
adjacent to a major city, the program must assume, at least at 
first, that the displaced people do not have access to other food 
sources. Later, however, it may be possible to decrease the amount 
of relief if evidence indicates people are able to obtain other 
sources of food.
When providing food in camps, a balanced food basket needs to 
be provided. This means that the food that is distributed must meet 
all the basic requirements for nutrition including calories, 
protein, vitamins, and minerals for members of a typical family.
Other major concerns in camp systems are:
Providing food on a regular and timely basis. Generally 
the food distribution interval is about one distribution 
every ten days.
— Ensuring equitable inter-family distribution of the food.
Usually people living in camps are far more vulnerable than 
people who have been able to remain in their villages. Therefore, 
great caution must be exercised in carrying out a free distribution 
program to ensure equitable distribution.
V i l l a g e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  S y s t e m s :
There are two general distribution models that can be used. 
These are general distribution systems and nutrition-based 
distribution systems.
1. General Distribution Systems
In the general system, a relief agency takes food in bulk to 
the villages and distributes it to everyone equally on a regular 
basis. The ration is usually based on a fixed allocation 
(determined by caloric content) times the number of family members.
This approach has several advantages. First, it is the easiest 
to plan. Simply multiply the number of people by the food ration to 
get the total tonnages required. Second, the program is fairly 
simple to manage; most of the emphasis is on logistics management 
rather than complicated nutrition monitoring. Third, since all the 
people are receiving food, a slight surplus will be developed in 
each community (because in planning, all recipients are counted as 
if they were adults in need of food). Also many people are likely 
to surreptitiously register more than once. This surplus will 
eventually be stockpiled for future needs or bartered by the
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families for other needed goods and services. Since every member of 
the community is receiving food, questions of equity and 
intra-village distribution are minimized.
The disadvantages of the program, however, usually outweigh 
the advantages. First, the neediest people are not specifically 
targeted. Therefore, some of the most desperate may not receive as 
much food as they need because of diversions or inequitable inter­
family distribution of the food. Second, it is the most expensive 
program. Since everyone is receiving food regardless of need, more 
food and transportation is required than if only the neediest were 
being fed.
The biggest disadvantage is the surplus of food in the 
community, which could slow agricultural recovery. The surplus 
could undercut prices that farmers and small merchants could get 
for the food that is produced. That could harm the farmers and 
merchants and delay recovery.
Phasing out such a program may also be difficult and is often 
disruptive. Since everyone in the community is getting food, it is 
more difficult to spot those who need additional nutritional 
support. Reducing the program without targeting specific people 
could mean that those not fully recovered would be harmed.
Finally, general food distribution programs are difficult to 
adjust to meet the needs of those groups with special nutritional 
requirements.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING 
A GENERAL VILLAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Carry out a nutritional assessment. Then:
1. Establish a logistics system and procure vehicles, 
fuel, and maintenance facilities.
2. Establish a registration system.
3. Designate distribution points in each community.
4. Establish a regular distribution schedule.
5. Establish a monitoring system with in-house spot checks 
(linked to specific addresses in each community).
2. Nutrition-based Distribution Systems
In nutrition-based systems, a parent, usually the mother, 
brings the thinnest child to a food distribution center and 
receives a food allocation based on the needs of that child. 
Initially, everyone in the family receives a general ration; then 
later, the program is adjusted to meet the needs of only the 
malnourished.
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The middle upper arm circumference (MUAC) method of nutrition 
surveillance is usually the method used to determine whether a 
child should be enrolled in the program. This method tends to err 
on the side of caution; in other words, all those who are on the 
margins are likely to be qualified for at least one month's food 
support. Once the people are enrolled in the program, more 
accurate weight-for-height measurements will be used to monitor 
progress.
The advantages of the nutrition-based system clearly outweigh 
the disadvantages. First, it provides better targeting. Food gets 
directly to the people most in need in each community. Second, the 
programs are easy to adjust. Because regular nutritional monitoring 
is carried out, the people most in need receive the food and those 
who prove to be healthy can be quickly discharged. If food 
conditions in the community continue to deteriorate, more people 
can be easily enrolled and exact food needs can be calculated.
The per capita cost is less. Since food is targeted to actual 
needs, surpluses don't develop and transport can be tailored to met 
those real needs.
Because food is going to those most in need, there is little 
adverse impact on the market. In most cases consumption will equal 
distribution and the normal system will not be affected either 
positively or negatively.
Nutrition-based systems provide a means of monitoring other 
factors or problems in the community, especially disease and in 
extreme situations, death rates. For example, if the distributing 
agency monitors such factors as diarrhea, disease, and attendance 
at the distribution center, and keeps records of participants by 
addresses or locations in the community, it is often possible to 
identify problems such as impure sources of water (detected by 
higher than normal diarrhea rates) and the prevalence of contagious 
disease, such as measles, and other diseases associated with 
malnutrition. It is also possible to monitor the geographic 
dimensions and spread of famine conditions.
Finally, it is easy to phase out the program when it is no 
longer needed. There is less impact on farmers because the food aid 
has been better fitted to actual needs.
The disadvantages of a nutrition-based system are few, but are 
important to recognize. Nutrition-based distribution systems are 
more difficult to administer, at least at first. However, 
monitoring permits administrators to discharge people when 
conditions have improved enough that they can take care of their 
own food requirements. Planning for food needs is more complicated 
because it has to be adjusted monthly. To receive the full benefits 
of the approach, more sophistication in operations is required. The 
distribution centers must be closely monitored and the data 
continually analyzed throughout the program. However, once the 
program is set up and in operation these functions become routine 
and are not difficult.
More staff is required. Nutrition-based programs are usually 
carried out by a voluntary agency with specialized health 
personnel. Sometimes UNICEF and sometimes government health
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ministries may be involved, though this is rare.
Good record-keeping is required not only for the program but 
for each individual case. Without good records, it is impossible to 
make the adjustments that make this program cost-effective.
Many critics of this approach are concerned that families may 
withhold food from one child so that they can remain in the program 
longer than is actually necessary. This behavior, referred to as 
the ”starve-a-child syndrome” is rare. If the agency does a series 
of spot checks to investigate intra-family distribution of food, 
this syndrome can usually be quickly detected. If the behavior is 
widespread, the syndrome can be overcome by distributing those 
kinds of food that only children have a taste for or that adults 
would not likely eat such as strained or blended foods like CSM* 1
or bulgur wheat.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING A 
NUTRITION-BASED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
First conduct a nutritional assessment. Then:
1. Establish a logistics system and procure vehicles, fuel, 
and maintenance facilities.
2. Establish a registration system based on:
a. Entry, using the middle upper-arm circumference 
measurement system
b. In-center monitoring using weight for height 
measurement systems.
3. Establish distribution points with in-house screening 
areas (with weighing scales, height-for-weight charts, 
registration cards, etc.)
4. Establish a distribution schedule that permits adequate 
time for each case.
5. Provide one nutritionist to monitor several distribution 
centers and to analyze the data being collected.
Common Problems in Village Distribution Systems
Experience has shown that there are certain problems that tend to 
occur in village distribution programs. These are:
1. Multiple registration: This usually occurs when agencies
unfamiliar with the community begin distribution. People
1 Corn soya milk, a common relief food used in supplementary 
feeding programs for children. Other popular blended foods include 
wheat soya blend (WSB), corn soya blend (CSB) and UNIMIX.
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quickly recognize that they can give bogus information and 
register more than once.
To combat multiple registration, families need to be "fixed" 
to a geographic location for their food distribution; spot 
checks should be carried out to be sure people are not 
cheating.
2. Inflated numbers of family members: People often try to
exaggerate the number of children in their families if the 
agency does not enroll people after on-site inspections. This 
behavior can be corrected by doing spot checks after the 
families have been enrolled. But this is difficult unless the 
checks are conducted at a time when the entire family is 
likely to be together, such as at night or during meals. Using 
people from the village to help enroll beneficiaries may be 
another way to reduce cheating, but local staff members may 
also cheat because they are likely to be sympathetic to their 
neighbors
3. Inflated numbers of people in a village: This is often a
problem when village leaders are put in charge of preparing 
the distribution lists for distributing food in their village. 
They may think it is their responsibility to inflate the 
number to ensure that the people get adequate amounts of food. 
If village leaders are providing the relief lists, spot checks 
should be carried out to verify the number of people in 
families and the number of families in clans or villages.
4. Registration of people who are not eligible: Often, people who 
are not eligible for food distribution will attempt to enroll 
to obtain food to sell or barter. To do this, they may 
"borrow" a child or other adults, and create a bogus family to 
qualify them for enrollment. Detecting non-eligibles is 
difficult, especially for an outside agency unfamiliar with 
the community. The best way to detect this behavior is through 
trusted local workers who verify the claims of each person or 
family.
5. Failure to report deaths of family members: It is common for 
families to hide the death of a family member so that they can 
continue to receive that person's ration. Many relief agencies 
find themselves caught in an adversarial situation with their 
clients over this issue. Since mortality is the major 
indicator of the performance of a program, it is important 
that this data be collected. As a general rule, agencies 
should make it clear to people that food rations will not be 
reduced simply because one or more children have died. The 
amount of oversupplied food in this case is minimal. Mortality 
information is far more valuable, and the additional food that 
a child would have brought in can be sold to help defray costs 
of burial, etc.
Camp Distribution Systems
When large numbers of people have congregated in camps or at the 
edge of cities in spontaneous settlements, it is usually necessary to 
distribute food to them directly. Indirect food systems are usually not 
used except to pay workers for camp operations.
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In-camp distribution systems are usually divided into "wet" feeding 
and "dry" feeding (or dry ration distribution). Wet feeding refers to 
the preparation of a cooked meal, while dry ration refers to the 
distribution the food in bulk to families, or groups of families, so 
that they can prepare the food themselves in their shelters.
Wet feeding is the least desirable food distibution method, though 
it is sometimes necessary. It is most often used to feed new arrivals, 
small populations or specific groups who have special nutritional needs.
Dry rations are the most common means of distributing food. It 
requires less staff, and it enables people to carry on life-styles as 
near to normal as possible.
In most cases, dry rations should be all the food aid required. 
Special feeding programs shouldn't be necessary if adequate supplies are 
available, if the basis for food distribution assumes adequate portions 
for all family members and provides enough food so the people may barter 
or exchange food. In most cases however, relief agencies cut the margins 
very close. Distributions, at least initially, may be haphazard and 
periodic shortages may occur. In these cases, inequities in the food 
distribution system may result as well as inequitable distributions 
among family members. When this happens, a supplementary food 
distribution may be necessary. This may be done by providing a 
supplementary dry ration for vulnerable groups, by providing special 
infant foods that are not likely to be consumed by adults or older 
children, or, in extreme cases, by conducting a supplementary feeding 
program where prepared meals are given to women and children who come to 
a special supplementary feeding center.
Dry ration distribution methods.
The two most common methods for distributing foods in a dry ration 
system are to individuals and to groups.
1. Individual distributions: In the individual system, each 
family is registered and issued a ration card. On specified 
days, one member of the family goes to the distribution point 
and, upon presentation of the ration card, collects the 
family's ration. Distributions are straightforward. As long as 
the distribution points are spread throughout the community, 
distribution can be done quickly and without too much trouble.
If registration is thorough and well monitored, each 
family is certain to get its full ration. That's the primary 
advantage of the system. But the system requires a lot of 
staff and there must be constant checking to make sure 
cheating is kept to a minimum. Furthermore, if the 
registration system is not adequate and is not address-based, 
multiple registration is easy and accurate targeting is almost 
impossible.
2 Group distributions: In a group distribution, food is
delivered in bulk to a sector or community unit of a camp or 
to a section of a community. The food is distributed in bulk 
there to the group leaders from that area. The leaders then 
distribute the food to the people based on their own 
assessment of needs.
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In recent years this has become a popular distribution 
method, especially where the recipients belong to the same 
village, tribe, clan, or extended family. Many sociologists 
argue that this method helps keep family and cultural units 
together and helps to reinforce the position of traditional 
leaders. Several critics, however, warn that traditional 
leaders may take an unfair portion for themselves as their 
"right" or "prerogative." And some studies have indicated that 
where group systems are used, nutritional recovery of the 
severely malnourished is often delayed and mortality rates 
take longer to decline, usually because inter-group 
distribution is not equitable. There are other examples, 
however, where the system has worked without major hitches. 
With proper organization and monitoring, problems in 
distribution can be detected quickly and corrected or 
alternative programs initiated.
From an administrative point of view, group distribution 
programs are fast and easy to monitor. Individual registration 
systems are not necessary, although it is important for the 
agency to do verifications and spot checks to ensure that the 
number of people claimed by the community leaders is accurate.
The primary disadvantage of group distributions is the 
difficulty in controlling the allocation of food. In addition, 
within the community, certain groups may not be receiving 
their fair share. As a general rule, group distributions 
should be avoided when:
A strong caste system exists among the people, and the 
society and its caste relationships are generally intact.
If the society has a practice of indentured servitude, 
slavery or holding captives as laborers (in these 
situations those groups will be denied food and high 
mortality will result).
—  When hostile insurgent groups are in the camp and may use 
food as a means of controlling the population.
When the system will make women vulnerable to sexual 
exploitation (when the system is controlled entirely by 
men, withholding of food for sexual favors is 
commonplace.)
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Chapter 10
INCOME GENERATING PROJECTS
During counter-famine operations, it will be necessary to 
initiate projects designed to provide alternative sources of income 
to the most affected families. To have a long-term, developmental 
impact, projects should be designed to help the most vulnerable 
farmers. When planning projects, several principles should be 
followed:
—  Priority should be given to projects that have a direct, 
immediate impact on improving agricultural production or 
reducing farmers' losses.
—  Projects should be organized on a communal and cooperative 
basis.
—  Projects should provide a sustained and fair, but not high, 
wage.
—  Projects should be carried out in a way that will help 
preserve the peoples' dignity, confidence, and self-esteem.
—  Projects should not compete with, or draw resources away 
from, normal agricultural production activities.
PROJECT CATEGORIES
Projects can be divided into three categories: individual 
projects on farms; mutual-help projects for small groups of farmers; 
and projects that benefit the community.
On-Farm Projects
Many projects can be designed as self-help activities, and 
relief agencies can encourage farmers to make improvements to their 
own land. To pay people to carry out these activities may seem 
counterproductive and may lead to concerns that they will create 
dependencies. However, the practice is common in developed countries 
—  for example, the U.S. government pays farmers to improve their 
lands by growing certain types of grasses. The PiK program (see 
Chapter __) is an approach that can be used.
Small-Scale, Mutual-Help Projects
The best and most effective projects are small-scale, 
mutual-help ones. Organization and monitoring is easier, and people 
usually take greater pride in the work. Most importantly, they can 
provide the basis for broader community development efforts.
Normally, these activities are organized around small groups 
that live on adjacent sites. The type of activity usually determines 
the number of people who are mobilized. The only criteria is that 
everyone involved has to benefit directly from the project.
Community Projects
Projects that benefit the community are easy to identify: 
schools, public health clinics, etc. easily come to mind. In a 
counter-famine program, however, it is important to remember that 
the activities selected should have an impact on food production —  
projects of general or longer-term benefit can wait.
PROJECTS
Irrigation
Irrigation is an important meathod for reducing the subsistence 
farmers' vulnerability to drought. Even minor amounts of irrigation 
can make a significant difference in the perennial viability of 
crops. Wherever feasible, irrigation works should receive the 
highest priority.
Labor is needed for digging wells, building water lifting 
devices, and digging irrigation canals and localized channels.
When organizing an irrigation project, the people to mobilize 
are those who will directly benefit.
Land Improvements
Erosion Control: The most common form of erosion control is 
contouring. Simple technologies, such as "A-frames" for determining 
contours (see Figure 10-1), have been developed that can be easily 
taught. Other measures that could be considered are planting 
windbreaks, constructing devices to capture and retain soil 
moisture, terracing hillsides, installing wells or improving 
existing ones, and improving irrigation and drainage.
Terraces: Constructing terraces in mountainous areas serves 
several purposes. First, the terraces increase the amount of surface 
area available for farming. At the same time, the increased area 
provides a better surface for capturing and retaining rain without 
the erosion that usually accompanies cultivated hillsides.
Terracing is labor intensive and therefore ideal for both local and 
area wide projects. The design of the terraces must be carefully 
evaluated, however. If they are too small, they will have little 
effect.
Land Fertility Improvements: A number of activities can be 
encouraged that will improve the fertility of the land. These 
include:
—  Rotational grazing of cattle or sheep.
—  Growing vegetative cover on the land (grasses, vetch, etc.)
—  Alternative cropping.
In situations where there is not enough time to organize 
agricultural rehabilitation projects before the next planting season 
begins, it may be necessary to pay farmers some form of income even 
though they are not working the land. It may even be desirable to 
give the land a rest to improve productivity the following season.
In this case, simply so what agricultural ministries do in the 
industrialized countries: pay the farmers leave the land fallow or 
to carry out land improvements. Payments should be proportionate to 
the amount of income they would normally earn from the amount of 
land they cultivate.
On-Farm Grain Storage: Projects that build better storage bins 
and silos can immediately reduce farmers' losses.
Fodder Harvesting: A serious effect of both droughts and floods 
is the loss of fodder available for large-scale animals. In cases 
where crops sprouted but failed to mature, it is often possible to 
salvage the emergent grains for the animals to eat. For example, 
following a flood in Bangladesh, one agency financed a program to 
buy the stalks from the farmers to donate or sell as low-cost fodder 
for livestock. By brokering the tailings, the program provided 
income for a large number of farmers and helped others maintain 
their animals. In areas where their was little immediate need for 
the fodder, the agency erected some mobile silos and stored it until 
there was a demand some months later.
Counter-desertification Measures: There are a number actions 
that can be taken to counter drought conditions and, in some cases, 
the spread of desert environments. They include:
1. Tree Planting: One of the easiest ways to fight 
desertification is for farmers to plant trees around their 
fields and homes. Each tree encourages the growth of a 
related micro-ecosystem and provides a small deterrent to 
wind-driven dust, sand and water erosion.
2. Construction of wind breaks: Planting sturdy shrubs and trees 
as windbreaks between fields can help slow winds speeds. The 
windbreaks reduce erosion and preserve valuable topsoils.
They also can help regenerate grass cover and ultimately 
increase soil moisture.
3. Construction of earthen or stone wind barriers: Wind barriers 
are small walls no more than a meter high that are placed at 
right angles to the prevailing wind. As wind blows against 
the barriers and is deflected upward, moisture is released, 
increasing the humidity around the barrier. Minute 
condensation forms and drops to the ground. Eventually small 
green patches will begin to take root. These can become quite
large. They can often help replenish ground water as well as 
provide small green spaces to protect against desert 
encroachment. (See Figure 10-2).
4. Green basins: Green belts can be created using "green 
basins," a technique developed in Australia. A series of 
closely spaced, circular basins are made by plowing slight 
depressions or making circular banks in fields. These basins 
trap wind blown seeds, which are nourished by moisture that 
is also trapped. When any amount of rain falls, small, 
temporary ponds form in the depression. The embankments or 
depressions also protect the seeds from dust storm. In 
Australia, green belts several kilometers wide and hundreds 
of kilometers long are often built as a line of defense, much 
like a fire break, to prevent further encroachment of the 
desert. (See Figure 10-3.)
5. Sand fences: In areas where desertification is pronounced, 
sand fences can help reduce losses from sandpiling. 
Eventually, however, the fences must be accompanied by 
larger, area-wide counter-desertification measures.
Water supply projects: Provision of drinking water for humans as 
well as livestock is an important activity during most famines. The 
most common projects are:
1. Digging wells or improving existing ones: Digging or 
improving shallow open wells is an ideal project if 
increasing the draw on the aquifer will not deplete it. Well 
projects can be designed to benefit both small and large 
communities and can employ large number of workers.
2. Dams: Even in the worst droughts, some amount of rain usually 
falls. Often the water is lost because it drains off before 
it can be trapped and stored. Therefore, an important water 
resource development strategy is the construction of 
retention dams at intervals across streambeds to trap flash
floodwaters.
Figures 10-2 and 10-3
A variation of this approach is the catchdam, which directs 
the water into channels leading to nearby depressions that 
can store a larger amount of water than the riverbed itself 
(see Figure 10-4). It may be possible in some cases to divert 
flood waters directly into irrigation systems.
Sub-surface dams are used to trap water in the sandy 
riverbeds of a dry stream if the speed of the flash flood is 
likely to destroy a normal earthen retention dam. A trench is 
dug across the streambed down to a layer of impervious clay. 
The trench is then filled and packed with clay to form an 
underground dam. When flash floods occur, a portion of the
water will be trapped in the sand behind the dam. Because it 
is trapped in the sand, evaporation will be reduced. Small 
wells can then be dug by hand to reach the water (see Figure 
10-5).
3. Construction of haouris: Haouris are man-made depressions dug 
in areas where soils contract and seal when they are 
dampened. This prevents seepage. Haouris are often made in 
the arid savanna lands of Africa and in various locations in 
the Asian Sub-Continent. They are an excellent project for 
areas with large numbers of pastoralists.
Haouris can be filled with sand to reduce evaporation. The 
haouri is first enlarged, then filled with sand or gravel. 
Since sand is porous, the amount of space it takes up is 
negligible compared to the water it saves from evaporation.
In areas where desertification is advanced, the people use 
the sand that builds up as the desert encroaches.
4. Recharging the aquifer: In cases where shallow aquifers are 
depleted, catchments can be built that will trap surface 
water and permit it to seep quickly into the water carrying 
strata. A number of methods can be used. The appropriate 
approach depends on the soils and the depth of the aquifer.
Chapter 11 
FAMINE LOGISTICS
INTRODUCTION
All famine interventions require logistical support. 
Conventional food aid responses, many counter-famine programs, and 
all immunization efforts entail the movement of supplies and 
personnel from one point to another. Even market interventions 
require movement of food to a point where it can be sold to the 
merchants. Without an effective logistics system, no relief 
operation can achieve its objectives.
Logistics are not complicated, yet few organizations properly 
implement logistics operations. There are too few experienced or 
trained logisticians working in emergency operations. As a result, 
this key activity is often plagued with problems and costly delays.
Logistics for emergency relief operations are different from 
most other types. The need for speedy delivery of supplies is often 
complicated by ad hoc organization formed by drawing personnel and 
equipment from several non-professional organizations. Because the 
procedures of the group are not standard, there is often some 
initial confusion which complicates operations and creates logjams. 
Unless these problems are addressed at the beginning, they can 
quickly multiply and further delay deliveries.
Definition
A good working definition of emergency logistics is:
"The practical art of establishing lines of supply, providing
commodities and the transport to move them."
The term "lines of supply" is important; logistics should be 
thought of as a linear system —  a flow of supplies from point to 
point along a linear route. Another way to view logistics is as a 
system of supply, where items flow through the system in one 
direction and documents describing that flow return in the other 
direction. For example, commodities such as food move down the 
system, while requisitions and reports flow back to the system's 
managers at each control point.
The Importance of Logistics
Logistics is the lifeline of a relief operation. People depend 
on the food and other supplies in the logistics system.
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Logistics is often the most expensive part of an operation.
For example, a truck that can move across unpaved roads costs 
approximately $50,000 U.S. dollars; its trailer may cost $10,000 to 
$15,000 or more. A 100-truck fleet with spare parts costs 
approximately $10 million (not including fuel, maintenance or 
insurance).
Because it is so expensive, logistics is the most problematic 
aspect of a relief operation. It is the activity most subject to 
corruption, especially when the goods involved are in short supply. 
Whenever there are competing demands for food, fuel and other relief 
supplies, then thefts, pilferage and diversions can be expected.
Logistics operations may cost more than expected because 
agencies are inexperienced in handling commodities or they are not 
familiar with the limitations of transportation or the complexities 
of the stages of a logistics system. In logistics, time equals money 
—  when a procured commodity sits in a warehouse or on a ship, it 
costs the agency even though the commodity is not in motion. During 
the Ethiopian famine of 1985, the final cost of imported food 
doubled because of the long delays in the ports and attempts to 
transport it inland.
As vital as logistics activities are in an emergency relief 
operation, there are few trained emergency logisticians; most of the 
people handling logistics have gained their knowledge by 
trial-and-error, and many consistently make the same mistakes. There 
is no central coordinating body at the international level to try to 
relieve competition in procurement or transportation. And in the 
conntries where aid is to be distributed, there is rarely a group 
set up to schedule arrivals of ships or planes.
The Scope of Logistics
Logistics covers the movement of many items, but in famine 
operations, movement of food is its primary and most important 
function. The movement of medical supplies, especially vaccines, is 
also important, but such shipments are usually much smaller and 
require specialized equipment and arrangements. Additional logistics 
activities include the movement of such items as tents, household 
supplies, fuel, and equipment. People are also moved from one site 
to another.
The Element of Time
An important objective of a logistics operation is to reduce 
transit time, especially in the early stages of an emergency. 
Decisions are often made on the basis of time rather than cost.
Time becomes the criterion against which all decisions are measured. 
In this sense, the time element is unique to emergency relief
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logistics and makes it distinct from other forms of logistics 
operations.
CONCEPTUALIZING LOGISTICS 
Components of a Logistics System
Logistics is a set of interrelated components. The primary 
components are the physical elements of the system or the hardware; 
the secondary components are the control system, sometimes called 
the software.
Primary components include warehouses and other storage 
facilities; transport such as trucks, planes, ships and/or other 
carriers; and special facilities such as fuel depots, garages, 
milling facilities, and cold storage facilities for perishables and 
medicines.
Secondary components include:
1. A control system consisting of:
a. Procurement.
b. A monitoring system (waybills, call forwards, 
requisitions, etc. that are used to track the 
operation).
c. The people who coordinate the shipments and carry out 
checks and audits of the supplies in the system.
2. A distribution system that controls distribution of
commodities to the settlements.
Model of a Typical Logistics System
The following is a conceptual model of a typical logistics 
system. The objective is to move supplies from their source (the 
supplier) to their destination (the beneficiaries (B):
Source
Destination
S
(Supplier)
B
(Famine Victims)
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The movement of supplies is carried out through a series of 
movements (transport) from one depot or warehouse to another, 
represented diagrammatically in the drawing below:
W --------- > T --------- > W
(Warehouse) (Transport) (Warehouse)
When supplies are procured internationally, they are shipped 
from the supplier by truck or rail to a warehouse at the port of 
shipment, then transported by ship (or in some cases by plane) to 
another warehouse at the port of entry in the affected country:
S --------- > T --------- > W --------- > T --------- > W
(Source) (Dock) (Port of Entry)
At the port of entry, the commodities are cleared and then 
transported to another (regional) warehouse and from there to a 
warehouse at a distribution point in the famine zone:
S---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W
(Port of (Regional (Regional (Destination)
Entry) Warehouse) Warehouse) Warehouse)
From the warehouse in the refugee camp, the commodities enter 
the distribution system and move directly to the beneficiaries:
S---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W--->DS--->B
(Regional (Dest. (Beneficiaries) 
Warehouse) Warehouse)
The overall system can be divided into three stages. The first 
stage is from supplier to port of entry; the second stage is from 
the port (after clearance) to the final warehouses (in most cases, 
through an intermediate warehouse in the vicinity or region of the 
famine zone); the third stage is from the camp warehouse through the 
distribution system to the beneficiaries.
S---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> T---> W---> DS---> B
[------First Stage------ ][----- Second Stage----- ] [-Third Stage-]
Control Responsibilities
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Responsibility for controlling logistics in the first stage 
lies with the procurement office. Control begins with the 
specifications of the order. The supplier is responsible for meeting 
the specifications, shipping the commodity, and delivering it in 
good shape to the port of entry. (Note: insurance does not usually 
extend beyond the port of entry. For this reason, in most cases the 
supplier will not accept responsibility for the cargo after it has 
been accepted by a relief agency or its agents in the port of 
entry.)
Once the shipment has been cleared, a relief agency is usually 
the consignee and takes responsibility for shipping it onward; thus, 
the agency is responsible for control in the second stage. Most of 
the effort (and problems) occurs during the second stage, primarily 
because agencies are not adequately prepared for this task. Ideally, 
responsibility for control is vested in a person known as the 
"traffic director." The traffic director controls delivery 
schedules, assignment of supplies, and decisions regarding when to 
ship from the port of entry to intermediate warehouses. The traffic 
director is usually the chief logistician and, in some situations, 
may be the local procurement officer.
In the third stage —  distribution to the people —  local 
government officials or the relief agency field staff are 
responsible for control.
Conceptually, the control system looks like this:
Procurement & Supplier Consignee (Traffic Dir.) Dist.
Team
S--> T--- > W---> T---> W-- > T--- > W---> T-- > W--- > D---> B
[-----First Stage------- ] [---- Second Stage------ ] [— Third Stage— ]
Local Procurement
The above descriptions cover a full-scale international 
logistics system. There is, however, a way to significantly reduce 
and simplify logistics: local procurement. With local procurement, 
it is possible to eliminate all of the first stage and most of the 
second as shown in the diagram below:
S----> T----> W----> DS----> B
(Local
Supplier)
It is usually possible to contract with local suppliers to 
deliver needed commodities directly to the distribution points.
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Logistics Coordination
The most important person in a logistics operation is the 
traffic director, whose responsibilities include:
1. Controlling procurement and distribution.
2. Controlling transport, the allocation of trucks or other 
vehicles and where they go.
3. Monitoring the warehouses.
4. Directing allocations of supplies to the intermediate 
warehouses and from there to the camps.
5. Planning the overall distribution system in cooperation 
with the camp administrators.
The traffic director must be based in the field, have 
suffiecient cars or aircraft to move up and down the system from the 
distribution points to the port of entry, and be able to control the 
fuel allocation for the vehicles. Ideally, the traffic director is 
an experienced logistician from an agency that has extensive 
experience in moving large quantities of supplies. In addition, he 
should be completely familiar with priorities in a relief operation. 
In summary, the traffic director should be the focal point for all 
coordination in a logistics system.
Decision-making
The need to make early logistics decisions in an emergency 
cannot be overemphasized. Early decisions save money and lives.
This is especially true for food and medical supplies. The longer 
basic decisions are delayed, the greater the cost. For instance, if 
it takes two months from the time food is ordered to the time it 
arrives at the distribution point, delaying a decision to procure 
and ship the food by even a week means that a portion of the food 
may have to be sent by air, increasing the cost perhaps tenfold. If 
the decision is delayed longer, it may not be possible to meet all 
the needs. As a result, lives may be in jeopardy (PEOPLE MAY DIE??) 
unless alternate sources of food can be found.
System Planning
At the beginning of an emergency, planners should conceptualize 
and plan the entire logistics system. It is important to define the 
key roles and responsibilities of all personnel at each stage and to 
set up the records and controls to monitor the flow of supplies 
through the system. Too often, organizations attempt to set up the 
system in a piecemeal fashion, resulting in confusion, delays, and 
higher costs.
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LOGISTICS CONTROLS
Various types of documents are used to control commodities in 
the logistics system. As supplies go down the system from supplier 
to destination, the documents include:
Stock control cards and warehouse records. These documents 
control the supplies while they are in a warehouse.
Ration cards. These provide the primary commodity control 
within the distribution system.
This system can be diagrammed as follows:
The paperwork that controls the flow or rate of movement of 
supplies while they are in the system consists of:
Call forwards. These documents are issued to summon 
supplies already in the system.
Requisitions. These documents call for supplies that need 
to be ordered or sent from a buffer stock further up the 
system.
Purchase orders or contracts. These are issued to 
suppliers by procurement officers to initiate the purchase 
of supplies not already in the system.
The Primary Documents
The two documents that control Stage I and II logistics are the 
waybill and the stock card.
Waybills are used to record the cargos being shipped, to 
certify that they have been received by the transporter in good 
shape and to indicate that they are being delivered in the same 
shape and quantity as received.
Normally a waybill will have an original plus three or four 
copies. When a transporter delivers the supplies to a warehouse, the
Waybills (or bills of lading). These shipping documents 
are used to control the shipment during transport.
Waybills Waybills Ration cards
S > T > W > T > W > DS > B
Stock Cards & 
Warehouse Records
Stock Cards & 
Warehouse Records
7
waybill is signed and the transporter uses a copy as his invoice for 
payment. Other copies are kept by the shipper at the point of origin 
and the warehouseman at the destination. Additional copies are used 
to notify the traffic director that the goods have arrived at the 
specified location.
Stock cards are the primary way of controlling supplies in the 
warehouse. They provide not only a storage record but also a record 
of the when supplies were delivered and the frequency that each type 
of good is delivered and withdrawn. One card is usually kept for 
each type of item in the warehouse.
Accountability
All parties should clearly understand the chain of 
accountability in a logistics system. In the warehouse, the 
accountable person is the storekeeper. During transport, 
accountability lies with the driver or person conveying the 
commodity.
Responsibility during shipment is transferred from the 
storekeeper to the driver by means of a waybill and from the driver 
to the next storekeeper with a receipted waybill.
Checkers should be used at each transfer point to check the 
goods loaded or discharged and certify that all are accounted for. 
Damages or losses should be recorded on the receipted waybill, 
indicating overage, shortage or damage. Again, the driver is 
responsible for shortages or damages in transit.
Role of Procurement in Logistics Control
The role of procurement in logistics control is often not 
clearly understood, even by procurement officers. Control begins 
when technical specifications are established for the items to be 
purchased. These specifications establish the quality of the 
commodity.
Other decisions made at the time of procurement also affect 
quality and the likely condition of the supplies when they arrive at 
their destination. For example, specifications regarding packaging 
of foods can determine how well they travel, the percentage of loss 
that can be expected en route, and how long the commodity can be 
maintained in a destination warehouse. What may appear to be a minor 
decision about the type of bag to use for food —  cloth or 
polypropylene —  can have a major effect on shelf-life and 
transportation requirements.
In most international relief organizations, procurement offices 
are located in the organization's headquarters; procurement officers 
are often far removed and sometimes unacquainted with conditions in
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the field. Unless the field staff provides clear, thorough 
specifications, complications are likely to develop. Therefore, it 
is extremely important for the procurement process to begin with 
requests from the field. Ideally, procurement officers or personnel 
thoroughly briefed in procurement procedures should be assigned to 
the logistics team in the field. They should be given the 
responsibility for preparing the procurement specifications; then 
the primary role of a procurement officer at headquarters would be 
to facilitate requests from the field. This is undoubtedly 
difficult, given donor pressures and the reality of donor 
constraints, but it is important for organizations to strive to 
focus their procurement activities at the field level.
STORAGE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
Warehousing
Selection of warehousing is important since relief supplies are 
likely to spend a good deal of time in these facilities.
1. Size. The warehouse must be large enough to store the 
types and quantities of supplies that are being 
stockpiled. If a variety of goods is being stored in one 
place, the warehouse plan should be based on the most 
bulky commodity.
Food grains usually require more space than other relief 
commodities. As a rule of thumb, one ton of grain usually 
occupies a floor space of one square meter and a 
volumetric space of one cubic meter. Calculating the 
amount of storage space needed is easy; if 500 tons of 
grain is to be stored, for example, a warehouse of 
approximately 500 cubic meters of storage space is 
required.
2. Permanent buildings. When storing grain, it is usually 
best to select permanent buildings with hard-surfaced 
(preferably concrete) floors. Almost any type of building 
can be used for storage, but those with minimal windows 
and large access doors are usually best —  fewer windows 
reduces the likelihood of theft. Grains shouldn't be 
stored on the second flood since few structures have been 
designed to withstand the heavy weight.
In remote locations, or in relief camps or feeding 
centers, it may be necessary to construct temporary 
warehouses. In some situations, adequate supplies of local 
materials may be available for building warehouses. 
Wherever time and weather conditions permit, small-scale
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warehouses can be built using local resources and 
employing the beneficiaries and/or local labor.
3. Prefab structures. Use of prefabricated flexible, plastic 
warehouses is increasing in emergencies; many models are 
now available. Primary criteria for selecting the 
warehouse should be its demonstrated wind resistance and 
climatic suitability. Before procuring a prefabricated 
warehouse, the method of anchoring the warehouse to the 
ground should be determined. In 1985, one-third of the 
warehouses procured for emergency relief operations in 
eastern Sudan were destroyed within a two-week period 
because they were insufficiently anchored and were unable 
to withstand high winds.
4. Selection criteria. Other than space, the main 
consideration for warehouses is the amount of protection 
they provide for the items stored. Within the storage 
enclosure, commodities must be protected from:
—  The climatic environment.
—  Theft.
—  Rodents and other pests.
5. Organization. Warehouses should be well-organized. 
Different commodities must be clearly identifiable, and 
all supplies must be within easy reach. Warehouses should 
be organized on a "first-in, first-out" basis so that food 
and medicines can be kept as fresh as possible.
6. Controls. Access to warehouses must be controlled.
Ideally, controls begin outside the building with a fence, 
good lighting, and a controlled gate. Within the 
warehouse, controls include limiting visitor's access to 
the building, interior lighting and limited access to the 
supplies by persons entering the building. At a minimum, 
workers who are authorized to enter should have some means 
of identification.
Stock controls, stock cards and other key paperwork should 
be available from the beginning, and warehouse operators 
should be thoroughly familiar with proper use of the 
control documents.
Storage Equipment
Plastic sheeting and canvas tarpaulins are the most common way 
to provide additional protection for the goods in storage. Both
provide only moderate protection against moisture and none against 
insects or rodents.
Two items are available to help store food grains in temperate 
or dry climates: bulk-grain silos and storage cubes. These 
containers are ideal for relief operations; they are light and easy 
to transport and move once they are on site. The containers are 
gas-tight and are made of a plastic sheet 0.83mm in thickness, and 
they can withstand solar ultraviolet (UV) irradiation for long 
periods. The storage containers are hermentically sealed, which 
gives them a major advantage over conventional plastic silos or 
other grain storage systems. When the hermetic containers are 
sealed, the oxygen concentration drops to between 6 percent and 8 
percent, and carbon dioxide concentrations rise to approximately 11 
percent. Insects and fungi cannot survive in the bag, and costly and 
potentially hazardous fumigation is unnecessary.
Rodents can gnaw through most synthetic materials, including 
PVC liners. However, the design of the containers and the way the 
material lies over the grain provide slippery surfaces that make it 
difficult for rodents to gnaw through with their teeth.
Two basic designs are available: a circular silo to store 
unbagged grains in bulk and a cubical container to store bagged 
grains. The silos are made in sizes from 50 to 1,000 metric tons, 
while the storage cubes are usually produced in sizes corresponding 
to truckbed cargo loads (10 to 50 tons).
The designs enable the containers to be used in various ways. 
Some common uses of the silos include:
Auxiliary dockside storage. Large 500 to 1,000 ton silos 
can be used to provide temporary bulk storage at ports 
when inland transport cannot clear the food from the 
wharves promptly. With these units, costly port congestion 
can be relieved and spoilage of food on the wharves can be 
prevented.
Overflow storage at regional logistics bases. Silos can be 
used to provide additional storage for unbagged grains at 
regional food storage depots or distribution centers. To 
relieve port congestion and bagging delays, bulk grains 
can be moved inland on lorries, transferred to storage 
silos, and then bagged at a regional depot or distribution 
center.
Storage of locally procured grains. The silos can also be 
used to store or protect grain in camps or settlements 
where supplies are procured locally or where famine 
victims produce a portion of their food needs. (They were 
originally designed to improve village grain storage and
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to reduce losses.) Since the silos are hermetically 
sealed, losses from moisture, insects, and rodents are 
minimized.
Storage cubes may be used for:
Temporary dockside storage of bagged grains. Cubes can 
provide temporary, safe, weatherproof storage space for 
bagged grains at overcrowded wharves until the food can be 
transported inland. They can be obtained in sizes 
corresponding to the loads carried by lorries, to 
facilitate logistical scheduling and loading.
Temporary storage at forward warehouses or at distribution 
centers. The cubes can provide additional safe storage for 
bagged grains until they can be distributed or placed in 
conventional warehouses.
Point storage for cross-line or cross-border logistics. 
Cubes can be used at staging areas where food is sent into 
conflict areas where conventional storage facilities are 
not practical. Food can be off-loaded directly into the 
cubes, which remain sealed until it is needed.
Cold Storage and Cold Chain Facilities
A cold chain must be established if vaccines are needed for an 
immunization program. Cold chain logistics is a special branch of 
emergency logistics and one that is almost always problematic. Some 
vaccines must be maintained within a specific temperature range from 
the time they are produced until the time they are injected into a 
patient. Anytime the temperature goes above or below that range, the 
vaccines can be damaged and lose their effectiveness. To establish a 
cold chain, certain types of equipment and facilities are required. 
These include:
Cold storage rooms at national or regional warehouses. 
Sealed cold boxes for transporting the vaccines.
—  Self-powered refrigerators or vaccine bins to store 
vaccines in the camps.
The most common break in a cold chain occurs when vaccines are 
shipped or stored in containers that are also used for food and 
beverages for relief workers. As people open and close the 
containers to get refreshments, temperatures inside drop below the 
critical levels and the vaccines are damaged. All vaccine storage 
facilities should be used only for that purpose. The World Health 
Organization will provide a current list of companies that supply
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cold chain equipment and approved cold boxes for emergencies. These 
can be obtained from:
World Health Organization 
20 Avenue Appia 
1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
or
Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Coordination Unit 
Pan American Health Organization 
525 Twenty-Third Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Figure 2_-2
PLASTIC GRAIN STORAGE SILOS 
FOR EMERGENCY LOGISTICS
Figure l_-2
PLASTIC STORAGE CUBES 
FOR EMERGENCY LOGISTICS *1
Forward Logistics Bases
In an emergency operation, it is often necessary to set up new 
logistics bases to simplify supply operations in or adjacent to the 
famine zone (the "forward" areas). These bases can usually be 
established quickly, especially if existing buildings are available 
to use as warehouses. If suitable buildings cannot be found, storage 
cubes may be used until prefab warehouses are erected.
The minimal requirements for a forward base are:
1. Adequate warehouses.
2. Storage cubes or tarpaulins to protect stockpiles.
3. Fuel depot.
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4. Vehicle workshop.
5. Radio, telephone, or telex communications.
The site for the base is determined by the type or types of 
transport that will be used to delivering supplies to and taking 
them from, the base. A railhead or major road junction is usually a 
good location. The most important factor, however, is the amount of 
time required to deliver goods in the forward area. In other words, 
the decision should be made not based only on distance (the site 
physically closest to the areas to be served), but on the amount of 
time it takes to travel that distance (the site with the best access 
to those areas).
A checklist of equipment and facilities for a forward logistics 
base is found in Table 11-A.
TRANSPORT
As mentioned earlier, transportation is the most expensive part 
of a relief operation. Thus, it is important to select the most 
appropriate form of transport for specific commodities.
Cargo Factors
The first consideration is weight. Weight is the primary 
limiting factor in all forms of transport. The heavier a commodity, 
the more expensive it is to transport and the more rugged (and 
generally, slower) the form of transport.
The second consideration is volume. Items that are light in 
weight but large in volume should usually receive a lower priority 
for transport. For example, plastic jerrycans are often in great 
demand in a relief operation. They are lightweight —  a thousand 
weigh only one ton —  but 30 of them can take up a lot of space —  
one cubic meter. Therefore, in a transport plane the size of a 
C-130, it is possible to bring only about 1,000 jerrycans cans per 
flight. Since the jerrycans only cost about $5 each, shipping them 
by air (which could cost up to $50,000 for an international flight) 
does not make sense.
Most logistics planners use a rule of thumb known as 
"cubing-out" to determine the most appropriate type of transport —  
they try to strike the right balance between the volume and the 
weight of an item. Nowhere is this more important than in choosing 
cargoes to transport by air.
Transport Efficiencies
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Ships/barges are the most cost-efficient means of transport, but 
they are usually the slowest. Aircraft are the least cost-efficient.
Shipping by rail over long distances is usually more 
cost-efficient than using lorries; the longer the distance, the more 
efficient. However, lorries are still needed at both ends of the 
rail line.
While railways are more cost-efficient than lorries, and can 
sometimes reach areas in the rainy season that lorries cannot, 
railways are also more problematic in most Third World countries.
In an emergency, when timeliness is crucial, it may be more 
advantageous to ship by lorry than by rail. If one truck breaks 
down, there are still others that are likely to get through; but if 
one locomotive breaks down, 20 railway carriages can be stopped 
indefinitely.
In remote areas, particuarly mountainous ones, pack animals may 
be more practical than trucks and other forms of transport.
Criteria for Selecting Vehicles
Important considerations when selecting vehicles include:
The distance to be traveled.
The terrain.
Road conditions.
—  Whether streams must be forded.
Load-carrying capacity of bridges en route.
Fuel efficiency.
Compatibility of the vehicle with maintenance in the 
country and the availability of parts.
Determining Fleet Size
In determining the number of vehicles that must be used for a 
mission, it is important to consider:
Time en route and turnaround times.
Load-carrying capacity of the vehicles being used.
Total tonnage needed to serve the target population.
Logistics staff
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Successful implementation depends on a good logistics staff.
Most logistics operations are understaffed. A good system requires 
many people, including a traffic director, procurement coordinator, 
transport coordinator, fuel coordinator, forward logistics officer, 
inventory control officers, accountants, warehouse staff, 
procurement officer, and maintenance officers. Control will be lost 
(and so will commodities) if too few qualified people are used.
Equipment
Critical equipment in a relief logistics operation includes 
telecommunications, control forms, forklifts (special forklifts may 
be necessary to unload planes), pallets to st(+'0AU0 stack supplies, 
and spare parts for vehicles.
Air Transport
The advent of large military cargo aircraft and large wide-body 
"jumbo jets" has made it common for relief organizations to ship 
cargoes by air in the early stages of an emergency. But this makes 
little sense since many of these shipments consist of items 
available locally or for which local substitutes could be found.
With basic health programs, such as UNICEF's Expanded Program of 
Immunization (EPI), even the need for sending vaccines has greatly 
diminished since adequate stockpiles have been developed in most 
countries.
Air transport is both costly and, ultimately, of little 
sustainable impact. Even the largest jet transports, such as the 
Boeing 747 and Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, have negligible cargo-carrying 
capacity when compared to other forms of transport. The C-130 
Hercules and the Antonov An-28, the most popular transports used in 
relief operations, can only carry a maximum of about 20 tons of 
food; that is equivalent to the capacity of one medium-sized lorry 
without a trailer. The C-130 will burn approximately 10 tons of fuel 
during a typical flight of 1,000 kilometers. At an average cost of 
$1,000 per ton, it will cost about $10,000 in fuel alone to deliver 
the supplies. Compare this to a shipping cost of $50 per ton by sea, 
or $25 per ton by lorry, and it is clear that air shipments make 
little sense unless the cargo is needed immediately to save lives.
Despite the costs, there are often tremendous pressures on 
relief agencies to fly in supplies during an emergency. Donor 
governments often make military transport available to humanitarian 
organizations at little or no cost. In these circumstances, the 
following principles may be followed:
1. Use of Aircraft. In first-stage logistics:
Use the largest plane available. Ideal civilian 
aircraft are the Boeing 747, DC-10, L-1011, DC-8F, or 
Boeing 707; military aircraft include the C-5 and
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C-141 transports. Avoid the smaller tactical 
transports like the C-13 0 or C-160 Transall for long 
international flights.
Land as close as possible to the famine zone.
Ship only items of verified high priority (such as 
measles vaccines, etc.) or equipment that will 
facilitate operations (radios, light vehicles, 
prefabricated warehouses, etc.).
If foods must be shipped, choose those that will 
provide the highest amount of calories and energy per 
weight. Avoid sending basic grains; send blended foods 
instead.
In second-stage logistics, use aircraft only when all other 
means have failed. If planes must be used, the following 
principles may apply:
Generally, the shorter the distance, the more 
practical the airlift (the aircraft will need to carry 
less fuel and therefore can carry a greater cargo 
load).
Avoid using helicopters. They are costly to operate 
and have a low carrying-capacity. Helicopters should 
only be used to ship supplies over short areas and 
into remote or isolated sites.
In second-stage logistics, the C-130, the 
French-German C-160 Transall, and smaller aircraft are 
more practical since the flights are over shorter 
distances, less fuel is required, and more cargo can 
be carried. Planes like the C-130 were originally 
designed as tactical transports to land on relatively 
short, unimproved strips.
In summary, if someone else is paying for the aircraft, go 
ahead and use them; but remember, it will still be 
necessary to use trucks at both ends of the flight!
Figure 11-3
USE OF AIRCRAFT IN EMERGENCY LOGISTICS
Medium Haul Short Haul Spot Delivery
(500-1,000 Km) (300-500 Km) (100-300 Km)
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OPERATIONAL LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Problems to Expect
Certain problems tend to occur frequently in a logistics 
operation. The most common are listed below.n
1. Problems in Stage 2:
a. Procurement delays. These delays are usually a result 
of bidding procedures, confusion about specifications, 
or lack of clarity in field requests.
b. Donor pressures to accept substitutes.
c. Acquisition of materials that were not requested and 
are unsuitable for the local situation, climate, or 
terrain.
2. Problems in Stage 2:
a. Customs delays (paperwork, clearances, etc.).
b. Congestion at the port of arrival.
c. Inland transport delays.
d. Theft and pilferage.
e. Losses due to improper storage or inadequate 
protection of the commodities while in storage. (The 
rations for a quarter of a million people were 
destroyed by one rainstorm in Ethiopia in 1985.)
f. Materials handling delays (off-loading (??) bulk 
grains, bagging operations at the port. etc.).
g. Losses from lack of insurance coverage.
3. Problems in Stage 3:
a. Inadequate storage facilities at the destination.
b. Inadequate means of protecting supplies while in 
storage.
c. Lack of suitable milling equipment.
d. Theft and pilferage.
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e. Problems with registration/disbursement procedures.
Figure ll-_
SCHEMATIC OF LOGISTICS SYSTEM AND EXPECTED DELAYS *1
Selecting a Logistics Agency
It is often difficult to select or designate a lead agency for 
managing a multi-agency logistics operation. There are several 
options:
Hiring a private firm.
—  Designating an NGO.
Selecting an experienced UN agency (e.g., UNICEF). (Note: 
World Food Programme usually only delivers food to the port 
of entry; the government or NGOs are responsible for inland 
transfer.)
As a general rule, the agencies best suited for the role are 
those NGOs with experience in managing large-scale food aid 
programs, especially the US PL-480 Title I and II programs. These 
agencies already have expertise and personnel familiar with food 
logistics systems. In many countries they already have a logistics 
system set up. Smaller development agencies usually do a marginal 
job in managing logistics programs.
Operational Hints
1. Always have adequate buffer stocks of supplies on hand to 
cover the times when logistics operations are not able to 
keep up with demand and unanticipated emergencies. Plan for 
an oversupply of 20 to 50 percent in an emergency.
2. Buy locally. Local purchase is an important and under-used 
resource. Wherever available, locally purchased supplies 
can provide significant advantages including:
Saving time.
Saving money.
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Bridging gaps until other supplies arrive.
Providing a buffer against supply irregularities.
Stimulating the local economy.
3. Simplify the system. The objective is to reduce the number 
of stops and transfers in the system. This speeds up the 
operation and reduces theft. Even if simplification 
increases operational costs, it will eventually reduce 
total costs.
4. Consolidate facilities to avoid unnecessary loading and 
unloading or extra staffing.
5. Unify the logistics system. For example, where there are 
several organizations simultaneously ordering and 
distributing food in a large operation, unify purchasing 
and shipping procedures.
6. Create redundancy in transport. If the operation depends on 
a railway system, for example, the loss of one bridge can 
halt an entire operation. It is necessary to have a backup 
system to deliver supplies.
7. Define the area of operation. The headquarters of most 
agencies are likely to be in the capital, but operations 
are usually in a remote area. The traffic director should 
be located in the area of operation, i.e., where the key 
commodities are needed or being moved. The area of 
operation generally extends from the port of entry to the 
distribution points and includes all the communications and 
transport facilities inside that area.
8. Standardize equipment, especially trucks. This is difficult 
when donors want to provide trucks from their own 
countries, but it is extremely important to standardize 
vehicles.
9. Make small, manageable shipments to the distribution 
points. Shipments should be of a size that can be 
controlled and not consumed by the people too rapidly.
10. Standardize and minimize supplies. A key concept in 
logistics management is standardizing the types of supplies 
and equipment being used and keeping the number of articles 
in a system to a minimum. Usually, the first thing a 
logistics consultant will do is reduce the number of 
supplies in the system until logistics management controls 
are in place and working well.
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Controlling Transport Costs
One of the major problems is keeping the cost of transport at 
acceptable levels. Often, local contractors raise prices to 
unacceptable levels when they know that an emergency exists and that 
a relief organization has few other options for delivering 
commodities.
To control transport prices, the relief agency has two options:
1. Purchasing a fleet of vehicles and setting up an 
independent transport operation. This is usually a costly 
option and requires the agency to manage and maintain the 
trucking fleet.
2. Purchasing trucks and then reselling them to local 
operators on a work-equity basis. This approach, known as 
"captive contracting," still requires an investment in the 
vehicles, but places the burden of maintenance on the 
purchaser/operator. These programs are usually popular, and 
the trucks can be amortized over a period of several years. 
In return for work-equity agreements, the purchaser agrees 
to provide transport services at fixed prices for a 
specified period of time. An added benefit of captive 
contracting is that the vehicles are usually maintained 
better than if they are operated by the relief agency. The 
prospective owners have a vested interest in maintaining 
the vehicles.
Rules of Thumb for Logistics Operations
1. Use trucks for distances under 500 km., rail for longer 
distances.
2. Don't build roads for food supplies; instead, build up 
buffer stocks. The only time to build roads for a transport 
system is when water tankers are being operated. (Improving 
patches in the road, however, could speed supplies.)
3. Mill grains in the camps or settlements. This will prolong 
the life of the grain and will eliminate the need for a 
complex unloading, bagging, and reloading operation further 
up the logistics chain.
4. The need for transporting supplies by air occurs in the 
early stages of an operation, not later on.
5. If a portion of the food supplies must be purchased 
overseas, buy food for the general ration from overseas and 
supplemental food from internal sources (if fresh foods of 
good quality are available) .
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6. In Africa, it may be necessary to import foods for a 
large-scale operation,especially those related to 
conflicts. In the rest of the world, food can usually be 
purchased locally.
O
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Figure 11-
CHECKLIST OP EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES 
FOR FORWARD LOGISTICS BASES
1. Site Preparation
Grading and Leveling 
Road Improvements 
Surfacing 
Culverts 
Drainage
2, Office Buildings
Permanent 
Prefab, Metal 
Tent
3. Office Equipment
Desks
Chairs
Photocopier
File Cabinet
Bookshelves
Expendable Equipment
Office Supplies
4. Warehousing 
Permanent
Prefab, Metal 1000 MT 
Prefab, Metal 500 MT 
Prefab, Metal ? 
Prefab, Plastic 1000 MT 
Prefab, Plastic 500 MT 
Prefab, Plastic ?
5. Storage Equipment
Silos 1000 MT
Silos 250 MT
Silos 100 MT
Storage Cubes 100 MT 
Storage Cubes 50 MT 
Storage Cubes 20 MT 
Storage Cubes 5 MT
6. Radio Room
Permanent 
Prefab, Metal 
Tent
7. Communications
Equipment
Radio (SSB)
Telephone
Intercom
Telex
FAX
Walkie-Talkies
8. Workshop
Permanent 
Prefab, Metal 
Prefab, Plastic
9. Workshop Equipment
10. Other Work Buildings
Permanent 
Prefab, Metal 
Plastic
11.Other Work Equipment
12. Fuel Depot
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Carts/Trolleys 
Forklift 
Storage Shelves 
Plastic Sheeting 
Other __________
13. Airfield/Heliooad 
Furnishings
Strip Grading/Leveling 
Fueling Station 
Bladders 
Storage Tank 
Pump (hand)
Pump (motorized) 
Radio Beacon 
Landing Lights 
VHF Radio
14. Security Facilities
Guardhouse
Fencing
Gates
15. Electrical System
Generator
Wiring
Poles
Light Standards 
Fuel for Generator
16. Water System
Deep Well (Borehole)
Submersible Pump
Storage Tank
Shallow Well
Handpump
Pipes
Outlets
Taps
17. Sanitation System
Storage Tank(s)
Pumps, Hoses, Fittings 
Defueling Stand 
Barrel Storage Area 
Fire-fighting Equipment
19.Residential
Beds
Tables
Chairs
Personal Storage 
Other
20. Mess Hall/Kitchen
Refrigerator
Stove
Wash Rack 
Gas
Utensils 
Pots and Pans 
Tables 
Chairs
Other _____________
21. Misc. Facilities
Toilets
Showers
Incinerator
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ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING
Chapter 12
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of a relief operation to its conclusion, it 
will be necessary to collect a variety of information to guide 
program planning and execution. This process is called assessment 
and monitoring; assessment refers to the process of determining the 
situation and possible responses, monitoring is the on-going 
evaluation of the interventions. The collection of information 
should be guided by a clear understanding of the interventions that 
are available and the most appropriate time to use them. If an 
agency is planning to use conventional food aid approaches, food 
availability and food logistics are important issues. If the agency 
chooses an income-support approach, the assessment must identify 
potential projects and determine the financial mechanisms that can 
be used. Most importantly, the assessment must decide whether the 
income-support approach can get adequate food supplies into problem 
areas in the time available.
The assessment and monitoring process usually consists of 
three stages. It begins with a reconnaissance of the area to 
determine the overall situation; this provides information to guide 
the first relief response. But more importantly, the reconnaissance 
is the first step in a continual monitoring process. It is 
necessarily a brief overview, based mainly on observations by the 
assessment team and relies on trained or experienced observers who 
look for indicators of problems.
After the initial reconnaissance is completed, and programs 
are being established, relief agencies collect more detailed data 
about the situation. In this, they may collect statistics from 
their programs or carry out sample surveys to compile more detailed 
information. This provides program staff with information for 
adjusting their programs.
IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSMENT
Rapid, accurate assessment is the key to a successful initial 
response. The purposes of an assessment are:
To determine people's needs.
To help set priorities for action.
—  To provide data for program planning.
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The importance of an accurate assessment cannot be overstated. 
A swift, accurate, credible assessment will enable relief managers 
to proceed quickly and efficiently. An incomplete or inaccurate 
assessment —  one that does not address major needs or provides 
misleading data —  may lead to inappropriate responses and costly 
delays.
VARIATIONS OF DATA REQUIREMENTS
Assessments and assessment information needs vary according to 
the group doing the assessment. Assessments may be carried out by 
host governments; international food agencies, such as WFP and 
USAID; donor governments; and NGOs. Assessments carried out by 
governments and the international organizations tend to be more 
comprehensive (because their interests are wider); surveys by the 
NGOs tend to be more problem-focused, e.g., on health and 
nutrition.
TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS
There are usually five types of assessments.
1. A situation assessment (also known as initial reconnaissance) 
is the immediate estimate of the overall situation. It 
determines the extent of the famine, locates the area of 
critical need, and identifies health threats. In the initial 
stages of a famine, relief agencies must respond according to 
certain assumptions; therefore, one of the most important 
functions of this initial reconnaissance is verifying that the 
assumptions are correct, and if not, developing the data 
needed to adjust the initial response.
2. Needs assessment is a determination of the needs of the 
people. These are usually classified as immediate needs, which 
concern health, life support, and protection, and long-term 
needs, which refer to economic and agricultural requirements.
3. Sector or activity assessments are evaluations of the needs in 
specific sectors (e.g. food, health, nutrition, etc.). One of 
the most important activity assessments deals with logistics.
4. Resource assessment determines the resources available within 
the country to support the relief operations and the impact 
that large-scale use of these resources might have on the 
local economy. This helps planners determine the aid levels 
required.
5. Epidemiological surveillance is the early identification of 
threats to public health precipitated or aggravated by the 
famine and the establishment of a monitoring and medical
2
response to identify, isolate, and eliminate any health 
problems.
ELEMENTS OF ASSESSMENT
An assessment can be divided into six activities:
1. Preparedness Planning: An accurate assessment depends on
thorough planning and preparation. The information needed can 
be identified well in advance. The methods for collecting the 
necessary data and the selection of formats for collection and 
presentation of the information should be established as part 
of the organization's general emergency preparedness 
activities. By preparing to undertake assessments well in 
advance of an emergency, all potential information needs can 
be identified and adequate procedures and methodologies can be 
developed. Standard survey techniques, questionnaires, 
checklists and procedures should be prepared to ensure that 
all areas are examined and the information is reported using 
standard terminology and classification.
2. Survey and Data Collection: The gathering of the information 
must proceed rapidly and thoroughly. In an initial 
reconnaissance, surveyors should look for patterns and 
indicators of potential problems. Using the procedures 
developed earlier, key problem areas are thoroughly checked.
3. Interpretation: Thorough analysis of the information gathered 
is critical. Those doing the analysis must be trained to 
detect and recognize indicators of problems, to interpret the 
information, and to link the information to action programs.
4. Forecasting: Using the data that have been collected, the
assessment team must develop estimates about how the situation 
might develop so that contingency plans can be drawn up. 
Forecasting can benefit from many specialists, especially 
those who have had extensive experience in emergencies and who 
might be able to detect trends and provide insights as to what 
course an emergency might follow.
5. Reporting: When data analysis and forecasts are complete, the 
results need to be disseminated. Reports should be prepared in 
a format that enables managers to formulate plans and 
projects. Essential information should be presented and 
structured so that the main patterns and trends are clear.
6. Monitoring: An assessment should not be seen as an end result. 
It is one part of a continuing process. The initial assessment 
should provide baseline data and a basis for further 
monitoring. Data systems must be set up so that relief 
officials can determine whether a situation is improving or
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deteriorating. The systems must also provide a way to measure 
the effectiveness of relief activities. Each assessment or 
survey should be designed so that it builds upon previous 
surveys and expands the data base.
ASSESSMENT METHODS
Several methods can be used to carry out assessments. The two 
most common are:
On-site visual inspections by trained observers: Qualified, 
experienced observers can often interview key personnel on site and 
visually review the people, their condition, and the sites where 
they are situated. From their observations, they can prepare 
estimates about the scope and magnitude of the situation. Visual 
inspections, however, have their drawbacks. Some major problems 
cannot be detected by simple observation. Often, what one can't see 
is more important than what is visible. For example, death rates, 
which are the most important indicator of stress in a population, 
cannot be determined from observation. In many societies, childhood 
diseases and malnutrition cannot be detected without detailed 
surveys since families routinely keep those children out of the 
sight of strangers. In one classic case in East Africa, a survey 
team reported that all was fine in a settlement because they saw no 
malnourished children. A simple survey would have shown that all 
the children had died.
Surveys: Simple surveys based on interviews with villagers in 
the affected areas and statistical information from registration 
forms at health and feeding centers can provide information that 
can be used to plan projects. Usually, sample surveys can indicate 
people's immediate needs and health and nutritional status.
A key assessment activity that must be carried out by survey 
is the first health and nutritional assessment. This survey 
provides the information needed to establish the baseline data,
i.e., points of reference, for disease surveillance and for 
evaluation of nutritional progress.
APPROACHES TO ASSESSMENT
Assessments may be broad in scope or focus on certain aspects.
Comprehensive assessments collect information about every aspect of 
an emergency. Relief authorities must weigh the importance of each 
set of problems in deciding where to assign priorities. 
Comprehensive assessments are usually carried out by the agencies 
that have overall emergency responsibilities, such as the 
government of the country. These exercises require extensive 
information-gathering and usually take longer to complete than
sector assessment. But if they are properly planned and executed, 
they provide invaluable information. The primary result of a 
comprehensive assessment is the establishment of priorities.
Critical sector assessments focus on those sectors that are 
critical for saving lives: food, water, public health and 
immunizations, and sanitation.
THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL ASSESSMENT
To design a successful and accurate assessment, planners 
should:
1. Identify the users. Every element of an assessment should 
be designed to collect information for a specific user. 
The potential users should specify their data needs 
during the design phase. For example, health workers need 
some types of information that will only be useful in 
certain formats, usually tables, while a procurement 
officer will need quantitative or statistical data.
2. Identify the information that is needed to plan specific 
programs. Too often assessments collect information that 
is incomplete or of little value for planning relief 
programs or specific interventions. In many cases, 
information is anecdotal rather than substantive. In 
others, valuable time is wasted collecting detailed 
information when representative data would be as useful. 
Determine what information is key, the method that needs 
to be used to develop the data, and how much and how 
detailed the it needs to be. The type of assistance an 
agency usually provides should be considered when listing 
the data to be collected. For example, an agency that 
provides food will need to know about availability of 
transport and fuel, road conditions, etc.
3. Determine the best places to obtain accurate information. 
If the information must be obtained from sample surveys, 
it is important that the areas to be surveyed provide an 
accurate picture of needs and priorities. For example, 
carrying out a health survey in a medical center would 
yield a distorted view of the overall health situation 
since only sick or severely malnourished people would be 
in the center.
4. Consider the format. It is important to present the data 
in a form useful to analysts and program planners —  one 
that makes the implications clear so that priorities can 
be set quickly. Lap-top microcomputers with integrated 
spreadsheets and graphics make it possible to present 
pertinent data in graphic form. By applying baselines and 
standards to the presentation, key relationships can be
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quickly noted. For example, daily death rates should be 
calculated and compared to the international standard of 
1.0 deaths per 10,000 per day.
5. Consider the timing of the assessment. Timing can effect 
the accuracy of the assessment since situations and needs 
can change dramatically day to day and information needs 
to be collected when it is available and most useful. 
Relief needs are always relative; but as a general rule, 
initial surveys should be broad in scope and should 
determine overall patterns and trends. More detailed 
information can wait until emergency operations are well 
established.
6. Distinguish emergency from chronic needs. Virtually all 
developing countries have long-standing, chronic needs in 
most sectors. The assessment should be designed so that 
analysts can distinguish between chronic and emergency 
needs. For example, malnutrition may be prevalent in the 
country in normal times; therefore a nutrition survey 
will almost certainly reflect poor nutritional status. 
The surveyors must differentiate between what is normal 
for the location and what isn't, so that emergency 
assistance and health care can be provided to those most 
in need. (Assessments may bring to light previously 
unrecognized or unacknowledged problems in a society. 
Thus, the data collection system should be careful to 
structure the information so that critical data such as 
health status, etc., can be used for long-term planning.)
7. Use recognized standards, terminology, and procedures. 
Assessments will invariably be carried out by a variety 
of people operating independently. To provide a basis for 
evaluating the information, the assessment must be 
reported using standard terminology, ratings and 
classifications. Standard survey forms that give clear 
guidelines for descriptive terms are usually the best way 
to ensure that all information is reported on a uniform 
basis.
It will be difficult to differentiate between chronic and 
emergency needs without having baseline data, accepted and 
recognized, and realistic standards in each sector.
Baseline data are normally used as a reference in health and 
nutrition programs. For example, health officials must know the 
prevalence of the disease in the community in normal times to 
determine whether there is an increase in the number or severity of 
cases.
Reference data are usually used en leiu of baseline date to 
establish a point of reference from which a program's performance
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can be judged. For example, when trying to determine death rates 
in a population, one must first know the normal death rates in 
order to determine whether or not mortality in the target 
population is abnormally high. In this case, relief authorities 
would obtain reference data on normal mortality among the 
population and compare it to the rates currently being 
experienced.1
Standards are used as targets for supplying food, water, and 
other basic human needs. For example, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) has set emergency water quanity standards at 30 liters per 
person per day.2 While some people, such as infants and small 
children require less, adults doing heavy work in warm environments 
require more. The average standard is a means of making sure that 
the families' total supply needs are met. In addition to the water 
standard mentioned above, the three most important standards are: 
the number of calories for relief rations (2250 kcal), the number 
of latrines per family (1), and the amount of space per person for 
emergency shelter (3.5 square meters).
Indicators are aspects of a situation that can be monitored to 
give an indication of the overall situation, changes or trends. 
Indicators are most often used in public health; for example, a 
reported increase in infant mortality could be a result of disease, 
starvation, or contaminated water. By cross-checking food 
consumption at the family level, water quality at distribution 
points, and diseases reported to aid stations or clinics, a more 
accurate picture of health and nutrition among the population can 
be gained. Thus, it is important to know which indicators to 
examine as "points of entry" in each sector.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY
A major objective of assessment planning is to establish its 
credibility. The assessment must be thorough and provide 
information in such a way that it reduces the necessity for other 
agencies or personnel to conduct their own assessments. In reality, 
few agencies accept the assessments of others; most agencies want 
to conduct their own assessments to confirm what others have said. 
To some extent, this duplication can serve as a means of 
verification. But if an assessment is well-planned, if the 
methodologies and procedures used provide an objective, clear, 
concise, and rapid picture of the situation, and if the assessment
1 The death rate in a population should not be exceed the 
normal rate. If the normal rate is not known, the international 
reference figure of 1.0 per 10,000 per day may be used.
2 A much more realistic standard for emergencies is 10 liters 
per person per day.
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report describes the information-gathering techniques, procedures, 
and standards, the need for verification and follow-up assessments 
can be substantially reduced.
Detailed and overly sophisticated survey techniques can yield 
useful information for long-term planning but are usually of 
limited value for emergency assessment. The time required for data 
processing and interpretation can take longer than the time 
available for planning an emergency response. For this reason, 
assessments should be used to verify or refute the assumption on 
which an immediate response is made.
The people must be consulted. Community social structures and 
responses to the situation should be reviewed to find out how to 
provide relief in culturally acceptable and supportive ways.
ASSESSMENT PRIORITIES
In an emergency, certain lifesaving interventions must be made 
immediately and certain systems must be established before other 
options can be brought into play. These responses begin as soon as 
famine conditions are recognized and follow a prescribed pattern 
until on-site assessments prove beyond a doubt that a specific set 
of interventions is not required. Assessment should begin 
simultaneously. The information collected is used to verify the 
types of problems that are occurring and to modify and adjust the 
responses. Therefore, in the initial reconnaissance, the assessment 
must focus on the primary threats to life that are expected and 
determine whether resources are being applied or are available, to 
address the expected problems.
Since malnutrition, measles, and diarrhea are the main causes 
of death during a famine, the first task is to determine the level 
of these three threats. This is done by calculating the mortality 
rates, identifying the prevalent diseases and their incidence, 
determining the nutritional status of the vulnerable groups, and 
determining the prevalence of diarrhea.
An effective response supplies ample food, immunization 
against priority diseases, and diarrhea control. Each of these 
responses —  food security, immunization, and clean water, ORT and 
sanitation —  requires that certain programs and systems be 
established and that each meet certain minimum standards.
Water and sanitation issues require consideration of the 
physical site where the refugees are living. Issues such as space, 
shelter, and flood protection may also require attention.
The way food will be provided must be considered. Top 
priorities are work programs to provide income; food logistics, 
including transport, fuel and storage.
8
The medical program requires close examination of the 
logistics system for receiving, transporting, and storing vaccines,
i.e., the cold chain.
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SUMMARY OF THE IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT PRIORITIES 
Step 1. Assess:
—  daily death rates
—  prevalence of disease and morbidity rates
—  nutritional status
—  prevalence of diarrhea
Step 2. Assess the food situation, including:
—  the availability of staple grains, including:
—  quantity
—  quality
—  cost
—  affordability to poor
—  geographic extent of food problem area
—  food assistance programs, especially:
—  methodology
—  system of enrollment and monitoring
—  outreach
Step 3. Assess health programs, especially:
—  measles immunizations
—  the integrity of the cold chain
—  record-keeping (surveillance)
—  diarrheal control program (oral rehydration)
Step 4. Assess water and sanitation programs, including
—  amount of water supplied
—  quality of the water
—  type of latrines in use
—  personal hygiene habits of people
Step 5. Assess the logistics system, including:
—  availability and suitability of transport
—  availability of fuel
—  storage space in the logistics system
—  availability of grain milling facilities
Step 6. Identify labor-intensive income generating 
projects that can be started quickly.
Step 7. Assess potential for alternative food security 
programs (e.g. cash for work, food for work, 
etc.).
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Selecting the Assessment Team
An assessment team should be made up of people 
qualified to evaluate and report on the priority areas. 
Comprehensive assessment should be carried out by three- 
or four-person teams. The following configurations could 
be used.
TEAM CONFIGURATIONS
3-PERSON TEAM
Function Profession
Health and Nutrition Nurse-Nutritionist 
or Physician 
Engineer or Planner 
Logistician
Water, Sa 
Logistics
nitation, (Shelter)
4-PERSON TEAM
Health and Diarrhea 
Nutrition and Feeding
Nurse or Physician 
Nurse-Nutritionist, 
Dietician
Water, Sanitation (Shelter) 
Logistics
Engineer or Planner 
Logistician
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Chapter 13 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
Throughout famine relief operations, agencies will experience 
a variety of issues that slow progress or confuse the situation. 
These are common and understanding them can provide some help in 
overcoming them.
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Assisting famine victims in the midst of a conflict is one of 
the most politically sensitive activities that relief agencies will 
carry out. In cases where the government is one of the parties in 
a civil conflict, agencies are often placed in the difficult 
position of having to deal with government authorities who are 
unwilling or hesitant to provide assistance to people whom they 
consider "enemies". In many cases, government actions or policies 
may be root causes of the conflict.
The fact that relief agencies must often provide assistance 
from the government's side of the lines can lead to charges that 
they are not neutral. This is especially a problem when NGOs are 
operating as part of a broad UN operation. Many liberation groups 
mistrust the UN because they must work with the knowledge of the 
host government. However, the reality is that the majority of 
assistance provided to famine victims in conflicts is delivered 
from the government's side since most people displaced by the 
famine and fighting tend to migrate to government-controlled areas. 
This is for a variety of reasons —  they tend to follow normal 
migration routes, try to use family ties, and stay in areas where 
their language is spoken. The main reason, however, is that they 
move towards the most viable economies, i.e., where the best 
opportunities for jobs are found. Migration is as much an economic 
survival strategy as flight from conflict. The displaced must earn 
a living; since they cannot rely on international relief, they must 
go where the economy is functioning.
LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
It is often difficult to reach famine victims with assistance. 
In many cases, they reside in remote areas where access is 
difficult and transportation may be poor. The topography may be 
rugged and seasonable rains may make surface transportation 
hazardous and difficult. In conflict zones, security conditions 
may prohibit or severely restrict travel. In areas adjacent to 
conflict zones, security conditions may be marginal at best, 
especially for the displaced.
In these situations, full attention must be given to advance 
planning. It will often be necessary to stockpile supplies in, or 
near, the areas where people are going so that shortages do not 
occur during times when the areas are isolated by conflict or 
climatic conditions.
In some cases, relief agencies may have to rely on 
extraordinary means of transport. Garrison towns may have to be 
supplied by aircraft and on-site management may also require the 
use of small planes to move quickly over vast areas where needs can 
change instantaneously. Emergency operations are often said to 
require planning in three dimensions: air, land and sea. However, 
operations planners should be aware that long-range relief 
operations, especially when aircraft are involved, are extremely 
expensive. Emphasis should be placed on procuring as many relief 
supplies as possible from local or nearby sources. It is often 
possible to use a broad range of market interventions that can have 
the same results as bringing large amounts of relief supplies from 
outside the affected area. (See Chapter ____.)
"STRUCTURAL" PROBLEMS IN THE RELIEF SYSTEM
Many relief workers talk about the "international relief 
system". However, no unified system exists. Rather, there are a 
variety of organizations that provide different types of assistance 
at different levels. They band together formally or informally as 
necessary. Some organizations act in the capacity of fund raisers 
and donors. Some provide funds directly to the famine victims 
while others fund local agencies.
Within this ad hoc structure, there are many difficulties. 
NGOs are the primary operating agencies. While many have a wide 
range of capabilities, most specialize in a limited number of 
services. Many of the most important technical fields where lives 
can be saved are routinely overlooked. For example, only a handful 
of agencies have the capability of providing water and sanitation. 
Few agencies are experienced in setting up and maintaining the food 
logistics systems required for providing massive food aid and, 
within the international community, no agency is specifically 
tasked with providing protection or security to the displaced.
Because of these "structural" deficiencies in the relief 
system, responses in critical areas are often ad hoc and 
uncoordinated. Added to this is the fact that the international 
assistance system is vastly overstretched. Needs have grown beyond 
their ability to meet all requirements. Experienced personnel are 
often transferred from one operation to another before their 
original assignments are completed. While the agencies need to 
build up cadres of emergency management personnel, the inconsistent 
nature of emergencies and the funding patterns of relief agencies 
preclude such measures.
DEALING WITH FOOD SHORTAGES
Often, relief agencies or governments are faced with 
situations where shortages of food supplies will cause deaths. In 
these situations, the person in charge must decide quickly how to 
equitably distribute the available foods and keep deaths to an 
absolute minimum.
Relief administrators have three choices. They can:
1. Give a fixed percent of the population a full ration and 
accept the resultant mortality;
2. Uniformly reduce the rations by a fixed percent; or
3. Reallocate the food according to need.
In the first method, the food available is determined and 
rations sufficient to feed X percent of the population at normal 
levels. That percentage will receive the normal intake; the rest of 
the population will receive nothing. This is shown in Figure 13-1 
below. For example, if there is a 20 percent shortfall in food, 80 
percent of the population will receive adequate nutrition and 20 
percent will die.
Figure 13-1
In the second method, the authorities supply a reduced ration 
to all the people. This strategy is referred to as "hard 
rationing."
In the third method, which is called the "fair-share" 
strategy, food is distributed throughout the population according 
to need; adjustments are made for such individual differences in 
requirements as size, work, age, sex, and pregnancy. If the total 
amount of food available is only a percentage of the normal 
requirement, all people will receive a reduction equal to that 
percentage of their normal food ration.
Each strategy will result in significantly different patterns 
of survival rates as shown in Figure 13-2, which is a comparison of 
the hard rationing and fair share strategies and their effect on 
survival.
Figure 13-2
To understand the graph, let us look at an example. Suppose 1
1 Manetsch. T.J. "On Strategies and Programs for Coping with 
Large Scale Food Shortages." In Robson (Ed.), Famine: Its Causes, 
Effects and Management. 1981.
for a given population there is enough food to feed ninety-nine 
percent of the people at a normal rate on a continuing basis. In 
the first strategy, 1 percent of the people would not receive 
enough food to survive. Yet if we were to reduce everyone's ration 
by only 1 percent, as in the hard rationing strategy, all would 
probably survive if the food distribution were equitable.
At the other extreme, suppose that we have a food shortage of 
99 percent and only 1 percent of the food supply is available to 
feed the same population. In this case, the survival rate would be 
1 percent on the first distribution strategy while 100 percent of 
the people would die using hard rationing or a fair-share 
distribution.
Comparison of these two curves on the graph suggests that 
fair-share can result in higher survival rates in a number of 
cases, but that beyond a certain point, that strategy would result 
in a higher percentage of deaths. In our examples, that point 
occurs at the 50 percent level. In actual practice, where that 
point occurs is determined by many extraneous factors including the 
amount of food being supplied, the supply mechanisms employed and 
the planned over supply allowance for children that is built in to
most relief rationing schemes. (See Chapter __) Generally, the
crossover point between the two strategies is at about the 40 
percent of food shortage level.
Additional strategies for stretching good supplies include: 
Better Targeting
This can be accomplished by using more accurate recipient 
targeting methods (which would include weight-for-height
measurements) for selecting families. Some food requirements in 
some areas could be reduced by 10 to 20 percent if the agency got 
more accurate data on the needs of individual families.
Using Nutritional Status as a Determinant for Issuing Food Rations
This approach can be used when nutrition-based feeding 
programs are in use. If food supplies are scarce, the authorities 
can use a persons nutritional status as a means of determining how 
much food a family should be given. The program would provide full 
rations to families until children (who are used for monitoring 
overall nutritional status) have reached 90 to 100 percent of the 
weight-for-height standards for three months. At that point, 
rations could be reduced 10 percent per month until the allocation 
is 70 percent of the full ration. If the children show no further 
deterioration at that time, rations could be reduced to 50 percent 
for an additional three months. If no deterioration in the child's 
nutritional state occurs, he or she could be phased out of the 
program.
This approach is based on the following assumptions: 1) that 
family food needs are not constant and change over time; 2) that
while a family receiving food changes will be occurring in the 
overall food supply; and 3) that food serves as income support 
allowing the family to build up small cash reserves that will be 
used to buy food to supplement the ration. It would be very 
unusual if food had to be supplied to the same family for over six 
months.
Reducing Rations in Areas Showing Major Improvements in Food 
Production or Only Marginal Deficits
Since famines shift geographically, it will probably be 
necessary to shift the assistance program to meet needs. If famine 
indicators are monitored monthly, it should be possible to detect 
the passage of acute famine conditions and begin reducing rations. 
As the price of food declines and people regain the ability to 
purchase food, rations can be gradually reduced to 70 to 75 percent 
of the normal amount. Continuing to give full food rations could 
have a negative effect on local market prices in recovering areas 
and impede production. Food in these recovering areas should be 
phased out as soon as practical and be sent to other areas.
Reducing or Halting Food Distribution Immediately After Harvests
Some food is produced even in the worst famines. When those 
crops are harvested, food distribution should be cut back or even 
temporarily halted for one to three months. (The period of 
suspension should be adjusted based upon the amount harvested.) 
This would allow the normal market to function as usual and would 
ensure that food distribution would not have an adverse impact on 
those areas where limited recovery is taking place.
Discharging Healthy Persons from the Rolls
In many instances, people are kept in feeding programs, or 
continue to receive assistance, long after they have been 
nutritionally rehabilitated. When food supplies are scarce, program 
administrators should closely monitor people in the program and 
discharge healthy patients as soon as they have recovered. Those 
who are discharged can then be enrolled in income support projects 
(cash-for-work, food-for-work).
All of the above strategies for stretching food depend upon 
strict nutritional surveillance and the monitoring of all 
communities in the program. The more accurate weight-for-height 
measuring method needs to be used in these strategies.
Program staff should be alert for the problem of "rotating 
beneficiaries." This occurs when people who have been nutritionally 
rehabilitated are phased out of the program too soon or without 
adequate means for maintaining their nutritional status. After 
leaving the program, they quickly deteriorate and several months 
later require readmission.
FOOD SELECTION ISSUES
Cultural Acceptability
The foods donated to famine victims often are not suitable or 
desirable to the recipients. This is a very real and unpleasant 
aspect of food aid. Relief workers have reported on numerous 
occasions that foods have been refused because they did not fit 
into existing dietary patterns. Although people who desperately 
need food sometimes accept unfamiliar products for a short time, 
they are more likely to reject the food outright, even in states of 
severe malnutrition. In addition, the diseases that often accompany 
famines may further reduce the willingness of a community to eat 
unfamiliar foods. In some cases, unfamiliar foods can lead to 
diarrhea, which further complicates the human body's ability to 
respond to a feeding routine.
On several occasions foods were first refused, then accepted, 
and then rejected again. These experiences usually occur after the 
first energy needs have been satisfied during a long-term food 
relief program. When this pattern exists, however, it prevents 
total nutritional recovery and can result in large numbers of 
people hovering on the borderline of starvation.
To help food donors select the appropriate foods during a food 
emergency, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN has 
prepared a provisional list of foods eaten in a number of 
countries. This report, titled "List of Major Foods Consumed in 
Selected Countries," is available from the FAO in Rome from the 
Food Policy and Nutrition Division. It should be in every relief 
worker's reference library.(3)
Mixing Foods to Balance Diets
A growing concern among relief nutritionists is the lack of a 
balanced diet in relief feeding programs. It is generally accepted 
that for emergencies the central foods in the food basket should 
include a grain, a source of protein and oil. But individuals also 
need a good mix of vitamins and minerals. In many areas, children 
do not receive enough vitamin A and have problems with their eyes 
as a result. In a number of recent operations, scurvy, a disease 
that results from vitamin C deficiency, has been seen in relief 
camp populations. Pellagra, a niacin deficiency has shown up in 
corn consuming populations when lime is not used to break down the 
outer shell of the corn's kernels. And in one camp in Thailand, 
beriberi broke out because the people had not received adequate 
supplies of vitamin B which is usually obtained from eating green 
leafy vegetables.
The diets of most societies have evolved over many years of 
practice and assumed some degree of nutritional balance, even the 
m°st basic diets. Often what people do not receive nutritionally 
from the main staples, comes from condiments and spices. A 
practical way to start planning a diet for famine victims is to
examine the people's normal eating patterns and try to build around 
them.
Table 13-A lists sources for vitamins and minerals.
Table 13-A
Food Sources of Vitamins and Minerals
Boredom with Diets
Relief diets —  especially those without spices —  are often 
boring. In some refugee camps in Sudan in 1985, people were given 
a simple meal of bread, oil, and pulses (beans, peas, etc.) for 
months on end; relief agencies reported that many people lost 
interest in eating. Famine workers observed the same phenomenon in 
Ethiopia in 1974.
The best solution is to vary the diet, adding a different mix 
of vegetables and fruits as often as possible. But if food supplies 
are limited, providing a variety of spices may be the best 
short-term solution. That way, at least the taste of the food 
varies. In the Ethiopian case, relief workers distributed a local 
spice called burpali. Spices and condiments are rarely in short 
supply and can be readily purchased in local markets.
DEPENDENCY CONCERNS
Relief programs should be alert to the possibility that 
long-term food aid might foster dependencies that could ultimately 
lead to greater hardships for famine victims. Many agencies believe 
relief efforts should switch from dry ration distribution to 
food-for-work or similar mechanisms to reduce the likelihood that 
dependencies will be created. Another way is to close out all food 
distribution programs and switch to a variety of cash-for-work and 
cash-based development assistance. Special emphasis should be 
given to promoting agricultural recovery and stimulating food 
production.
There are two types of dependencies associated with food aid: 
perceived and situational.
Perceived dependency is an attitude. It can result from 
apathy, lethargy, frustration, and, commonly, paternalism. 
Development agencies are most concerned about the latter two, 
frustration and paternalism. They often result from programs that 
last a long time, have little input from victims, and continuously 
provide free goods and services. The victims often find it more 
convenient not to work; it is easier to receive food than to work 
to produce the food that would remove them from the distribution 
rolls. Perceived dependency syndrome exists when disaster victims
refuse to participate in self-help activities, when they demand 
they be given more, or when they won't participate in food-for-work 
or similar programs.
While this behavior is frustrating for relief agency 
personnel, it is not too serious. It may indicate that an excess of 
food aid is going into the community or that some of the people on 
the food rolls could be excluded. It usually is a sign that people 
are taking advantage of a program or the benevolence of the donors 
rather than that a true dependency exists.
Situational dependency is an economic situation in which 
forces created by the relief program have disrupted local economies 
and food production cycles. Situational dependency should be of far 
more concern to relief agencies. Three types of dependencies can be 
created: individual dependency, local economic dependency, and 
national agricultural dependency.
Individual dependencies occur when people are able to obtain 
more food from relief programs than they can by working at their 
normal endeavors. There are hidden disincentives in relief projects 
that tend to discourage food production. If a farmer can earn more 
food working in a food-for-work project than he can toiling in his 
fields, and if the work project requires that he spend most of his 
time on the project, he is unlikely to till his fields. If this 
occurs during the planting season, he could become dependent on 
food aid for the remainder of the year. For this reason, salaries 
in cash- and food-for-work programs should be lower than normal 
wages. If they are equal to or higher than normal, the relief 
agency may find itself the principal employer in the area.
Local economic dependency is a far more serious situation. It 
occurs when food aid distributions affect the agro-economy of a 
community. If large amounts of food aid are distributed throughout 
the year, local farmers may find a depressed market after harvest. 
If they cannot sell enough food to recoup their investment or buy 
seeds for the following year, they may be forced to seek work off 
their farms. This results in less production the following year and 
further lowering of the overall harvest level. When this occurs, 
more people may be forced onto the relief rolls. A cycle of 
dependency can eventually develop.
National food dependency occurs when the amount of food being 
imported brings food supplies in the country up to a level that is 
more than the amount normally grown nationwide. Even if that level 
is still less than the total food need, food prices nationwide may 
drop below the cost of production. This is because commercial food 
sales normally make up the difference between food production and 
total demand. If imported food continues too long, it may replace 
some of the commercial imports and lower prices thereby creating a 
disincentive to local production. National dependencies are not 
usually the result of famine assistance programs, but of normal 
food aid imports but they sometimes start in the aftermath of 
famine assistance programs.
The following steps can help reduce the likelihood that 
dependencies will be inadvertently created by food aid programs.
Careful targeting of food aid.
Using caution in establishing food-for-work programs.
Utilizing a food store/coupon approach in lieu of 
food-for-work.
Phasing out food aid as quickly as possible whenever 
feasible. Experimental reduction of food aid linked to 
food production should be tried continually.
WOMEN'S ISSUES
The majority of adult famine victims are women and most of 
these are heads of households. In many programs, especially in 
conflict zones, women and children make up two-thirds to three- 
quarters of the population. Yet most relief programs have a 
distinct male bias. For example, many loan programs are less 
effective because women are not eligible to apply. Other programs, 
such as food-for-work, are often predicated on males being the 
primary breadwinners.
Women's programs tend to be minimal; few go beyond handicraft 
projects or small cottage industries. No program of assistance for 
displaced persons will succeed unless it is designed to involve 
women in decision-making at all levels.
Women in Income Support Projects
Women make up half the rural work force and are involved in 
most agricultural activities. Their working hours tend to be much 
longer than those of their male counterparts —  they are 
responsible for taking care of the family, working in the fields, 
helping with the livestock, collecting firewood and water, all in 
addition to maintaining the home. They frequently share the 
responsibility of bringing in an income. Because of the lack of 
technology, even the simplest tasks can be burdensome and 
time-consuming, requiring great physical labor and limiting the 
woman's ability to participate in social and economic development. 
This results in an under-utilization of a productive sector of the 
population.
In planning income support projects, consideration must be 
given to increasing women's participation. Projects should be 
designed so that women can continue their necessary daily 
activities at home. Activities should take place close to the home 
or village and should not require that every participating woman 
spends the entire day on the job; hours should be flexible so that 
women with dependent households can attend to other 
responsibilities. Projects should also introduce new technologies
to help women reduce their daily burden. For example, rural women 
are traditionally responsible for fetching firewood. This can 
consume several hours each day, especially when the people are 
living in peri-urban or refugee camp environments: the nearby trees 
will soon be depleted and people have to go farther each day to 
find wood. Introduction of more efficient wood-burning stoves
would make the task easier (and help slow environmental 
degradation).
Women can participate in anything men can do so long as their 
tasks do not involve heavy labor. The following summarizes the 
considerations for projects that will facilitate women's 
participation:
—  They should be close-to-home activities.
—  They should be in accessible areas.
They should require only a few hours a day.
They should not involve unusually heavy labor.
A child-care program should be established to enable 
mothers to leave their infants and young children in 
proper care.
Types of projects appropriate for women include:
Earth-moving projects in which dirt and gravel need to be 
carried. This includes terracing, road building, and 
clearing sites for construction projects.
—  Tree planting in reforestation projects.
Clearing light brush for farmland or reforestation 
projects.
Maintaining windbreaks.
Most aspects of small building projects including 
clinics, outpatients facilities, mother-child health 
(MCH) centers, schools, and community centers. Women can 
be involved in tasks ranging from ground-clearing to 
roofing.
—  Helping with the production of cooperatively produced or 
marketed crops, such as roasting and turning coffee beans 
or winnowing and thrashing wheat.
Operation and maintenance of day-care centers and
involvement in food-distribution center activities.2
PRESERVING PEOPLE'S DIGNITY DURING FOOD RELIEF
Dependency is a problem of the spirit more than anything else. 
Receiving free food for long periods can rob people of their 
dignity and self-esteem. To avoid breaking people's spirits, 
several approaches should be considered.
The first provides work that results in either cash, script, 
coupons, or credit to purchase food. In these cases, food sales 
should be permitted.
A second approach allows people to contribute cash or 
barterable materials for the food they receive. The contributions 
should not be considered a payment for food but a voluntary 
contribution. Nor is it a true hardship for those people who can 
make the contributions. Contributions help people preserve their 
dignity when they are facing pressures that could create perceived 
dependencies.
GENERAL OPERATIONAL CONCERNS 
Coordination
Many of the difficulties in relief operations arise because 
national and international groups haven't coordinated their efforts 
or worked effectively with local governments.3 There are several 
reasons why coordination is difficult. First, agencies rarely agree 
on what approach is the most effective to use in a situation. This 
is particularly a problem when new, inexperienced agencies come 
onto the scene. And second, there are few internationally 
recognized standards for programs. Even agencies involved in 
feeding programs don't agree on the services to be offered and the 
levels of assistance that should be given. If the local government 
or UN doesn't set the standards, there is no basis for 
coordination.
One of the most important actions that needs to be taken 
early in an emergency is the joint development of program 
standards, standard operating procedures, and mutually 
acceptable protocols for programs.
2 INTERTECT, "Ethiopian Food Needs Assessment," Catholic 
Relief Service, December 1985.
3 Cox, W. "The Ecology of Famine: An Overview." In Robson
(Ed.), Famine: Its Causes, Effects, and Management. 1981.
Staffing
An effective relief organization requires more than food and 
medical personnel. The organization also needs technicians to 
conduct assessments and monitor all aspects of the famine; public 
health workers, especially those trained in epidemiology, to treat 
and prevent famine-associated disease; logistics and communications 
personnel to handle the acquisition, transport, and distribution of 
materials; business and economics specialists to handle financial 
matters and give advice on the integration of the relief activities 
into the local economy; and liaison personnel to mesh relief work 
with the local civil authority. An effective operation requires 
that relief workers with little knowledge of the local scene be 
brought in and trained quickly, that a large variety of food and 
other materials must be mobilized from distant sources, and that a 
fleet of vehicles of some size and diversity must be deployed and 
maintained. Under those circumstances, one can appreciate the need 
for a large organization with a wide mix of capabilities.
NOTES
1. De Waal, Alex, Famine that Kills, Darfur, 1984-85, Save the 
Children Fund, 1987.
Bang, F.B. "The Role of Disease in the Ecology of Famine." In 
Robson (Ed.), Famine: Its Causes, Effects and
Management.[incomplete footnote]
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Chapter 14
FAMINE OPERATIONS DURING CONFLICTS
Denying food to one's foes to try to weaken their resistance 
is a tactic as old as war itself. The sieges of the Middle Ages, 
for example, were often characterized by attempts to starve people 
inside their walled cities into submission. In the civil and 
separatist conflicts of the latter part of the 20th century, 
withholding food has become even more widespread as a tactic. And 
when it comes from a government trying to starve segments of its 
own people, as it often does, it has an unprecedented viciousness.
It is perplexing why the tactic is still used after all these 
centuries. Ultimately, it is a failure. All the great military 
strategists, from Clauswitz to North Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nyien Giap, 
have said that making war on the civil population solidifies the 
opposition and stiffens their resolve. No war has ever been won by 
starving the enemy's civilians; those bearing arms will always be 
the first to receive food. Even the indirect effects, such as 
famine's impact on morale, are greatly overestimated. During the 
U.S. Civil War, enlistments in the Confederate Army increased 
during Sherman's scorched earth campaign, so much that they more 
than compensated for desertions. In some cases, the enlistees 
wanted revenge; in most, they knew that the Army was the only 
source of a good meal.
In spite of what military history has shown, relief officials 
are constantly having to provide famine assistance during today's 
proliferating conflicts. For the most part, the strategies for 
famine assistance are dictated by the politics of the moment, as 
well as the military situation. In recent years, however, a number 
of approaches have been developed that might be applied in other 
situations. Before discussing them, however, let's take a brief 
look at some of the recurring patterns and consequences of war that 
have an impact on relief operations.
From an operational point of view, the two most important 
constraints created by war are the collapse of the normal food 
marketing system and the massive displacement of the civil 
population. In their dislocation, people may have been forced to 
abandon their convertible assets, hastening the onset of famine 
conditions. Their inability to buy food and the collapse of the 
market system means that an artificial food distribution system 
must be set up in many cases. This does not rule out income support 
programs, however. In fact, food will still be available within the 
conflict zone but at abnormally high prices, especially if it's 
being hoarded by wholesale merchants.
Displacement complicates relief operations in many ways. 
People may migrate within the conflict zone. They may move to areas 
outside the zone but within the country. Or they may seek asylum in 
a neighboring country. Each migration pattern requires a different
set of approaches and each approach, if successful, will influence 
what options people may seek when they are displaced.
The fact that displacement rarely follows a predicable pattern 
makes it difficult to strategically place counter-famine resources. 
Pockets of need may develop over a wide geographic area and may 
shift dramatically as people are forced to flee. Combatants may 
destroy of confiscate food, creating instant food shortages that 
cannot be foreseen. In this environment, the need for a strong and 
flexible logistics system is paramount.
People tend to congregate at relief camps. And the failure of 
relief agencies to find alternative living situations for them 
poses other problems for supplying emergency aid. High density 
camps require massive infrastructures be set up to provide basic 
services, such as water, sanitary services and shelter. The term 
camp is a misnomer; it is a community with the same needs as a 
town. There are alternatives, but few agencies use them.
In many cases, displaced persons migrate to urban centers in 
search of jobs. They usually form, or move into, squatter settle­
ments on the periphery of towns and cities. Obtaining food is less 
of a problem if the city is outside the conflict zone. People can 
find work and procur food in most urban areas. Food deficiencies 
will occur periodically, but the problem is usually hunger, not 
famine.
People migrating to cities within the conflict zone are 
another matter, especially when they go to "garrison towns" that 
are surrounded by opposing forces. In this case, famine conditions 
usually exist in the settlements of the displaced.
Crowding in both camps and settlements makes another problem 
worse: communicable disease. As we have seen, when people are 
nutritionally weak, it is difficult for them to resist many 
diseases. If a disease breaks out in these dense, dirty settle­
ments, it can spread rapidly.
The movement of food is the major factor determining the 
success of a famine relief operation during a war. As we have 
noted, logistics is complex, costly and slow —  and, in war, it is 
even more so. Adjusting and redirecting food supplies to meet 
changing needs can be a frustrating exercise and is often a no-win 
situation. For this reason, agencies should be alert to alternative 
ways of freeing food supplies in, and adjacent to, the conflict 
zone. They should constantly seek alternatives to artificial 
distribution systems. One should never assume that there is no food 
available —  experience shows that there will always be some even 
in the worst situations. The problem is how to get it released and 
flowing into the hands of the people who need it.
There are three situations relief agencies are commonly faced 
with: 1) operating at the perifery of the conflict zone on the 
government's side; 2) operating from the perifery on the
government's side sending relief across the lines (cross-line 
operations) and 3) operating from a neighboring country into rebel- 
held areas (cross-border operations).
OPERATIONS ON THE PERIFERY
Relief operations on the perifery of a conflict zone are 
usually focused on assisting persons who have been forced out of 
the area due to fighting. Typically, feeding centers and temporary 
camps are set up in the first safe place that the displaced stop 
after leaving the conflict zone. In many cases, the people arriving 
are in terrible shape. They are often severely malnourished, sick 
and exhausted from their evacuation. They may have been trauma­
tized by attacks upon them during their journey. And in some 
cases, they may have passed through endemic disease areas for which 
they had no resistance. Typically, large numbers of people will 
arrive without any visible assets, and families may be separated 
from or have lost family members.
In these conditions, emergency assistance and relief are 
required. Typically, large percentages of the people will 
accumulate around a health post, a water point or other rallying 
point, and a camp will evolve. Needs include food, nutritional 
rehabilitation, medical and public health assistance, water and 
possibly protection. Relief agencies can expect the majority of 
the displaced in the worst condition to congregate in relief camps.
Operationally, the emergency phase can generally be said 
to last as long as there are new arrivals and as long as malnutri­
tion, morbidity and mortality rates are above normal. From the 
migrants point of view, however, the emergency phase lasts either 
until they can be assured that their families can live on the 
assistance being provided or they have accumulated enough resources 
to move on to an area where they can find steady employment.
In the initial stages of a conflict, it may be possible for 
the early arrivals to find employment opportunities in nearby towns 
or on local farms, especially if resident farmers have a tradition 
of employing migrant labor or establishing temporary sharecropping 
relationships. But soon, these openings will be taken and the job 
market saturated to a point where the wage scale is sufficiently 
depressed that subsequent arrivals must move outward in search of 
jobs and income. A viable strategy to reduce the burden on relief 
agencies and to help hold people in the area is to try to increase 
the availablity of jobs in the area. This can be done by initiating 
cash-for-work projects, a variety of community development 
programs, etc.
Another strategy that has been used with some success is 
called "paired villages." In this approach, the non-resident 
population (the displaced or returnees) are formed into new 
"villages" that are then moved to, and paired with, existing 
villages inside the enclave. Relief agencies provide a range of 
assistance to help the outsiders integrate into the local economy
in ways that are mutually beneficial to both communities. The 
ultimate objective is to achieve a symbiotic relationship between 
the two.
The program should be carried out on a village-by-village 
basis. First, potential host villages are identified in areas 
where additional labor could increase agricultural or economic 
productivity. Village leaders are then queried to determine 
whether they would accept the establishment of a temporary 
settlement adjacent to their village. In return for accepting the 
people, the host village is assured priority for development 
assistance to their village.
When a village agrees to accept the newcomers, families are 
formed into groups according to their original village, area of 
origin, or ethnic group. Then they are taken to the new site, where 
they receive temporary food rations, materials to build shelters, 
and assistance designed to help them integrate into the community 
and economy.
At the same time, the relief agencies provide comprehensive 
assistance designed to help the two communities coexist. The first 
activity is usually upgrading or expanding water supplies, then 
expansion of health services, public works projects to improve the 
local environment, agricultural extension and rehabilitation 
assistance, and construction of schools or other facilities —  all 
in accordance with priorities established with the local leaders.
This approach has many advantages for both the people and the 
relief agencies. There are, however, some potentially serious 
implications that should be recognized not the least of which is 
the liklihood that the host village will exploit the temporary 
residents.1 The factors that are likely to determine the success 
of the approach are:
the selection of villages that 1) can absorb the new 
population and 2) can accept the newcomers with a minimum 
of intercultural conflict;
—  capacity of the local economy to absorb new workers;
—  the degree to which the host population remains receptive 
to the outsiders (which often depends on how much aid 
they receive.
—  the degree to which the non-residents' former village 
lifestyle and social systems can be maintained.
On the whole, however, paired settlements is a workable strategy.
1See: Cuny, Frederick C. , "Paired Villages," INTERTECT, 1988.
CROSS-LINE OPERATIONS
Cross-line Feeding Programs
In cases where battle lines are well defined and it is diffi­
cult for people to cross between opposing forces, it may be 
possible to negotiate a cross-line feeding program. An example of 
such a program is the "Northern Initiative" which was set up in 
Ethiopia in 1985 to feed famine victims in the conflict zones in 
the north. A number of large NGOs were selected to operate the 
program on behalf of the donors —  they were perceived by all 
parties as being neutral. One part of the program, operated by 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Eritrea, is representative.
The long war in the north, which began in the 1960s, had made 
progressively deeper cuts in the area's food production. To make up 
for the shortages, a number of relief agencies began a cross-border 
supply operation from neighboring Sudan (see the section below).
As the Ethiopian famine developed in the early '80s, major 
donors began to consider increasing the level of support for the 
cross-border program. The overall potential of the program to meet 
the increasing needs was limited, however, by logistics problems 
and the tonnages that could be delivered. Furthermore, the 
Ethiopian military periodically threatened to cut off the 
operation. It was not too great a threat at the time: the small 
scale of the operations made the convoys difficult to intercept. 
But the threat could become more important if the operation grew in 
size and conseguently became more visible.
By late 1984, the famine situation in northern Ethiopia had 
reached such proportions that hundreds of thousands of people were 
streaming into Sudan, and millions more were estimated to be in a 
critical situation in the rebel-held areas. The people had two 
choices: moving into relief centers in the government-held areas, 
or moving westward and crossing into Sudan in search of food. Both 
options were seen as disruptive. As long as the refugees or 
displaced persons were being fed in relief centers, away from their 
villages, chances for agricultural recovery were minimal.
In response to the situation, a number of relief agencies 
sought permission to initiate feeding programs from bases in 
government-controlled areas. After much negotiation, the Ethiopian 
government agreed to a program that would place food at the forward 
edge of the government lines; local villagers would be allowed to 
pass through the lines to collect food and return it to their 
communities. It was hoped that this program could feed a 
significant portion of the famine victims and keep people from 
becoming refugees or displaced persons.
The CRS program, which was carried out through the Ethiopian 
Catholic Secretariat, worked as follows: local priests were 
permitted to cross the government lines to visit villages in the 
famine zone and estinmate need. Village elders were asked to
identify people in the villages who needed food and to prepare 
lists. The lists were submitted to CRS logisticians, who then 
prepared estimates of the monthly tonnages required. Based on these 
estimates, CRS trucks delivered food to churches located at the 
edge of the conflict zone. On appointed dates, church workers then 
took food stocks to designated sites that government troops 
withdrew from. Then village representatives came through the lines 
to collect the food and transport it to their villages. In the 
village, the elders were responsible for ensuring that the food 
reached the intended beneficiaries.
The priests were permitted to cross the lines to monitor 
distribution in the villages, although monitoring was always 
problematic. At the height of operations, about 3,000 MT of food 
per month was being distributed by CRS in Eritrea for a target 
population of 200,000 people.
The Northern Initiative was not the only way food was provided 
in the rebel-held areas; in addition the cross-border operation 
from Sudan delivered 3,500 tons per month, an airlift to several 
garrison towns supplied MT, air drops from low-flying 
transports delivered 1,500 MT and a food supply operation of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross provided 2,600 tons. 
Therefore, it is difficult to accurately judge the overall impact 
of the program. However, it must be conceded that the Northern 
Initiative was an important factor in increasing food supplies in 
the famine zone.
The most serious constraint on a cross-line program is the 
difficulty in monitoring food distribution. In the CRS program, the 
priests who crossed the lines had neither the time nor the 
resources to interview more than a few selected families or observe 
the distributions as they occurred. It would have been difficult 
for them to detect abuses, food diversion, etc., unless the 
practices were widespread. The distribution at the village level, 
therefore, could be affected by intentional diversion, withholding 
of supplies, or outright thefts. Even more probable, unintentional 
distribution problems could have been caused by a combination of 
inaccurate weighing or measuring of the food as it was distributed, 
and poor record-keeping on the part of those responsible for 
distributing the food.
There is a major logistical constraint on this type of 
program: the areas from which the food is distributed must usually 
be government-controlled. In more rugged terrain, the maximum 
distance that people are willing to go for the food is 
approximately a three-day journey. In areas where governments 
control the roads, there may be pockets where the people are not 
receiving food because the distances are too far.
Market Based Approaches (Spill-Over Strategies)
In some cases, it may be possible to increase food supplies in 
the markets on the edge of the conflict zone. As supplies increase,
prices decrease. At some point, traders from the famine zone or 
those who can pass safely through the lines will purchase the food 
and transport it back into rebel-held territory. This approach, 
called "spill-over," requires some degree of caution when selling 
the food in the periferal markets; there is always the danger that 
prices could be depressed so low that it undercuts local farmers.
One way that local producers can be protected is to set up 
special arrangements for traders who are willing to run the risks 
of carrying the food into the conflict zone. This can be done by 
selling to designated traders from special supplies set aside for 
the purpose. The prices would be low enough to make it worth the 
risks.
RELIEF STRATEGIES IN REBEL-HELD AREAS
In many countries, rebels effectively control the countryside. 
Government troops venture out of their garrisons, usually in the 
larger rural towns, only sporadically. In these cases, a number of 
initiatives can be taken to provide famine relief. The most common 
are shipping food across the border to distribute to the famine 
victims and the procurement of grain from suppliers in or adjacent 
to the famine zone and redistributing them via relief programs or 
market sales. The first program is called "cross-border relief" and 
the second "internal purchase." Once the food arrives in the famine 
zone, how it is distributed depends a lot on the degree of security 
in the area. If it is relatively secure, food distribution 
patterns are similar to those used in areas outside the conflict 
zone.
Cross-border Relief
In some cases, it may be possible and desirable to deliver 
food into the heart of the conflict zone. The most common 
approaches are: "open roads" programs where relief agencies
negotiate an agreement with both sides to permit convoys to cross 
the border on designated routes to safe distribution points; 
cross-border operations where food is trucked surreptitiously 
(usually at night) from a neighboring country to distribution 
points held by the insurgents; and air supply operations where food 
is flown into the famine zone overflying contested areas. Since the 
first two rely on ground transport, they are the preferred method 
because they are the most effective and least costly.
Perhaps two of the most successful examples of cross-border 
operations were those carrying food from Sudan into Eritrea and 
Tigray in northern Ethiopia. Each operated effectively for many 
years, and they were cited as one of the reasons why relatively few 
Ethiopian refugees came to Sudan during the 1984-1985 Ethiopian 
famine. More importantly, they were was cited as one of the reasons 
why major famine conditions did not break out again in 1987.
The operation was supported by a consortium of agencies with 
offices in Sudan and Europe that raised funds, procured food, and 
monitored the program on behalf of the donors. All transport and 
delivery was handled by indigenous relief organizations afilliated 
with the rebels. The overall strategy was to provide food to people 
in their villages so that they would not have to relocate in times 
of severe shortage. In 1988, transport capacity for the Tigrayan 
operation averaged 5000 MT per month. Food supplies were 
transported across the border by vehicles of the Relief Society of 
Tigray (REST) from storage facilities in Sudan. There was a central 
transit facility approximately 100 km from the border; from there 
routes branched out to ten distribution sites in western and 
central Tigray. The farthest point in the system was approximately 
500 km from the border. With this operation, almost 400,000 people 
received food on an emergency basis.
The primary constraint on cross-border operations is security. 
When operating over wide areas, it may be possible to conceal the 
routes and make deliveries without much danger. In small, confined 
areas, however, the chances of being detected increase, and losses 
can be high enough to force alternative approaches.
The delivery of food should be only one part of an agency's 
assistance program. The cross-border operation in Tigray was, at 
its best, only one of several approaches being used —  cash 
distribution to families with vulnerable children and internal 
purchases were carried out simultaneously.
Internal food delivery projects require donors to make a major 
leap of faith: most assistance requires support and sometimes 
participation by the insurgents. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
establish some degree of accountability. For example, Biafran 
authorities in the Nigerian civil war (1967-70) did an excellent 
job distributing the aid flown in there. Likewise, most donors have 
been satisfied with the way food aid was distributed by the 
Eritrean and Tigrean groups in northern Ethiopia.
Perhaps the most important question is: does the assistance 
reach the intended beneficiaries? The answer might seem 
straightforward —  if the aid doesn't reach the beneficiaries, 
they'll move. But conflicts may prevent movement; for this reason, 
careful monitoring is necessary.
Agencies undertaking internal delivery programs without 
government sanction must also be aware of the logistical 
difficulties. Private contractors may be reluctant to risk their 
own vehicles in such a situation; therefore the agency may have to 
buy and maintain a fleet of trucks. Because deliveries will be off 
main roads and often over difficult terrain, those vehicles will 
need to be rugged ones. And much time and attention will go into 
maintenance. Above all, the vehicles should be considered 
expendable —  invariably some will be lost to hostile action, taken 
by rebel forces for their own use, or torn up by road conditions.
Agencies must also recognize that their food aid efforts will, 
in the eyes of the government, put them on the side of the 
insurgents —  humanitarian neutrality in a civil war is a 
distinctly Western concept, not necessarily welcome in the Third 
World. If the agency has other relief or development programs in 
the country, the government may sharply curtail them when the 
agency begins to operate in rebel areas.
In spite of these problems, cross-border food deliveries are 
important. Providing food, directly or indirectly, helps keep 
people at home. If access to food declines as a result of the 
conflict, displacement will increase and mortality will rise. Any 
strategy that can help reduce displacement is an important element 
in reducing the number of deaths.
Internal Purchase
In many situations, the purchase and distribution of 
internally available food reserves is a viable alternative to 
imported food aid. In most conflicts and famines, the amount of 
food available is far more than outsiders realize. Often cereals, 
pulses and livestock may be available. Since famines are usually 
the result of market disturbances and conflicts have the effect of 
disrupting normal marketing, food is often trapped in pockets where 
it cannot be sold or transported as usual. In internal purchase 
program, a relief agency locates sources of supply, imports cash 
(local currency) to buy the food and then purchases and 
redistributes the food either by selling it at lower prices or 
giving it to relief agencies or committees in the famine or 
conflict zone to distribute through selective feeding or targeted 
food programs.
Internal purchase has many advantages. It is faster than 
importing food, is less costly, and can usually be managed by a few 
people working with local merchants and traders. Usually, once 
merchants start to release food that they are hoarding, others will 
also start to sell, especially if the agency is reselling the food 
to local vendors at low prices. Thus, the primary advantage is 
that it can help to reactivate the normal market system.
The food obtained through an internal purchase operation is 
often more compatible with local tastes than imported foods. When 
the food is sold, the proceeds can be used to buy more food or to 
support cash-for-work projects that give the poorest an chance to 
earn money to participate in the sales.
While the acquisition of internal food supplies is often more 
effective than external food aid, it is very important to be sure 
that buying and distributing local food reserves does not 
significantly disrupt the local economy. For example, villages 
outside the famine zone may produce a surplus. However, if villages 
adjacent to them are producing at a marginal or subsistence level, 
the adjacent villagers may depend on that surplus for their own
protection. Remembering that famines shift geographically, it is 
important to carefully analyze food availability.
IMPLEMENTING AN INTERNAL PURCHASE PROGRAM
Step 1: Assess whether food is available in the country
to meet local needs.
Step 2: Inform the local authorities that you intend to
conduct a feasibility study for the internal purchase.
Step 3: Establish an assessment team.
Step 4: Determine the amount of food available for purchase
by assessing the gross surplus and subtracting the amount 
required for local needs and local trade.
Step 5: Identify the implementing agency.
Step 6: Assess the availability of local currency and the
steps required to convert hard into local currency.
Step 7: Assess the availability and requirements for
transportation, storage, and containers.
Step 8: Determine the maximum contract size, identify local
sellers, and develop a list of sellers and the location(s) 
and amount(s) of their supplies.
Step 9: Evaluate the feasibility of the program by comparing
the time and cost factors to those of importing food, and 
assess the logistical needs of the operation.
Step 10: Inform the local and/or national authorities of 
your intent to proceed; enlist their support for the currency 
exchange and obtain taxation information from them.
Step 11: Proceed with the actual purchase:
a) Determine the amount of food to be purchased.
b) Convert and transport the currency.
c) Prepare contracts.
d) Negotiate with sellers.
e) Develop purchase and distribution plan.
f) Conduct purchase.
INTERNAL PURCHASE IN TIGRAY: A CASE STUDY
Continuing insurgency, as well as political and logistical 
problems, made providing relief food to the 1.5 million 
affected people difficult in the Tigray province of northern 
Ethiopia. In Novmber 1984, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) 
determined that 25,000 MT of grain usually sold to Eritran 
buyers or held in reserve by merchants, was available in 
western Tigray. REST appealed to donors to provide 
currency to procure the grain for distribution to famine 
victims.
The donors were hesitant at first. Several were suspicious 
about the severedity of the famine if food was available.
Since REST was affiliated with the Tigray People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF), the insurgents who control the area, the 
proposal required working outside government channels.
Most donors were reluctant to give hard currency to buy the 
food.
The cost of the grain was high, more than in Europe or the 
U.S. It was feared, however, that food from abroad could not 
arrive in time to save lives. Thousands of people were 
preparing to migrate to Sudan or other areas, and starvation 
was already occurring in large areas of the region. Thus, the 
acquisition of available grains seemed a necessary 
intervention. With some hesitation, church agencies in 
Europe provided $200,000 for the first purchase.
Planning and implementation was primarily undertaken by 
REST, which identified the merchants, determined average 
prices, and supervised transportation, storage, and 
distribution of the grain. Initially, purchasing was carried 
out jointly by REST and a donor representative.
The purchase proceeded smoothly, though there were problems. 
Original plans called for procurement of 10,000 MT of sorghum, 
which left a sizeable amount available for local needs and 
trade. However, during the time it took to convince donors to 
proceed, the available surplus dwindled to 3,000 MT, and the 
prices rose. The exchange of currency was difficult and 
cumbersome. Hard currency was sent to Sudan, drawn from the 
bank in cash, and transported to the border, where it was 
converted into Birr, the Ethiopian currency. Birr was 
available only in small notes; hence, the bulk carried was 
considerable. As the program continued, the supply of notes 
dwindled and often delayed the program.
Even with these problems, the program was rated an overall 
success in the short term. It was estimated that food arrived 
months earlier than imported food. Since that time, donors 
have continued to support the program during periods of 
scarcity and an efficient system of procurement has developed.
The long-term impact of the program, however, is not clear 
since it is not known what role donor intervention plays in 
the market economy.
Operations in Border Enclaves
Another type of cross-border operation increasingly faced by relief 
organizations is support to people in border enclaves. Often large 
numbers of civilians displaced by fighting accumulate in enclaves along 
the border of a neighboring country. These groups may include a 
homogeneous ethnic or political group or may represent a variety of 
minorities, political factions, ex-soldiers, and other disparate groups. 
Some may cross the border to seek asylum as refugees but in many cases 
a larger number will stay in their own country, possibly slipping back 
and forth across the border to seek food and assistance.
The reasons why they remain in their own country are often mixed: 
some will stay because they do not trust the government of the 
neighboring country, some fear being put in refugee camps, others may be 
waiting for other members of their family, village or group to catch up. 
And in some cases, the people may be under restraint by armed factions 
operating in the area.
There are several categories of people who may need assistance. 
They include:
refugees who have crossed the border into the neighboring 
country;
displaced persons who have congregated but not crossed the 
border (they are often found in a variety of spontaneous 
encampments along the border);
—  people who have been affected by the conflict deeper inside 
the country but who have not fled their immediate areas;
refugees who fled the country then quickly decided to return 
(ricochet repatriates); and
villagers who find it increasingly difficult to survive 
because of increased competition for resources in the enclave.
Until recently the conventional approach was to encourage the 
neighboring country to grant people unrestricted asylum so that the 
people could come out and receive protection and assistance until they 
could be repatriated in safety. However, the current thought among many 
relief practioners is that if the situation is safe enough for them to 
stay inside the enclave, it is generally desirable that most of the 
people do so. The determinants of whether this strategy should be 
pursued are:
the degree of safety and security that is likely to exist 
during the peoples' stay in the enclave (and whether 
operations in the area will make the enclave a target);
whether sufficient supplies can be delivered to support the 
population in the enclave (the displaced plus the host 
population); and
the degree of cooperation and flexibility that armed factions 
within the area extend to the relief agencies.
The reason why this strategy is being increasingly advocated is 
straightforward: relief agencies usually have a freer hand in helping 
the people than if they were admitted as refugees. Despite a variety of 
international conventions and protocols designed to promote assistance 
and protection, the reality is that few host countries welcome refugees 
and most are increasingly harsh in their treatment of them. Most 
refugees are placed in squalid refugee camps without adequate food, 
water or sanitary services;2 they are restricted from working, and face 
a long, debilitating existence where they are increasingly marginalized 
and disenfranchised. Relief agencies operating in border enclaves can 
often pursue a wider range of options to assist the people and can help 
them attain a larger degree of self-sufficiency than would be possible 
in a refugee camp setting. Furthermore, the government of the 
neighboring country can usually be persuaded to permit relief agencies 
to operate from their border and stage relief into the enclave —  
they'll overlook the issue of national sovereignty and all other legal 
issues to keep the refugees out.
Both the United Nations and International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) are often unable to provide effective assistance or 
protection for people in enclaves since their operations require 
permission from the host government. But that government is not likely 
to give its permission to foreign agencies to establish an international 
presence in areas outside its control. Thus the task usually falls to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are not constrained by 
international agreements like those that govern the UN. If the
population is not too large and the major donors support their 
operations, NGOs can usually provide the services that are required.
Operations in enclaves usually require a multi-pronged approach:
1. Assistance to refugees who have crossed the border.
This is necessary for both humanitarian reasons as well as to 
keep the host country off the agencies' backs. Primary 
responsibility for assistance and protection of refugees in
2Recent comparisons of mortality among refugees and those who 
remain behind in conflict areas show that in most cases, the people 
would have had a higher chance of survival if they had stayed in 
the conflict zone.
the country of asylum lies with the host government and the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees.
2. Assistance to communities that have been impacted by the 
influx of refugees.
This is usually accomplished through a "refugee affected areas 
program" carried out by UN, Red Cross, and private relief 
agencies. This program has two purposes, to equalize the 
amount of assistance being given in the border area so that 
resources are not drawn out of the enclave into the 
neighboring country and to take the pressures off the host 
government so that they will give the relief agencies more 
freedom to operate.
3. Assistance to displaced persons (and returnees) who have moved 
into the enclaves.
Assistance is provided via a mix of "cross-border" relief 
programs. Relief operations are usually organized by NGOs 
(possibly working in conjunction with the ICRC — though this 
is often not possible —  or with UNICEF3) . Food and relief 
supplies are staged across the border using a combination of 
approaches, including:
direct relief, where agencies take food and medical 
assistance across the border and deliver it to the 
people;
—  a "take away" approach, where designated representatives 
of villages or other specific groups of people come to 
designated relief points along the border and pick up 
food to take back to their people;
market interventions, where food is sold to merchants to 
take back to village markets for resale. The proceeds of 
the sales, which would be in the local currency, are then 
put back into the community via cash-for-work schemes, 
employment of public workers, agriculture and livestock 
rehabilitation activities, etc.
4. Assistance to villages in the enclave affected by the influx 
of displaced persons (and/or returnees).
Villages in enclaves are affected not only by increased 
competition for resources such as water, but may also be 
subjected to increased insecurity (both from armed groups 
among the displaced as well as from attacks by the government 
or other combatants) . They may also be cut off from their
3UNICEF is le one UN agency that can work in non-government 
controlled areas as its mandate gives it the right to work in any 
environment in which children are in danger.
normal markets in their own country and the neighboring state, 
thus impoverishing the people and increasing their 
vulnerability to food shortages. Because of these, it is 
important to tailor relief programs to include the resident 
population and meet a variety of their needs; if this is not 
done, they may be displaced themselves. Focusing on the 
resident community early in the assistance effort will also 
relieve many of the pressures that will quickly develop on the 
displaced population and help the relief agencies obtain 
cooperation from local leaders.
After a short period of relief operations in the enclave, the focus 
should shift to longer term, more development- and rehabilitation-style 
projects and activities. For example, schemes should be explored to 
provide farmers with small plots of land to work until they can return 
to their own land (alternative land leases) . All programs in the enclave 
should be designed so that they can be operated by the people themselves 
with minimal intervention from the relief agencies.
Some of the programs which can be undertaken in enclaves are:
1. Market interventions;
2. Internal Purchase;
3. Agricultural inputs distribution;
4. Direct food relief (via cross-border food deliveries);
5. Livestock interventions (including purchase and 
redistribution, market support, and veterinary services 
(vaccination); and
6 .
7.
Reentitlement (short-term employment, usually through cash- 
for-work projects)%
Operations in border enclaves can often provide a workable 
alternative to asylum and can help the displaced temporarily live 
relatively productive lives in dignity and in an environment where they 
have more control over their own lives. If security and resources 
permit, it may be possible to draw refugees back into the enclave 
through spontaneous repatriation. However, it must be recognized that 
security is paramount; if people feel threatened they will quickly 
abandon the enclave and may seek refuge in the nearby country. Agencies 
working in enclaves should be prepared for sudden changes that could 
completely alter the nature of their work, increase or decrease the 
caseload, and, possibly, undo months of work. On the other hand, 
enclaves that remain calm can sometimes provide a basis for expanding 
the area of relative stability and can be a means of stimulating talks 
to resolve the conflict.
OPERATIONAL CONCERNS IN CONFLICT ZONES
Any operation into rebel-held territory is likely to be fraught 
with problems, not the least of which is targeting and monitoring the 
assistance. Income support programs may be accused of providing cash 
that will eventually end up in the hands of the insurgents; claims will 
be made that food aid will be skimmed off by fighters and not given to 
the intended people. In many cases this may be true, but experiences 
thus far have shown that it has negligible impact on the overall 
military situation —  mainly because the militants will have already 
obtained the food they need, and the relatively small amount of currency 
that would be skimmed off, especially if it is local currency, will have 
little value on the international arms market.
Dealing With Liberation Movements
A major constraint in helping people in rebel-held areas is that 
organizations must deal with an anti-government group. Officially, the 
United Nations can only do so with the concurrence of the government. 
This means that many opportunities to help famine victims lost. In some 
cases, it is possible to get the government's agreement to make limited 
contact with the insurgents. While it may not be comfortable with these 
arrangements, there are advantages to them which they recognize. With 
patience, it should be possible to establish a wide range of contacts, 
either directly or indirectly, with rebel groups even in the midst of 
intensive military campaigns. Over time, it may be possible to 
negotiate point-by-point agreements of what can and cannot be done in 
areas that rebels control, or in which they are operating, that will 
permit agencies to provide support in contested areas. It is important, 
however, to take special care that projects launched from the government 
side are not co-opted as pacification efforts or come to be viewed by 
the rebels as supporting pacification. The specific modalities of 
working with rebel groups, or their supporters, must be undertaken with 
utmost care and every effort must be made to ensure that all sides 
approve specific projects or activities.
Food Distribution Problems in Conflict Zones
When food is distributed during a conflict without supervision by 
relief workers, a number of problems are likely to occur. But spot 
checks can detect many of them. For example, the measuring devices used 
to distribute grains are usually tins that have been roughly cut and 
marked to use as scoops. Since the villagers have no way of knowing how 
much the scoops are supposed to measure or how to calculate the volume 
being dished out, it is possible for some food to be skimmed regularly 
at the distribution point. In remote areas, distribution teams may 
charge the local people for delivering and distributing the food. People 
responsible for preparing distribution lists may demand a kickback for 
putting a family on the distribution roll. And, in some villages, food 
may simply be "taxed" by, or voluntarily diverted to, insurgents.
The most likely problem, however, is bogus recipients on the food 
rolls. Registration officials should be chosen for their honesty and
then thoroughly trained. During the registration process, spot checks by 
supervisors should be carried out wherever possible.
Choosing Foods for Programs in Lawless Areas
In areas where programs are plagued by banditry and looting of food 
supplies, agencies should carefully consider the foods that they will be 
trying to supply. If the foods have become a target of the thieves, it 
is probably because they have relatively high value on nearby markets. 
In Somalia in 1992, relief agencies imported rice, wheat grain, and 
vegetable oil for their famine feeding programs. These were commodities 
that the more affluent Somalis favored in normal times. They also had 
long shelf lives, could be easily stored (or hoarded) for long periods, 
and were ideal food for soldiers. Since the Somali shilling was 
virtually worthless, it was better to hold those foods than money. 
Thus, it was no surprise that relief food quickly became a target. When 
bandits realized that the relief agencies and the political factions 
were powerless to stop or punish the looting, widespread attacks on 
relief shipments and stores began to occur.
To stop the thefts, the relief agencies decided on a two-pronged 
approach. They began by selling the higher valued commodities to 
private traders to take and sell in the markets at reasonable prices4 
then switched the foods in the free feeding programs over to lower value 
and less preferred commodities such as blended foods with a shorter 
shelf live and grains that the Somalis grew themselves, like sorghum.
Controlling Price Fluctuations in the Periferal Areas
The arrival of large numbers of displaced famine victims will 
probably increase food prices in the periferal areas even though they 
may not have enough money or goods to purchase food for a sustained 
period. It usually will be necessary to intervene in the markets and to 
initiate income support projects to ensure the poor can buy food. As a 
rule, eligibility to participate in income support projects should not 
be restricted to the displaced alone; rising food prices will affect the 
local poor as well.
Cash-for-work should be the primary approach because if the people 
can buy food, the merchants in the area will quickly bring more food 
into the area to meet the increased demand thereby reducing the need for 
relief food. In many cases, this may be the fastest way to get food to 
the displaced. Indirect food distribution programs (such as food coupon 
stores and food-for-work) can also be initiated.
4 The proceeds from the sales were used to fund cash-for-work 
projects organized by NGOs.
